The History of British Trotskyism to 1949
being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of Hull
by
Martin Richard Upham, B.A., M.Sc.
September 1980
PREFACE
Trotskyism has been neglected by historians excavating those ever
more popular quarries the 1930s and 1940s. Their disinterest is my main
case for devoting a full-length thesis to Trotskyist activity before
1949. It may be objected that Trotskyism was unimportant throughout my
chosen period. But while it was certainly no major influence before
1949, even in the restricted area of the labour movement during that
time, Trotskyism maintained activity and conditioned in part the
behaviour of other movements and individuals who are thought fit
subjects for historical enquiry. There is therefore a job of recovery
to be done in order to establish whom Trotskyism affected and why. Yet
there is, simultaneously, a larger question to pose: if Trotskyism was
unimportant throughout, why was this so? There is no iron law of labour
movements which inevitably permits communist parties to eclipse
Trotskyism. In a number of metropolitan countries Trotsky received
early and significant support from noted communist leaders. Since this
did not happen in Britain where the communists themselves never
gathered mass support, the historian must ask why. It is also necessary
to allow for those occasions when Trotskyism passed out of the shadows
into the floodlights: these moments have also been skipped, for the
most part, by historians, and need to be put in their proper setting
within the labour history of the time.
My claim to have undertaken original work rests chiefly on the lack
of secondary material on the subject. The main lines of development of
the Trotskyist movement laid down in this thesis I have derived from
contemporary manuscripts and published material, and from conversations
with participants. Invariably my investigation took me from a working
knowledge of labour movement history into uncharted waters. Sometimes I
floundered and occasionally I was misled by red herrings: at all events
I had to make my own charts and I hope they will help others. Yet I do
not seek to give the impression that there has been no secondary work
at all. How do I relate to what has been written? The last five years
have seen a spurt of scholarly interest in the non-communist left of
the labour movement. Two theses on the I.L.P. have been written which
span a period similar to that of this thesis and discuss Trotskyist
influence on the party. [1] At the end of 1979 a thesis by John Archer was completed covering Trotskyist movements between 1931 and 1937. [2]
Since I had at that time a first draft of my own thesis, I did not, on
the advice of my supervisor, read Archer’s work. There has also been
written a shorter bibliographical thesis on the Trotskyist press by
Alison Penn which is a useful tool although it lacks absolute
authority. [3]
Published work which discusses British Trotskyism in whole or part
falls into two categories. There are the articles written by Brian
Pearce under a variety of pseudonyms some twenty years ago, several of
which have now been republished. [4] Pearce always went to the sources and unearthed many forgotten episodes or facets of better known events. Hugo Dewar’s Communist Politics in Britain
(1976) is broader though less sure in content but only marginally
concerned with the Trotskyists. Reg Groves has published his
recollections as The Balham Group
(1974), an invaluable memoir which yet leaves much unsaid. Harry Wicks
has also written briefly of the early years of Trotskyism. [5] Wartime and the controversy over Military Policy (q.v.) have stimulated interesting articles in the socialist press. [6]
Finally there have been accounts of the post-war controversies within
the Fourth International arising from European economic recovery. [7]
Consigned to the not recommended category must be those squibs
written by political activists in order to cancel out the past or to
justify the present: I have responded to these by seeking to establish
fact and demolish myth but they are mentioned in my bibliography.
It seems to me that the history of Trotskyism in Britain has a
natural periodicity. There was no organised movement in the 1920s. The
years to 1938 when the Fourth International was launched were in
Britain years of survival and sectarianism. Toeholds were established
but conditions were most unfavourable for the gathering of support.
From 1938 to 1944 there was a contradictory development as the official
British Section of the Fourth International splintered repeatedly and
finally ceased to be a coherent political force, while an unofficial
group, regarded as a pariah by official Trotskyist opinion, built the
strongest position yet for the movement in Britain drawing to it some
who were disaffected and others who were new. The process was thus
simultaneously one of fission and fusion. 1944 to 1949 were years when
the Revolutionary Communist Party declined as its perspectives collided
with reviving capitalism and it was progressively debilitated by
internal disputes. Just as in the 1930s, but now for quite opposite
reasons, there were no major industrial conflicts and this absence
blighted Trotskyism’s prospects. My argument is that the major
influences on the British working class were established at the
beginning of the 1930s while Trotskyism was still incipient. Only the
peculiar political conjuncture induced by the war permitted Trotskyist
growth. The end of the war brought a return to traditional political
loyalties, the objects of which had not yet been tested to the full.
There was simply no room for a strong Trotskyist organisation and all
the characteristics accurately or unfairly imputed to it were secondary
in effect to the brutal centripetal tendencies of the British labour
movement.
1. P.J. Thwaites, The Independent Labour Party, 1938-50 (University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1976); G. Littlejohns, The Decline of the Independent Labour Party, (University of Nottingham MPhil. thesis, 1979).
2. J. Archer, Trotskyism in Britain: 1931-1937 (Polytechnic of Central London Ph.D. thesis, 1979).
3. A.M.R. Penn, A Bibliography of the British Trotskyist Press (University of Warwick M.A. thesis, 1979).
4. See M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce, Essays on the History of Communism in Britain, 1975.
5. H. Wicks, British Trotskyism in the Thirties, International, Vol.1, No.4, 1971, 26-32.
6. W. Hunter, Marxists in the Second World War, Labour Review, Dec. 1958, 139-46; B. Farnborough (B. Pearce) Marxists in the Second World War, Labour Review, April-May 1959; D. Parkin, British Trotskyists and the Class Struggle in World War 2, Trotskyism Today, March 1978, 27-30.
7. Notably P. Jenkins, Where Trotskyism Got Lost, 1979.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This thesis was begun as a piece of research in the Summer of 1972.
In the eight years that have passed since then I have been helped in my
research by a great many people. Whenever I needed it I have been
assisted by my supervisor John Saville, who read critically whatever I
wrote and made me a little less unscholarly than I originally was. It
was he who was responsible for acquiring the Haston Papers, now lodged
at the University of Hull, and who cleared the way for me to research
them. Latterly, he carefully read my penultimate draft and his comments
were always stimulating. I am deeply in his debt. Equally responsible
for my research falling into the minority category of completed
doctoral theses was my wife Chitra who encouraged me to take up anew a
project which had all but lapsed and who transformed my scribbled first
draft into clear typewritten pages. I also owe a huge debt to Sally
Boston, Assistant Librarian of the University of Hull, whose
responsibility it has been to classify the Haston Papers. She was
heroic in coping with the arrival of a researcher so soon after they
were deposited and helped me on countless occasions, sometimes at some
personal inconvenience. To their names must be added those of Joyce
Bellamy who put me to work to acquire the rudiments of scholarship on
the Dictionary of Labour Biography even before my
research officially began and from whom I continued to learn, together
with those of David Rubinstein and other members of the Department of
Economic and Social History at the University of Hull with whom I have
had many rewarding discussions.
Among the others who have helped me, especially in the early stages
of my research, were such former and continuing activists as John and
Mary Archer, Margaret Johns, Brian Pearce, Sam Bornstein, Sam Levy, Reg
Groves, Harry Wicks, John Goffe, Ted Grant, Jock and Millie Haston, Roy
Tearse and Sid Bidwell. My thesis would have had a very one-dimensional
character without their help and – not infrequently – their
hospitality. I have been most fortunate also in the help I have
received from the staff of a number of libraries. Much of the early
reading was undertaken in the Brynmor Jones Library of the University
of Hull where I was able to feast off strong Labour and socialist
history sources. I am grateful also to Richard Storey, Senior Projects
Officer of the Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick, and his
present and former staff on whom I often descended and demanded vast
numbers of photocopies. This was of critical importance for one who had
to work in his spare time. Special mention must also be made of
Margaret Kentfield, Nick Wetton, and the staff of the Marx Memorial
Library, an institution geared, in its opening hours and desire to
place the minimum of obstacles between reader and source, to the needs
of those who are not full-time students. I also worked at the L.S.E.
library and that of Nuffield College at the University of Oxford, at
the British Museum Reading Room and at its Periodicals Library in
Colindale, at the Public Records Office and the Fitzwilliam Library,
University of Cambridge.
In my first year of work I was maintained by the Social Science
Research Council on the recommendation of the Department of Economic
and Social History, University of Hull. In my second year I was
fortunate to receive an award of equivalent value to that from the
S.S.R.C. from the A.J. Horsley fund at the University of Hull. For a
short time after the completion of that year I worked on a part-time
basis for the Dictionary of Labour Biography under the direction of
Doctor Joyce Bellamy and Professor John Saville of my department. After
that I encountered the vicissitudes of completing this kind of work
under part-time conditions, constrained by absence from easy access to
a community of scholars and a good library and by being unable to
devote the whole of my mind to the project. It was therefore of
tremendous assistance that I should be granted by my employers, the
Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, a sabbatical leave of two calendar
months in the Summer of 1980, during which time I was able to devote
all my time to writing the penultimate draft. Mr. Bill Sirs, the ISTC
General Secretary, showed no hesitation in granting me leave although
my request came at a critical moment in the Union’s fortunes.
Finally I am deeply indebted to Carol Tarling who quickly mastered
the intricacies of thesis lay-out and the almost unfathomable mysteries
of my handwriting to present me with a finished product which is a
pleasure to the eye.
LIST OF APPENDICES
A. A Note on British Trotskyists and Spain.
B. Reg Groves and the Aylesbury Divisional Labour Party (1937–1945).
C. Articles in Workers International News While it was Published by Workers International League (January 1938–February 1944).
D. Peace and Unity Agreement (1938).
E. Industrial Programme of Workers International League.
F. Trotskyism and the I.L.P.
G. Programme of the Revolutionary Communist Party.
H. War Cabinet. The Trotskyist Movement in Great Britain – Memorandum by the Home Secretary.
A NOTE ON REFERENCES
In the footnotes to the text I have tried to reduce details in
references to the minimum consistent with precision. Where possible
details of references are given in full in the bibliography. There are
no references to works published after 1979 at which date the first
draft of the thesis was complete.
In the footnotes and in the bibliography the following abbreviations occur:
BSSLH: Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History
Inprecorr: International Press Correspondence
JCH: Journal of Contemporary History
JSLHS: Journal of the Scottish Labour History Society
PQ: Political Quarterly
Unless otherwise stated in the bibliography, the place of publication is London.
Introduction
TROTSKY AND THE BRITISH LABOUR MOVEMENT IN THE 1920s
|
The failure of Trotskyism to establish a presence in the 1920s is to
be explained partly by reference to the character of the Communist
Party of Great Britain and partly by the quality of British Marxism
itself. Lack of interest in theory and the absence of intellectuals who
would make major contributions to Marxist thought had already separated
Britain from the Continent before 1914. [1]
Detachment from ideological controversy was carried over into the
infant CPGB, whose formation had been the subject of historical debate.
[2]
Respect for Trotsky as a revolutionary leader spanned the labour
movement spectrum at the start of the decade. By the end it had
narrowed to liberal and independent socialist intellectuals. The
Communist Party, which had promoted him enthusiastically up to the
middle 1920s turned, with the Comintern, away from him. For the Labour
Party, twice in government, he was too revolutionary. Trotsky had
support against both parties, but no organised following. The low level
of Party life, incomprehension at the debate within the Russian Party
and the Comintern, a lack of intellectuals among the membership [3],
all might be urged as reasons why the Communist Party produced no
Trotskyist opposition for nearly ten years. The Party observed the line
from Moscow until the late 1920s when a combination of Comintern
pressure and a rank and file revolt precipitated a leadership purge.
Support for Trotsky came from outside the Party, from people who had
stayed aloof from the attempt to build a Bolshevik Party in Britain or
who had taken part and then left as individuals. [4] In neither case were they the people to organise a movement. Until 1930 Trotsky was left in Britain only with admirers.
No one in Britain in 1923 grasped the significance of the clash
between the Left Opposition and the Russian Communist Party which burst
into the open that year. In other countries there were fierce disputes
within the Communist Parties over the critique advanced by the
Opposition in its platform. [5]
In Britain this did not occur. Lenin’s death in January 1924 physically
removed from Russia an influence neutralised for some time. Since the
battle between the Party leadership and the Left Opposition continued,
pressure began to build up for national parties to declare themselves.
The British Communist press, like the bourgeois press, was at first
content to report. [6] This was, after all, not the first instance of debate within the Russian Party. Inprecorr, originating from Moscow, mirrored developments there more closely and, moreover, without a timelag. Trotsky’s views on the New Course were printed as well as those of Stalin and Zinoviev, [7]
but Trotsky’s progressive isolation would soon be apparent.
“Trotskyism” as an identifiable phenomenon was categorised as such by
April 1924. [8] But the Comintern journal Communist International ran no campaign against Trotsky until the broad offensive after the General Strike, and he himself was still a contributor. [9]
However, British representatives at the Fifth Comintern Congress in
July 1924 endorsed the condemnation of Trotsky’s attitude by the CPSU.
although no discussion in the CPGB had yet taken place. [10]
In November 1924 a definite lead was given in Inprecorr as Russian and foreign communists began to react to Trotsky’s The Lessons of October. [11] A sequence of rubbishing articles was begun which lasted until 6 February 1925. [12] Trotsky’s introduction to The Lessons of October only appeared after three months. No reader of Inprecorr
could possibly doubt, after such a sustained onslaught, that this was
more than an ordinary policy difference. The British Party reacted
swiftly to the debates at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern. On 30
November, a party council approved the stand on Trotsky adopted there
and in the CPSU. [13] Within a week Tom Bell had published the first authentic British article against Trotskyism. [14] Yet at this point the party leaders had not read The Lessons of October [15]
and that certainly meant that the membership, in general, had not read
it either. One exception was Arthur Reade, member of the London
District Committee and business manager of Labour Monthly,
who read German and had access to Comintern documents. He knew
Trotsky’s views and expounded them at classes he gave to the Battersea
Young Communist League. [16]
He and several of these young communists attended the Party’s London
aggregate meeting of 17 January 1925 to hear Andrew Rothstein and other
speakers. When J.T. Murphy put down a resolution endorsing the Party’s
condemnation of The Lessons of October, Reade moved an amendment from
the London District Committee supporting the Opposition and regretting
the haste with which the Party Council had taken a stand. [17] He was defeated with ten or fifteen votes in support. [18] But an attempt was made to delay the vote until the case for both sides had been put and this fell by only 81 votes to 65. [19]
The meaning of these votes seems to be not an endorsement of Trotsky’s
views by a minority of London communists, but a fairly widespread
feeling that party leaders had been too eager to put themselves on
record. England could join the triumphant list of countries where
Trotskyism was completely isolated [20],
but it was the manner rather than the ideas of the leaders which had
occasioned protest. Yet Rothstein’s article of a week later suggests by
its title more alarm among the party leaders after the aggregate than
before. [21]
The introduction to The Lessons of October was published on 26 February 1925. [22] By then, however, the attack on Trotskyism had broadened out and stretched back in time. [23]
Bell published Trotsky’s 15 January letter to the central committee of
the Russian Party with a preamble arguing that its rejection proved the
Party to be still a Bolshevik one. [24]
He and Gallacher attended the extended plenum of the Executive
Committee of the Communist International, which met from 21 March to 6
April. [25]
They took no part in the debate on theoretical matters, but in the
eleventh session, devoted to Trotskyism, Bell followed Treint and
Neumann in a speech composed entirely of slogans. [26]
The British delegates supported a motion calling for a drive against
deviations to be conducted by all parties. Back in Britain Reade had
been suspended from the London District Committee of the Party
following the January aggregate. He appealed, but was turned down by
the Party Executive on 26 April. [27]
Some time after this he left the Party and the country. Perhaps the
first British Trotskyist had departed, apparently making little
impression. The Seventh Party Congress of the CPGB met at the end of
May, and Bell implemented the ECCI decision by moving a motion agreeing
with the Russian Party Central Committee in its estimate of Trotskyism
and the measures taken against it. [28] There was now published The Errors of Trotskyism by Bukharin and Kamenev, a reply to The Lessons of October, with an English edition introduction by J.T. Murphy. [29] It has been suggested that, even at this late date, the British Party leaders had seen only a summary of Trotsky’s book [30] and indeed this was what was published with The Errors of Trotskyism.
There would be no support for Trotsky from Party leaders when he was
out of step with Moscow, though for more than a year he was to remain a
legitimate figure with the British Party. With a minor manifestation of
Trotskyism in the CPGB dispelled, support for the Opposition leader now
appeared outside the Party. [31] The response to Lenin (1925) illustrated the point well. Reviewers in the Party press tended to regret Trotsky’s loss of form. [32] Communists writing in non-party publications were hostile. [33] The ex-communist M. Phillips Price was friendly, [34] and Frank Horrabin was able to enjoy himself over communist inconsistency. [35] This divergence was important now and later. Many of the independent Marxists around The Plebs met Max Eastman [36]
during his 1924 stay in Britain following a twenty one months spell in
Russia. Eastman had met Trotsky in Russia and witnessed the debate
around Opposition criticism of the Party programme, details of which he
must have passed on. In the spring of 1925 he published Since Lenin Died. [37]
Though formally disowned by Trotsky, Eastman offered a detailed
account of the clash within the Russian Party during the last two years
– the only one available. He analysed Lenin’s suppressed Will,
with its celebrated member by member assessment of the CPSU Central
Committee. He reproduced a passage on Trotsky from Lunacharsky’s Revolutionary Silhouettes. It was a definite and radical challenge to the prevailing version of recent events in Russia. [38]
The Communist Party was accustomed to speaking with authority about
the Soviet Union. Eastman could be the butt of unqualified attacks. For
tactical reasons Trotsky had disowned the book [39]
and Party reviewers in Britain therefore took the line of separating
author from subject. Arthur MacManus bracketed Eastman with Party
renegades Price and Levy. “Under the guise of defenders of Trotsky”
they were all attacking the Russian Party. [40] Jackson predicted that Trotsky would be furious at the way his name had been used. [41] Palme Dutt ridiculed the book. [42] The Party went to some lengths to separate Eastman from Trotsky which suggests considerable embarrassment. [43] The belief that Eastman’s account might be true and Trotsky deserving of sympathy surfaces only in the non-party press. [44]
Support from outside the Party was a mixed blessing when it was offered
by lapsed members. Nor did it provide any profound analysis of what had
taken place in Russia: Postgate, for example, expressed the wish that
the two factions might speedily be united and win success for the
revolution. [45] A journal like The Plebs
might be an alternate outlet for news, but was not likely to provide
fundamental criticism of the kind Trotsky himself had offered in The New Course. He was defended as a revolutionary hero, not as a theoretician, [46] a point sometimes overlooked. [47] The communist press continued its attempts to clarify the status of Eastman’s book well into the summer. [48] After the controversy died, [49] the British Party seems to have been uncertain about Trotsky’s status. He could still be reviewed [50] but articles published were not on immediate issues. [51]
It was only his decision to devote his next important book to Britain
which brought him again to the attention of the communist press.
Though certain subjects were taboo, Britain was not one of them. [52] Where is Britain Going?,
a sparkling polemic against British labour and trade union leaders and
their gradualist philosophy was published in February 1926. It was
published not by the Party but by George Allen and Unwin who attached a
preface by Brailsford. [53] Where is Britain Going?
was very much part of Trotsky’s case against Comintern policy. It
appeared during a phase of the struggle in Russia between the Joint
Opposition and Stalin and Bukharin. It did not handle roughly the
British Party’s support for left wing figures on the TUC General
Council, but Trotsky later wrote:
“The book was aimed essentially at the official conception of the
Politbureau, with its hope of an evolution to the left by the British
General Council, and of a gradual and painless penetration of communism
into the ranks of the British Labour Party and Trade Unions.” [54]
It has been suggested that the British Party did not understand the book. [55]
No other communist had written anything as relevant for the year of the
General Strike, however, and it was well enough suited to the party
mood after May for a second edition to be published. Trotsky confronted
the entire working class leadership, left and right. His critics were
the party’s critics, and he wrote as a party member. The CPGB could
only rally to him.
Where is Britain Going? scattered its shot so
widely as to stimulate many of its victims into print. Norman Angell
was provoked into writing a full length book to show “the futility of
revolution”. [56]
For MacDonald, Trotsky was a pamphleteer not an historian, a devotee of
theories not a slave to facts; he had concocted “an oriental riot of
fancy regarding facts and events”. [57]
Brailsford in his introduction to the first edition, had observed that
the imprisoned CPGB leaders had been sentenced for the opinions
expressed in the book. While allowing Trotsky force of argument,
Brailsford did not believe his Russian approach would convince. Russell
[58]
allowed that Trotsky was “remarkably well-informed” on the politics of
the British Labour movement, but considered that he was advocating an
English revolution for Russian advantage. Lansbury [59]
gave much support to Trotsky while defending himself. Transport
Workers” leader Robert Williams, a former Labour Party Chairman, and
yet another former communist, had been pilloried by Trotsky in the book
for having “ratted”. Like Lansbury he had both to defend himself
against Trotsky and to defend Trotsky against his critics. [60]
Cleverly he pointed out that the charge of renegacy presented by
Trotsky against him was advanced against Trotsky himself by the Russian
leadership two years before. He recalled the persecution of Trotsky and
the suppression of Lenin’s will:
“ ....those in charge of the machine were so afraid of the criticism
of one who had rendered more service to the revolution than all of them
combined that they deliberately suppressed it.”
The non-communist reviewers generally took the line that Trotsky did
not understand the peculiarities of the English. Communist reviewers
believed they detected another common factor in these reactions:
hostility to the proletarian revolution. [61]
Through the reviews of MacDonald and, especially, of Williams, the
fact of Trotsky’s downfall was kept to the fore in the labour movement
press. The Communists, with their front rank leaders in jail and their
attention on the imminent expiry of the coal subsidy showed no public
awareness of Trotsky’s deeper purpose. [62]
His book was a welcome friend at a critical time as Palme Dutt strongly
underlined: “A challenge may safely be issued to the critics to name a
single book by a single English author or politician, bourgeois or
labour leader, which is as close to the essentials of the English
situation as Trotsky’s book”. [63]
Dutt was not prepared to allow the critics a single point, not even
disavowing Trotsky’s claim that the Liberal election victory of 1905
was partially a result of shock waves from the Russian Revolution of
that year. Indeed, he continued,
The English working class has cause to be grateful to Trotsky for
his book; and to hope that he will not stay his hand at this short
sketch, but will carry forward his work of interpretation, polemic and
elucidation, and elaborate his analysis further which is so much needed
in England. [64]
It may be that the British party leaders were mostly dense in
matters of theory. They had, moreover, no public guidance from Moscow,
where it had first been published, as to the attitude they should adopt
to Trotsky’s book. Trotsky’s polemic could only assist those more
astute party leaders who were later to gain control of the party. The
authority of Dutt and Labour Monthly was growing and both must have influenced the reading of Party members. [65]
It soon became impossible to quote Trotsky as an authority, but that
did not prevent borrowing from the theoretical arsenal of one who had
been cruelly vindicated by events.
International developments soon impelled Stalin to decisive moves
against the Joint Opposition in Russia. Repercussions in the CPGB could
not fail to follow. The British crisis of 1926 was merely the current
event on which Trotsky was honing his polemical scalpel to a fine
sharpness. He returned to the subject several times in an independent
way during the General Strike. He pressed especially for severance of
the trade union connections established through the Anglo-Soviet Trade
Union Committee established in 1923. Under the title Problems of the British Labour Movement some of Trotsky’s later thinking appeared in the communist press. [66]
It was a sterilised Trotsky that was allowed into English, free of
uncompromising references to the left members of the TUC General
Council, with whom the Soviets retained a connection until 1927.
In July 1926 Stalin spoke of the British party as being one of the best sections of the Communist International. [67]
He made it quite clear, however, that his commendation did not derive
its inspiration from the party’s influence. It continued to gain
members through 1926, even approaching 11,000, but then shrank. [68]
Yet Britain had held the attention of the entire Communist
International during 1926 and the setback of the General Strike had to
have repercussions. In Russia Bukharin and Stalin increased their
power, while measures were taken rapidly against the Joint Opposition.
Criticism of Trotsky grew more strident. Those who had access to Inprecorr
could follow the new Comintern leaders“ orchestrated attack. Articles
in it were intended “for the widest possible publicity”. Dead disputes
with Lenin were resurrected. Opposition prophecies of doom were refuted
by reference to the greater size and more proletarian composition of
the party. The Joint Opposition was deemed to be a Social-Democratic
deviation, a theoretic consensus with Otto Bauer. Communist International, no longer Zinoviev’s organ, analysed the clash in the USSR, and attacked Trotsky by implication through Zinoviev and Kamenev. [69] Readers of Communist Review
were treated to Bukharin’s lengthy treatment of the Opposition platform
between September and December. The actual words of the Opposition
leaders were available to British communists only through Inprecorr. [70]
Dire warnings were attached that “Field Marshal” Trotsky wanted “to
lead the opposition of all countries” and that the dissidents must
choose between Lenin and Otto Bauer.
Problems of the British Labour Movement had been allowed to
surface in the English pond, but the CPGB was anxious there should be
no misunderstanding about where it stood. [71] On 9 August the political bureau adopted a resolution on the Discussion in the CPSU. [72] which rejected Trotsky’s call to sever the Anglo-Russian Committee and condemned Problems of the British Labour Movement. [73] It was still possible to discuss Opposition ideas [74]
(those that were known), but the leading figures in Russia had little
time left as party members. And in Britain even Opposition views on
economics could be disregarded no longer. [75]
After 1926 it took a determined party member to discover details of
the much abused platform of the Joint Opposition. Communist
International carried no articles by opposition leaders during 1927,
but kept its readers informed about their successive downgrading. Tom
Bell reported to Communist Review on the fifteenth
conference of the CPSU. but, while he witnessed the debate on
Trotskyism and Trotsky’s own speech in it, he passed little on. [76] Those who read Inprecorr would know that the opposition platform was a major preoccupation of the conference. [77]
Bell had spoken in the debate on the Opposition, but he was unwilling
or unable to subject its ideas to any theoretical analysis. He
condemned its factiousness and disloyalty however, and went on to
reassure the Russian comrades:
Though our experience with oppositions is very limited (probably our
time will come when we too shall have to deal with serious political
oppositions) nevertheless, our experience, limited as it is, justifies
our complete identity with the measures taken by the Party of the USSR
to deal with its opposition.
Since there is little evidence to indicate any profound grasp among
British communists of the Opposition platform, Bell’s support for
Stalin rested on a narrow base. Smith, a colleague, attempted to shore
him up with some purely British complaints of substance. He objected to
Trotsky referring to the British Party as a brake on the revolution and
complained that Lansbury, Plebs, and other Lefts were using Trotsky’s call for the exposure of left reformism:
... this group of liquidators, of renegade Communists, of Left
elements in the labour movement, seize with joy on every attack which
Trotsky makes upon the leaders of the Party and of the Communist
International.
Comrade Trotsky’s policy is objectively helping these liquidators,
while the article to which I referred was of direct assistance to them.
[78]
The climax of the clash in the CPSU was ill-reported in the British
communist press: only publicity from outside forced the party to deal
with it in any detail. Trotsky’s own speech to the conference, and
indeed Smith’s, was reported verbatim only in Inprecorr.
What was more, the performance of the more left wing members of the TUC
General Council during the General Strike could only nurture doubts
which Trotsky was free to nourish. The pride of the British party was
punctured. CPGB membership continued to grow after the General Strike
but apparently went into a consistent decline from Autumn 1926 [79]
which was not reversed until 1930. Factors in this decline were the
effectiveness of Labour Party action against the National Left-Wing
Movement a natural depression following the failure of the General
Strike and growing sectarianism on the part of the Party itself. There
were some in the Party who leaned towards intransigence, but their
influence was increased by pressure from Moscow which was displeased
with lack of progress in Britain and at loggerheads with CPGB leaders
over the colonial question. [80]
Malcontents lacked the strength to displace the Party leadership at the
January 1929 Party congress, but this was accomplished with Russian
support at a special congress in December. [81]
The staggered passage into what became known as the “Third Period”
(following the years of revolution and then stabilisation), was
accompanied in Britain by increased vigilance against Trotskyism. The
honour of proposing Trotsky’s expulsion from the ECCI. In September
1927 fell to a British communist, J.T. Murphy. [82]
Murphy’s own Sheffield District telegraphed Moscow endorsing
disciplinary measures against the Opposition leaders and called for
action to further the struggle against war. [83] The Russian leaders were pleased and noted that the British party was innocent of Oppositionism. [84]
When British delegates attended the Moscow conference of the Friends of
the Soviet Union a fortnight after Trotsky’s expulsion from the CPSU,
they took the initiative in moving a resolution (passed with one
opposed), approving the measures taken against him for trying to set up
a second party. Indeed they went further, and demanded “more severe
measures”. [85] Inprecorr
was deluged with anti-Opposition articles: “Trotskyism” was assuredly
the issue of the hour. The British Party ventured into the field of
theory. Jackson, who had written of Trotsky with such awe two years
earlier, now discovered that the Opposition leader’s views on the
danger of reaction were diametrically misplaced. It was, concluded
Jackson, Trotsky himself, with Zinoviev, who represented the danger of
Menshevism and Thermidor. [86]
His colleague Gallacher developed the theme for an international
audience. “In Britain every rotten reactionary, every reformist
trickster, looks with hope to the Opposition’s; which statement he
wisely left without explanatory footnotes, since Smith had been
complaining the previous month that Trotsky handled the Left too
harshly. [87]
Gallacher’s claim that “every attack on the party by the Trotskyists
was hailed with delight in the war mongering press of Britain” would
have proved equally hard to sustain.
There were still traces of interest in Trotsky – pictures on walls, enthusiastic delegates to the Y.C.L. congress of 1928. [88]They
added up to little. The parties had been warned that the exclusion of
Trotskyism from the CPSU must of course, also result in “the end of
Trotskyism in the Comintern”. [89] Rust reassured the international that Trotskyism had no following among “the active conscious sections of the workers”, [90] which verdict was confirmed. [91]
Yet the new broad definition of Trotskyism, obscurely commingling with
reaction, is to be gathered from his affirmation that the British Party
had “tremendous duties” in the fight against it, especially since the
Baldwin government led the Anti-Soviet bloc. [92]
Stalin’s praise for the party gains in significance when the glassy
smoothness of the British Party is compared to turmoil elsewhere.
The Communist press ground on about Trotskyism throughout 1928 and
into 1929. Publicly it now presented Trotskyism as a non-communist
current, supported by reaction and used (consciously or unconsciously)
against the USSR. Original Opposition documents were rare. They were
not being printed in Britain, and were only just becoming available in
English through the efforts of American communists sympathetic to
Trotsky. [93] The only exception (and this partial because of Inprecorr“s
small print run), was the last letter of Adolf Joffe with its
celebrated final words to Trotsky proclaiming that he had always had
the better of the argument politically. But this was forced on the
communists by publication in the Western press, and issued with a
gloss. [94] Periodically, the Communist press would carry further material against the Opposition. [95] The stimulus would invariably be external, as when Rothstein took the opportunity provided by Eastman’s The Real Situation in Russia to reduce to rubble the Opposition documents of recent years. [96]
The CPGB had survived the twenties relatively intact by making the
right noises, but its hour was approaching. Manuilsky wondered: How
does it happen that all the fundamental problems of the Communist
International fail to stir our fraternal British Party? It is not that
the British Communist Party does not pass resolutions or take a stand
upon all important questions. No, this cannot be said. Nevertheless,
one does not feel any profound organic connection with all the problems
of the world Labour Movement. All these problems have the appearance of
being forcibly injected into the activities of the British Communist
Party. [97]
Trotsky intruded once more into British politics in the 1920s, this
time over an issue which would not alienate the liberal intelligentsia
but draw them towards him. He had arrived in enforced exile in Turkey
in February 1929 and shortly began to cast around for a visa. The
possibility of British asylum for him was first raised in the Commons
under the Tories that same month. [98]
He told the press that his favoured place of exile would be Germany but
Britain did appeal since it offered a chance to revisit the British
Museum. [99] He professed puzzlement that the subject of a visa for him should bring the House (of Commons) down in laughter. [100]
Before the second Labour Government was formed, Trotsky received
several celebrities of the left in Prinkipo. Cynthia Mosley was one of
them. She admired him greatly, though her esteem was not reciprocated. [101]
Sidney and Beatrice Webb called on him in May 1929. They were not
impressed by his arguments and disputed that the Labour Government was
obliged to offer him asylum. [102]
The return of Labour to office in May 1929 provided an opportunity
for Trotsky to cash his cheque of goodwill – or at least to discover
the extent of his credit. Two fairly sustained efforts were made to
secure asylum for him in Britain, one in the early, the other in the
dying days of the Labour Government. Those who favoured his entry
included Emrys Hughes who compared his case with that of Marx, and many
ILP branches, who wrote to their Head Office urging his admission. [103] Perhaps in response the Party invited him to deliver a lecture at its party school. [104]
Trotsky requested a visa of the British Consul in Constantinople and
then, in early June, cabled MacDonald. He later wrote to Beatrice Webb
and Snowden, and telegraphed Lansbury. [105]
To the public he declared that he hoped, given asylum, to supervise the
publication of his books in England and to pursue (social) scientific
work. [106]
What was more he had a special interest in seeing if “the difficulties
created by private ownership can be surmounted through the medium of
democracy”. Democracy which planned to overlap the greatest obstacles,
he observed, could hardly begin by denying the democratic right of
asylum. [107]
An impressive list of celebrities of radical England spoke up for
Trotsky’s right of asylum, but the Webbs (Sidney was now a minister),
were crucial exceptions. Beatrice Webb wrote that those who preached
the extension of revolution would always be excluded from the countries
in view. As Caute remarks [108]
she thus indicated her ability to miss the whole purpose of asylum. She
also showed ingratitude for her reception by Trotsky when he was in and
she was out. Of the major British papers, only the Manchester Guardian (which was to befriend him over the years) and the Observer supported his claim. [109] The Times believed his presence in Constantinople a ruse by arrangement with Stalin to screen revolutionary activity in Germany. [110]
Other rumours abounded. There was a general disinclination to take at
face value Trotsky’s protestations that his interest in British asylum
was exclusively personal.
Magdeleine Paz had been among the 280 signatories of a January 1926 complaint to the Comintern about dictatorship in the PCF. [111]
Later, her group Contre le Courant, was an early vehicle for the ideas
of the Left Opposition in France. She now became the central organiser
of a campaign to win Trotsky a British visa, and she it was who put to
the government the strict conditions which Trotsky was prepared to
observe, if admitted. [112]
Clynes hesitated under the pressure and then in July 1929 came out
against a visa for Trotsky. The government seems to have feared that
his entry would provide difficulties for them, found his ideology
distasteful, and worried as to whether, once in Britain, he might be
difficult to expel [113],
Clynes suffered “a chorus of frantic personal abuse” but he had no wish
to jeopardise his relations with Russia and stood firm. Later he was to
find solace for his rectitude in the verdict of the Trials. [114]
There was another attempt to raise the matter in the House in
November 1929, but the second sustained effort to secure entry for
Trotsky occurred in the spring of 1931. Ivor Montagu [115],
who had met Trotsky in Prinkipo, employed George Lansbury as an
intermediary to Clynes. One request was that Trotsky be allowed to
change boats at an English port en route for Norway. [116]
It is now clear that it was certain Labour ministers, rather than – as
might have been expected the Liberal Party, which barred Trotsky.
Samuel (who was related to Montagu), intervened repeatedly, as did
Lloyd George himself. Keynes, Scott, Bennett and Garvin all urged the
government to reconsider its decision. It is noteworthy that there was
stronger support from Labour intellectuals at this time than there was
to be later over the Moscow Trials. Laski protested to the government.
Shaw wrote Clynes a lengthy letter, [117]
and joined with Wells in composing two statements against barring
Trotsky’s entry. Ellen Wilkinson added her name. But there was no
success in this classic liberal issue. MacDonald, Clynes and Henderson
overrode Lansbury’s protests in Cabinet. [118] Possibly they were still smarting from the treatment they had received in Where Is Britain Going?
With only minority support, they may have felt their parliamentary
position at risk. There might also have been a sense of insecurity in
the labour movement. An astute cartoon by David Low in the Manchester Guardian
depicted a supplicant Trotsky having the door shut in his face by the
determined Clynes. “But I am an old friend of the House”, protests the
exile. “Yes, that’s why”, comes the reply.
No Trotskyist movement emerged in Britain before 1930 due to meagre
awareness of, and involvement in, the Russian and Comintern debates by
communists and, perhaps, the small size of the CPGB Party leaders dealt
uncertainly with Trotsky as an individual and as a theoretician unless
they first received guidance from Moscow. The Where Is Britain Going?
episode occurred because of lack of this guidance and also because
nobody in Britain, and perhaps elsewhere, was equipped to give the CPGB
such a boost. Trotsky’s standing in Britain, which was high at
mid-1926, collapsed abruptly as a direct result of the new drive
against Trotskyism in the Comintern.
Outside the Party, reactions to Trotsky separate into three groups.
The Labour and Trade Union leaders had a conventional fear of him and
their experience in 1926 and even in 1929 gave them no encouragement
that he had changed from his days of power in 1917-23. The
ex-communists admired him as a revolutionary hero and writer, but had
no firmer grasp of the issues at stake in his decline than had the CPGB
They had themselves left the Party for various reasons and had no
following they could convert to “Trotskyism” had they even wished to do
so. Liberal and Socialist intellectuals also admired Trotsky, but they
had always rejected Bolshevism. Some of them, like the Labour and Trade
Union leaders, had crossed swords with Trotsky in the past. Had the
Communist Party of Great Britain recruited them in significant numbers [119]
it is conceivable they might have backed Trotsky. Certainly they might
have forced the theoretical issues. As it was they rallied strongly to
him as an exile seeking a visa, far more strongly than they would in
the middle of the 1930s when he was a more remote figure, communist
influence more pervasive, and the world a more threatening place.
There were a number of British journals which, like The Plebs,
stood for independent Marxism, but they had no distinct world view.
Throughout the 1920s Trotsky and the Oppositionists were at work
developing their world view without any British contribution. A
semi-finished product was available by the time some British communists
finally came over to Trotsky in the next decade. At the same time,
because there was no British Trotskyism there was no alternative view
available when the crisis finally arrived for the CPGB Party members
had a choice of the leaders who had not done well to date or new
leaders with Russian backing. Falling membership rolls indicate their
choice. A Trotskyist current might have been able to win support for
ending the blurred boundary between communism and the Labour left,
without retreating into a sectarian steadfast. But no via media was
advanced with authority in Britain, and it is difficult to conceive of
avowed Trotskyists surviving as party members any more easily after
1926 than they did in 1932. Even the old leadership had made short work
of Arthur Reade. In the end the weaknesses of the CPGB, must provide
the main explanation as to why a following for Trotsky emerged later in
Britain than almost anywhere else.
Notes
1. The link between Continental Marxism and actual revolutionary movements is discussed by P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, 1979, 1-21.
2. W. Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain
(1969), presents the launching of the CPGB as an unnatural distortion.
R. Challinor interprets the decline of the CPGB from 1920 through the
decay or removal of its S.L.P. cadre: The Origins of British Bolshevism, 1977, 215-77.
3. N. Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals, 1959, 22.
4.
None of the most eminent of those who left during the early 1920s
attempted to justify themselves at any length. Their views on the CPGB
have to be gleaned en passant from articles in The Plebs
and elsewhere. There was thus no domestic critique of the CPGB from
within the Marxist tradition which might, as news of Trotsky’s fight in
Russia became known, have become connected with the International Left
Opposition. Marxism outside the CPGB receives masterly treatment from
S. Macintyre, Marxism in Britain, 1917-1933 (Cambridge D.Phil., 1976).
5.
The German, Polish and French Parties – all mass organisations – all
came out for Trotsky before the Fifth (1924) Congress of the Comintern
(J. Braunthal, History of the International, 2, 1914-1943,
trans. 1967, 295, 296n). Leading figures who rallied to him now or
later in the 1920s included Warski (twice General Secretary of the
Polish Party), Cannon, an American leader, Nin, a founder and leading
figure of the Spanish Party, and Bordiga, the Italian maximalist. In
France, where the Party was initially stronger than the Socialists,
Loriot and Souvarine, and Monatte and Rosmer from the Unions, all
supported the Opposition (F. Borkenau, World Communism,
Michigan 1962, 261-2). In Italy, Gramsci from jail criticised the
Russians” preoccupation with domestic questions (F. Claudin, The Communist Movement, 1975, 116-7). Togliatti and Thorez, each destined for the General Secretaryship of a major party, privately approved the Critique of the Draft Programme of the Comintern, 1928 (I. Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed. Trotsky: 1921-1929, 1959, 444). There is a useful summary of expulsions from the world’s Communist Parties for Trotskyism in The Third International after Lenin, 1973, 282.
6. Labour Monthly, Feb. 1924; Communist Review Feb. 1924. This last is seen by a critic as a “fair presentation”, B. Pearce, Early Years of the Communist Party of Great Britain, in M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce (eds.), Essays an the History of Communism in Britain,
1975, 173-4. Publication of these articles has been attributed to
partial apprehension by the CPGB of what was happening in Russia (L.J.
Macfarlane, The British Communist Party. Its origin and development until 1929, 1966, 92-3).
7. Inprecorr, Vol.4, No.12, Jan. 1924, 83-94. Macfarlane comments that Labour Monthly for March 1924 gave a Trotsky reply to Stalin’s accusations of factionalism “with obvious approval” (op. cit., 92).
8 Communist Review
in that month ran the resolution of the thirteenth annual conference of
the CPSU. condemning factional activity by the Opposition and
classifying “Trotskyism” as a petty-bourgeois deviation. But the same
journal could carry articles by Trotsky (Gorki on Lenin – Trotsky on Gorki, Dec. 1924, 381-6) and others which praised him:
He himself is a magnificent exponent of the conclusion to which he
comes, namely that we must not wait for a bureaucratic “introduction”
of the new order from on high, but must try and find in our every day
conditions, the embryo forms and movements of the new order amidst the
lumber of the old. (Trotsky on Culture, Communist Review, Nov. 1924, 355).
In each case, however, the theme of the article tended not to be of immediate political import.
9. The Philistine discourseth on the Revolutionary, Communist International, July 1924.
10. L.J. Macfarlane, op. cit., 93.
11. Ostensibly an autopsy on the bungled German insurrection of 1923, The Lessons of October developed the argument to embrace the role of Zinoviev and Kamenev in 1917.
12. The sequence began with How one should not write the History of October, a reprint from Pravda,
and continued with contributions by Kuusinen, Bukharin, Stalin, Rykov,
Kamenev, Krupskaya and Sokolnikov. From abroad, V. Kolarov (Bulgaria),
the German Communist Youth CC, and Bela Kun joined in. Even Brandler
and Thalheimer, now in disgrace, attacked Trotsky but a corrective
article by Ottomar Geschke was attached to their views.
13. J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Vol.2. The General Strike 1925-1926, 1969, 327.
14. The Truth About Trotsky, Workers Weekly, 5 December 1924. Bell recalled the Trotsky had criticised Party elder statesmen as early as December 1923 and claimed:
“needless to say the ideas of Comrade Trotsky found ready support from the bureaucrats and Nep-men ...”
He produced no evidence to support this assertion, however, nor did
he show why this should be so from an exposition of Trotsky’s views.
But he emphasised that the British Party was in line with the CPSU.
endorsement of Comintern policy on Germany and Bulgaria and warned
against splits.
15. L.J. Macfarlane, The British Communist Party,
92-3. Macfarlane argues that the swift British endorsement of the
Soviet line pre-empted a purge. A purge was taking place in the Parti
Communiste Français at this time (A. Treint, The Bolshevising Party Conference of the CP of France, Inprecorr,
Vol.5, No.17, 240). Treint, who was to align himself with Trotsky in
1927, crowed that Trotsky had been ousted from his early popularity in
France.
16.
Arthur E.E. Reade was an Oxford student rusticated at the end of the
war for his political activities (Interview with Harry Wicks, 30
November 1979).
17.
This aggregate meeting of the London District membership of the CPGB
joins with the District Party Committee in regretting the hasty vote of
the Party Council in condemning Comrade Trotsky without full
information: and this meeting at the same takes the opportunity to
express the-London membership’s emphatic support both of the left
wing’s minority fight in the Russian Party against bureaucracy, and
equally of the Comintern’s struggle against right wing divergencies
from Leninism in the French, Bulgarian and German sections (quoted in
H. Wicks, British Trotskyism in the Thirties, International, Vol.1, No.4, 1971, 27).
18. Workers Weekly for 17 January 1925 gives Reade 10 votes out of 300. Reade claimed 15 out of 200 (J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party, 2, 327).
19. J.D. Young and W. Kendall, The Rise of British Trotskyism, The New Leader, 7 May 1960.
20. Trotskyism completely isolated in the CP of Russia and in the Comintern, Inprecorr, Vol.5, No.7, 22 January 1925, 75.
21. C.M. Roebuck (Andrew Rothstein), Trotskyism – A Peril to the Party, Workers Weekly, 23 January 1925.
22. It appeared, without comment, in Inprecorr, Vol.5, No.16, 209-26.
23.
Bukharin savaged Trotsky’s most distinctive theoretical contribution
and asked, “Is it not clear that this ”permanent” question of a
“permanent” theory is the ”permanent” contradiction between Trotskyism
and Leninism?” (The Theory of Permanent Revolution, Communist Review, Feb. 1925, 381-94.)
24. Trotsky and the Party, Communist Review, March 1925, 446-56. Trotsky’s letter appears with the CPSU Central Committee reply.
25. Discussion on the Question of Trotsky, Inprecorr, Vol.5, No.37, 23 April 1925, 485-6.
26. J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party 2 327n.
27.
In 1929 Reade was back in politics, now as Labour prospective
Parliamentary Candidate for North Berks. That year he clashed with
Arthur Henderson at Party Conference over NEC vetting of election
addresses (LPCR, 1929, 242). Reade later left the
Labour Party to become a Parliamentary Candidate in Bristol for Oswald
Mosley’s New Party. (Interview with Harry Wicks, 30 November 1979.)
28. J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party,
Vol.2, 327. The motion was identical with that passed at the London
aggregate and received unanimous support (L.J. Macfarlane, op. cit., 140).
29 See C.M. Roebuck, Leninism and Trotskyism, Sunday Worker, 31 May 1925, a review of The Errors of Trotskyism,
for an early attempt to depict Trotsky’s principles as a discrete
philosophy distinguished by its views on the peasantry and the Party.
30. L.J. Macfarlane, op. cit., 140.
31. The suppression of Lenin’s Will was known to M. Phillips Price, a former M.P. and Party member, who dealt even-handedly with the struggle in Moscow (A Lion at Bay, The Plebs,
June 1925, 238-41). Price may have heard about the Will from Max
Eastman (see below), but he may not have known that it condemned Stalin
(D. Caute, The Fellow Travellers, 1973, 86).
32. T.A. Jackson believed that Trotsky overdramatised and was lost without Lenin (Sunday Worker,
5 April 1925); A. MacManus thought Lenin lacked Trotsky’s “usual
brilliance” and was “quite his weakest piece of work”. Trotsky ought,
he suggested, to publish a real book on Lenin, not just fragments (Communist Review, May 1925, 35-41) .
33. M. Dobb, Lenin and Trotsky, The Plebs, May 1925, 184-91; W.N. Ewer, who worked closely with the communists and wrote frequently for Labour Monthly was spiteful in the Daily Herald and wrote in Labour Monthly of The Twilight of Trotsky.
34. Lansbury’s Labour Weekly, 4 April 1925.
35. He pointed out that part of the poorly received Lenin had been published by Labour Monthly the previous year: (B. Pearce, Early Years of the Communist Party of Great Britain, in M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce (eds.), Essays on the History of Communism in Britain, 1975 , 175) .
36. An American journalist, formerly an editor of The Liberator,
and an early member of the CPUSA. For Eastman’s relationship with
Trotsky, whom he persuaded to allow him to write his autobiography, see
D. Caute, The Fellow Travellers (1973), 22. S. Macintyre discusses Eastman’s links with The Plebs in Marxism in Britain, 1917-33.
37. Published by the Labour Publishing Company.
38.
It was not Trotsky’s account however. Eastman believed that he had
failed to take the opportunity to lead Russia after Lenin’s illness. He
anticipated later writers with his view that Trotsky “had no idea of
political manoeuvring. He has nothing but a complete incapacity for it”.
39. Of necessity during the factional struggle, I. Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, 1959, 201-2 and n.
40. Since Lenin Died. More facts and fiction. (A Review of the latest Menshevik Diatribe), Communist Review, May 1925, 35-41.
41. Poor Trotsky, The Sunday Worker, 10 May 1925.
42. Labour Monthly (June 1925). See also Since Eastman Lies, Workers” Weekly, 8 May 1925.
43. The Sunday Worker
considered Trotsky’s first disavowal to justify front page treatment on
10 May 1925. On 31 May it ran Eastman’s complaint at the treatment he
had received in the communist press with Jackson’s defensive note.
Trotsky’s second, less ambiguous denial appeared in full on 19 July.
44.
R. Postgate, another ex-communist, defended Trotsky on the personal
level but failed to see any deeper significance in Russian events (Why Trotsky Fell, Lansbury’s Labour Weekly, 2 May 1925). M. Phillips Price drew on Eastman and reports now becoming available from Russia (A Lion at Bay, The Plebs, June 1925).
45.
Eastman’s emphasis in his book on Trotsky’s personality had allowed
MacManus to advise him to pay less attention to the psyche and more to
the revolution.
46. R. Postgate and J. Horrabin, Trotsky’s “Comrades“, The Plebs, July 1925, 286-8. See also Gallacher’s reply in August.
47. See for example R. Challinor, The Origins of British Bolshevism, 1977, 273
48. In the International: Comrade Trotsky’s Declaration with regard to Eastman’s Book: Since Lenin’s Death (sic), Inprecorr, Vol.5, No.60, 30 July 1925, 833-4; Final Text of Trotsky’s letter on Eastman’s book: Since Lenin Died, Inprecorr, Vol.5, No.68, 3 September 1925, 1004-6. Eastman replied to his critics in Lansbury’s Labour Weekly for 29 August 1925 and rounded off the discussion with a well-written article in Plebs (A Response to Trotsky, Oct. 1925, 393-8) in which he attempted to explain Trotsky’s disclaimers.
49. In 1926 Eastman published two further books, Leon Trotsky: The Portrait of a Youth (reviewed in The Plebs, September 1926, 343-4), and Marx, Lenin and the Science of Revolution,
a refutation of dialectical materialism which should have ended once
and for all the belief that he was a Trotskyist (S. Macintyre, Marxism in Britain, 1917-33,
105-6). In 1928 however he had gathered round him a tiny group of
Trotsky sympathisers simultaneously with the emergence of a Left
Opposition within the CPUSA See C.A. Myers, The Prophet’s Army: Trotskyists in America, 1928-1941, Westport, Conn., 1977.
50. Charles Ashleigh discussed Literature and Revolution (Purges for the Highbrow, Sunday Worker, Nov. 1925).
51. The Spirit of Moscow (Sunday Worker, 21 June 1925) which appeared at the beginning of China’s revolutionary phase; The struggle for the Quality of Production, Inprecorr, Vol.5, No.81, 19 November 1925, 1235-6; Towards Socialism or Capitalism? The Language of Figure, I, Labour Monthly, Nov. 1925, 659-66, and II, Labour Monthly,
Dec. 1925, 736-48. This last was the first introductory section of a
work already published in Russia. Later sections, criticising Bukharin,
were omitted without acknowledgement by Labour Monthly (B. Pearce, Early Years of the Communist Party of Great Britain, in M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce, op. cit., 176). Trotsky’s writings never appeared in the journal after this, though he was to be anathematized many times.
52. The history of the revolution was one. John Reed’s Ten Days That Shook the World,
with its accurate portrait of 1917 and a commendatory preface by Lenin,
was suppressed shortly after it appeared in February 1926. Those with
copies were confronted by footnotes correcting Reed’s account and
referring them to The Errors of Trotskyism (J. Braunthal, History of the International: 1914-1943, Trans. 1967, 244n).
53. See below. The first (Moscow) edition is dated May 1925. In September 1925 the book had appeared in the United States as Whither England?
In October 1926 the CPGB brought out its own edition in which it
dropped Brailsford’s introduction and replaced it by Trotsky’s own for
the second German edition (dated 6 May 1926). For the diluting effect
this had see B. Pearce, The Early Years of the Communist Party of Great Britain, in M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce, op. cit., 176-7.
54. My Life, New York, 1970, 527.
55. H. Dewar, Communist Politics in Britain, 1976, 65.
56. Must Britain Travel the Moscow Road? (1926). Angell claimed his book had been “a thumping success” in publishing terms (After All, 1951, 268).
57. Trotsky on Great Britain, The Nation, 10 March 1926.
58. Trotsky on our Sins, The New Leader, 26 February 1926.
59. Trotsky, Lansbury’s Labour Weekly, 27 February 1926.
60. The Gospel According to Trotsky, Labour Magazine, March 1926. The Daily Herald reviewed the book on 10 February. All these reviews appear in G. Novack (ed.) Leon Trotsky on Britain, NY 1973.
61. T.A. Jackson: The Retreat Before Moscow, The Workers” Weekly.
William Paul defended Trotsky against Angell and other critics unable
to handle his “unanswerable case”, insisting that the course of the
General Strike had confirmed Trotsky’s estimate of ruling class
intentions. Trotsky would not have approved of Paul’s argument that
gradualness comes after revolution and not before, evidence for which
was the gradual building of a communist basis in Russia (Where Angell Dares to Tread, Sunday Worker, 18 July 1926). When he reviewed Towards Socialism or Capitalism?, Paul directly imputed this idea to Trotsky himself (The Path to Socialism, Sunday Worker,
8 August 1926). The last reply to Angell came curiously late in the
year when J.T. Murphy studiously avoided taking a position on Trotsky’s
book. (An Angel’s Dilemma, Communist International, 30 November 1926, 22-3). Much water had flowed beneath the bridge by then.
62. “The Party Press gave the volume high grades for brilliance and apparently could not fault it ideologically”, A. Calhoun, The United Front: The T.U.C. and the Russians, 1923-1928, Cambridge 1975, 170. When T.A. Jackson reviewed Bukharin’s Historical Materialism, he felt unable to do so without defending Trotsky against all critics, and notably Brailsford (Historical Materialism, Communist Review,
May 1926,), 39-47). It is worth noting that the official history steers
the reader through the party’s experience of the General Strike without
mentioning Trotsky’s book once (J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party, Vol.1, 1969).
63. R.P. Dutt, Trotsky and his English Critics, Labour Monthly, April 1926, 223-4.
64. loc. cit., 241.
65. The previous year Dutt had written:
“Thus the Left Trade Union leaders occupy at present the position,
not only of leaders of the workers in the immediate crisis but also of
the spokesmen of the working class elements in the Labour Party – it
might almost be said, an alternative political leadership.” (The Capitalist offensive in Britain, Inprecorr, Vol.5, No.62, 6 Aug. 1925, 856).
This was the very thesis against which Trotsky fought. After the
General Strike, however, Dutt reverted to a position to the left of the
leadership. He repeated Trotsky’s later criticisms without
acknowledgment (L.J. MacFarlane, op. cit., 157). In
this period he gained the loyalty of younger party members who, like
Reg Groves, were to become Trotskyists. See for example Groves’s
retrospective of Dutt’s role in 1924-8 (The Red Flag, Aug. 1934).
66. Four chapters under this heading appeared in Russia. One of them was published in Britain (Communist International, No.22, 1926, 19-41).
67. The General Strike in Britain, Inprecorr, Vol.6, No.50, 10 July 1926), 816.
68. H. Pelling, The British Communist Party, 1975, 192.
69. J. Sten, Leninism or Trotskyism, Communist International, 30 Oct. 1926, 5-9. Attacks on the Opposition became frequent in the journal at this time.
70. Extracts from the speeches of Zinoviev and Trotsky to the plenum of the enlarged ECCI. in December were printed. See A New attack of the Opposition and After Zinoviev, also Trotsky, Inprecorr, Vol. 6, No.87, 16 December 1926, 1501-2.
71. It had already complained to the ECCI about Trotsky’s hostility towards it (I. Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, 223n and 269n).
72. Workers Weekly, 13 August 1926.
73. Yet amid all this, the last ungrudging reference to Trotsky’s role in 1917 appeared. Barret Robertson, The Life of a Red, Sunday Worker, 15 August 1926.
74.
In 1926 or 1927 members were invited locally to approve the
condemnation of the Russian Opposition by the CPSU. and the ECCI.
Stewart Purkiss and Billy Williams, future Balham group members,
abstained or opposed the leadership on the Russian economic question in
their St. Pancras branch. Reg Groves himself abstained on the Russian
economy and voted against the official resolution on China at a West
London area aggregate (Reg Groves, The Balham Group, 1974, 16). ’No-one”, Groves records, “showed any surprise or concern over our attitude.”.
75. See Maurice Dobb’s hostile review of Towards Capitalism or Socialism? (Plebs, Oct. 1926).
76. 15th Party Conference of the CP of the Soviet Union, Communist Review, Jan. 1927, 428-34.
77. Inprecorr, Vol.7, No.2, 6 Jan. 1927, 16
78. Inprecorr: Vol.7, No.4, 12 Jan. 1927. Smith was presumably referring to Problems of the British Labour Movement. Some years later Bell himself repeated the allegation that Trotsky called the CPGB “a brake on the revolution” (The British Communist Party: A short history,
1937). In fact no such expression occurs in the original or published
versions of the article, though Trotsky’s main argument was the need
for the utmost implacability on the party’s part in its dealings with
left reformism, and he did warn that development of the party might lag
behind development of the revolution.
79. Official figures of party membership, derived from a variety of sources, are given in H. Pelling, The British Communist Party. A historical profile, 1975, 192-321 .
80.
Ironically J.R. Campbell, at the Tenth Party Congress of January 1929,
warned the party delegation to the Comintern that their stand on the
colonial question was receiving support from Trotsky (L.J. Macfarlane, op. cit., 209).
81. The detailed course of events can be followed in L.J. Macfarlane op. cit., 177-274. See also H. Pelling, op. cit.,
36-53. Work is proceeding on the third volume of the official history
of the CPGB which will cover this period. See also F. Borkenau, World Communism, Michigan, 1962, 334.
82. See Expulsion of Comrades Trotsky and Vuyovitch from the EC of the CI, Inprecorr, Vol.7, No.56, 6 Oct. 1927, 1250-1 and I. Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, 359-61. J.T. Murphy’s own account is to be found in New Horizon,
1932, 9 274-7. Murphy was to part with the CPGB in 1932 and was even to
be loosely bracketed with Trotsky by communist leaders. But though no
longer a party member he did not revise his views on Trotsky and
continued to admire Stalin. See his Stalin (1944).
83. Inprecorr, Vol.7, No.57, 13 Oct. 1927, 1272.
84. The “Victories” of the Opposition a “World Scale’, Inprecorr, Vol.7, No.58, 20 Oct. 1927, 1287-8.
85. Inprecorr, Vol.7, No.66, 24 Nov. 1927, 1485.
86. Must Thermidor came in Russia?, The Communist, Dec. 1927, 262-9.
87. The Opposition – the Hope of the British Imperialists, Inprecorr, Vol.7, No.68, 1 Dec. 1927, 1534.
88. M. McCarthy, Generation in Revolt, 1953, 101, 121-2.
89. Communist International, 1 Feb. 1928, 52.
90. A.B., The International Countenance of Trotskyism, Inprecorr, Vol.8, No.9, 23 Feb. 1928, 196.
91. Britain is not among the countries cured of the bacillus in Trotskyism. Latest attack on the Comintern, Communist International, 1 March 1928, 106-111.
92.
Yet the Comintern, in its debate at the Sixth World Congress, did not
see fit to mention Trotskyism in the debate on the English question (Inprecorr, Vol.8, No.10, 25 Feb. 1928, 222, 249-54.
93. J.P. Cannon, History of American Trotskyism, New York 1973.
94. J. Yaroslavsky, The Letter of A. Joffe and The Philosophy of Decadence (Inprecorr, Vol.8, No.3, 19 Jan. 1928, 81-6).
95. In 1928 the party published a pamphlet under the title Where is Trotsky Going?
96. The Real Situation in Russia, Communist Review, April 1929, 200-212.
97. Inprecorr, Vol.9, 1929, 1140, quoted by Pelling, op. cit., 45.
98. I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast. Trotsky: 1929-1940, 1963, 17-21, gives an account of Trotsky’s quest for a visa during 1929. See also My Life, New York 1970, 574-8 (14 March 1929).
99. Interview By The Daily Telegraph, 14 March 1929, Writings Supplement (1929-33), 13-15.
100. Interview By The Daily Express, 16 March 1929, Writings Supplement (1929-33), 66.
101. J. Bellamy and J. Saville, Dictionary of Labour Biography, Vo1.5, 158.
102. M. Cole, Beatrice Webb (1945). Deutscher dates the visit in April, but My Life gives early May.
103. C. Holmes, Trotsky and Britain. The “closed” file, BSSLH,
Autumn 1979, 33. Hughes continued to be interested in securing a
British visa for Trotsky years later, even suggesting that he should be
given exile on a Scottish island (Forward, 25 April 1934).
104. My Life, 574. The invitation was sent on June 5.
105. I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 17.
106. On 15 July 1929 he repeated his claim to be motivated only by personal considerations in a letter to The Daily Herald (Writings: Supplement (1929-33), 195).
107. Why I Want To Come To London, 11 June 1929, Writings: Supplement (1929-33), 153)
108. The Fellow Travellers, 204. For contemporary comment, see Manchester Guardian, 19 July; Daily Herald, 22 July, 25 July, 1929.
109. I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 20.
110. My Life, New York 1970, 568.
111. D. Caute, Communism and the French Intellectuals, 1914-1960, 1964, 91. Caute traces the emergence of French Trotskyism on pp.89-92.
112.
After 1929 Trotsky broke with Magdeleine Paz. He allowed her grudging
credit for acting on his behalf over the English visa and for her part
in securing the release of Victor Serge from the Soviet Union. He
viewed Paz and her husband, however, as mere liberals (Trotsky to
Serge, 29 April 1936 and 19 May 1936, Writings: Supplement (1934-40), 660, 665).
113. C. Holmes, loc. cit., 33.
114. J.R. Clynes, Memoirs, 1924-1937, 1937, 116.
115.
Ivor Montagu (1904- ) had, as a young man, admired Trotsky. Later he
was baffled by the dispute between him and the Soviet leaders (The Youngest Son,
1970, 192, 339); in this, his autobiography Montagu omits any reference
to his part in the asylum episode or to the visit he paid to Trotsky at
Prinkipo in 1931. In view of letters from Trotsky, now published, it
seems likely that Montagu was the British Communist, later famous for
his orthodoxy, whose correspondence with Trotsky Deutscher described as
a “thick pile” of friendly letters, though he claims his correspondence
was not extensive (C. Holmes, loc. cit., 37n).
116. C. Holmes, loc. cit., 36.
117. Quoted at length in I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, op. cit., 17-18.
118. ibid., 20n.
119. M. Johnstone, The Communist Party in the 1920s, New Left Review, Vol.41, 1967, 47-63.
----------------------------------------------------
PART ONE 1929 -38
ORGANISED TROTSKYISM TO THE FORMATION OF THE BRITISH SECTION
(1929–NOVEMBER 1931)
An organised Trotskyist group emerged in Britain late in 1931
stimulated by dissatisfaction with communist performance and growing
awareness of Trotsky’s critique. The British Section of the Left
Opposition emerged from the Communist Party, although there were others
in Britain interested in Trotsky’s ideas. It crystallized relatively
late, without great impact, and conditioned by the Communist Party from
which it sprang.
The first meeting of the International Left Opposition gathered in Paris on 6 April 1930 without British participation. [1] Later in the year, however, Trotsky wrote of the “very promising ties established with Britain”. [2] In 1930 and 1931 the embryonic International had contact with three dissatisfied groups on the British left.
The first group included independent Marxists who were dissatisfied with the CPGB Among these was Dick Beech [3],
with whom American Trotskyists corresponded as early as 1930. Beech
knew a number of leading Continental communists who had come over to the
Opposition. These acquaintances he shared with Jack Tanner [4],
also formerly a party member. Others who were known to the Opposition
included the photographer Clare Sheridan, then a close friend of Ivor
Montagu, Flower, a Daily Telegraph journalist [5], and Ellen Wilkinson. [6] Pierre Naville, leader of one of the two French Opposition factions visited Britain in 1930 for talks with Beech. [7]
Beech, Tanner and Wilkinson all were trade unionists who had been
Communist Party members. Ivor Montagu, who had remained a communist, but
was not a trade unionist, had friendly relations with Trotsky at least
up to the end of 1931 [8],
when he was seen as “a very good comrade”. Also within the CPGB in 1931
were the middle class Freda Utley and the working class Margaret
McCarthy, both of whom had witnessed in Russia the effect of the rout of
the Left Opposition and silently favoured Trotsky’s views. [9] These names, or some of them, might have added lustre to the Opposition, but none of them joined it.
The second cluster of contacts consisted of those in the ILP and
outside it, who had not been in the Communist Party and thought
revolutionary politics had to make a new start. Sometime in 1929 and
1930, the Marxist League was formed, an independent revolutionary
propaganda group. It was not large. Its leading figures were Frank
Ridley [10], Chandu Ram [11] and Hugo Dewar [12],
the organiser of the League. The League, as such, stayed independent of
all parties and spent its time selling literature and holding open air
meetings in Hyde Park, Tottenham Court Road and elsewhere. [13]
In 1930 and 1931 it had contact with the Trotskyist Communist League of
America. The CLA, to which Trotsky looked to help stimulate a British
Opposition, invited Ridley to send reports to The Militant. The League sold this paper, together with American Trotskyist pamphlets, at its public activities.
In 1931 Ridley and Ram expounded the view that events were moving to a
crisis in Britain. The National Government was the first stage of
British fascism, which a reformist ILP (still within the Labour Party)
and a sectarian CPGB were inadequate to resist. “It is socialism or
starvation, communism or chaos”, argued Ridley. [14] There was little role for trade unions, since there was no scope for reform. [15]
What was needed was a new party and a new (Fourth) International. In
Autumn 1931, Ridley and Ram formulated theses on Britain. The country
was at a transitional stage between democracy and fascism, ruled now by
an “anti-parliamentary” government. Trade unions were ’imperialist
organizations”, doomed to disappear now that the era of superprofits had
gone. The Comintern should be entirely rejected, and with it the
Communist Party of Great Britain. [16]
Trotsky was unimpressed. He expected an Opposition current to develop
from within the CPGB When it did it would stand on the shoulders of
Bolshevik experience. Ridley and Ram advanced theses for a Fourth
International but they had made no struggle against Stalinist control of
the Communist Party. “It would be very sad if the critical members of
the official British Communist Party would imagine that the opinions of
Ridley and Ram represent the opinions of the Left Opposition.” [17]
It would not do to declare the historical role of the Labour Party
and the trade unions at an end. Nor was it possible to abstain even from
a weakened communist party. If the few hundred Left Oppositionists
remain on the sidelines they will become transformed into a powerless,
lamentable sect. If, however, they participate in the internal
ideological struggle of the party of which they remain an integral part
despite all expulsions, they will win an enormous influence in the
proletarian kernel of the party. [18]
Trotsky was speaking here of Germany, but he believed that in Britain
also the Opposition would have to earn support by fighting false
Comintern policies from within. An opposition which emerged that way
would be more firm than one which drew facile, abstract conclusions,
however willing it might be to engage in correspondence. [19] Ram expounded his and Ridley’s views at an Autumn meeting of the International Secretariat in Paris, [20] but found no support there or among the American Trotskyists.
Trotsky participated in a discussion in Turkey at which Marxist League ideas were aired. [21] The call to launch a Fourth International was not being made only in Britain. [22]
And the belief that the situation was at crisis point reflected the
views not of isolated individuals alone, but also of the CPGB, whose
influence Trotsky believed he detected. [23]
Those communists who were questioning this very exaggeration of the
prospects for fascism by their party were disturbed at the views of
Ridley and Ram and were reassured by the Americans.
“It was the unanimous decision of the International Secretariat that
at present there is not an organisation in England that represents the
International Left Opposition nor its International Secretariat.” [24]
This was thumbs down for the Marxist League. Hugo Dewar withdrew, dissenting from its view of trade unions [25]
and prepared in practice to undertake the struggle Trotsky proposed. He
joined the ILP in Clapham and then moved to the Tooting local of the
CPGB [26] The Marxist League continued in being, and on 1 January 1932 launched a short-lived journal, The New Man. [27] Ridley later rejected the Fourth International when the International Left Opposition decided to launch it. [28]
It was from disgruntled members of the CPGB that the British Section
of the Left Opposition was finally to be launched. Any dissatisfaction
these future Trotskyists felt before 1930 however, was with the CPGB as
it was before the eleventh (special) party congress of November-December
1929, at which leadership was transferred to a new more intransigent
group. [29]
The Opposition was a London affair. Reg Groves [30], Stewart Purkis [31] and Billy Williams [32] had read Where Is Britain Going? and The Lessons of October
before the General Strike. They worked together as members of the
Clearing House Branch of the Railway Clerks Association in Poplar and
were part of the influx of new recruits into the Communist Party
immediately after the General Strike. [33]
By 1929 Groves and Purkis had worked their way up to the London
District Committee, Groves serving as Assistant Organizer for most of
1929. Groves was a young turk pushing the party towards the new line
being urged by the Comintern, though he was the only CPGB member invited
to the Lenin School who refused to go. He had rejected the TGWU as a
company union, and called for the political levy not to be paid in the
GMWU. [34] He urged an end to the “old method” and called for a new leadership on the eve of the special congress. [35] Purkis wrote for the party press in industrial matters, [36] and was active with Williams in the St. Pancras local.
Henry Sara (1886-1953), the same age as Purkis, was moderately well
known in the party. He was a former SLP member and wartime conscientious
objector, who had not joined the CPGB at its foundation, but came into
it following a trip to Russia. [37] He gave lantern lectures on his tour [38],
had a taste, like Groves, for nineteenth century history and, uniquely
among the future founder members of the British Section, he had
participated in theoretical discussions in the party press. [39] He wrote with independent convictions, authority and, occasionally, an academic air. [40] In 1929, he stood as parliamentary candidate in the General Election for Tottenham South, an area where he was well known.
The fifth key personality from the early cadre of British Trotskyism was Harry Wicks [41],
another railwayman, who had first encountered Opposition ideas at YCL
classes in Battersea given by Arthur Reade and attended the aggregate of
17 January 1925. Wicks was part of the strong organization which the
CPGB had built in Battersea in the 1920s, at the apex of which stood
Shapurji Saklatvala a communist Member of Parliament. In 1927 Wicks,
unlike Groves, accepted an invitation to join the Lenin School in
Moscow. [42]
He stayed there until 1930, attended the Sixth World Congress of the
Comintern in 1928 and witnessed the final rout of the Opposition. He
also met George Weston, a West London craftsman who backed Trotsky.
Wicks returned in 1930 to find the CPGB isolated and its Battersea base
in ruins. [43]
In 1930 the separate dissatisfaction of these five with the party
became evident. Early in the year, Groves presented a series of
complaints on the style and content of The Daily Worker launched on 1 January. [44] He began to contribute an information column, Workers Notebook, but editing of this caused disagreements as well. [45] Links between Groves and Purkis were reinforced through this clash [46] and also through an abortive attempt by Groves to join the Marx-Engels Institute that summer. [47]
Meanwhile Sara, and to a lesser extent Purkis, clashed with the
official line over two issues of theory. It was the year of Bukharin’s
ouster from the presidency of the Comintern. Sara, not intimidated,
supported Bukharin’s views on the effects of imperialism on competition
at home and claimed, moreover, that Lenin endorsed them. [48]
Purkis was implicated in passing, in the conflict between the party and
Freda Utley over whether the working class of its own effort might
achieve socialist consciousness. [49]
Groves and Sara, members of the party agitprop committee, were by 1931
beginning like J.T. Murphy, another committee member, to make systematic
criticisms of the party. [50]
Years later, Stuart Purkis recalled “we came together in 1930,
brought together by agreement on the need for propaganda for the United
Front”. [51] The marrying of disparate discontents into a Trotskyist critique occurred during 1931. Groves and Sara had seen the American Militant in London radical bookshops [52] and read Trotsky’s Autobiography, My Life (1930). Trotsky’s article Germany: the key to the international situation [53]
had also been widely noted, the first English presentation of his case
for a United Front of the mass parties of the German workers against
fascism. By 1931 the Communist League of America had behind it three
years experience in running an Opposition group against a more ferocious
Communist Party than the British one, but in a more open political
situation. [54]
One of its responsibilities was to stimulate the creation of a sister
group in Britain. When Groves contacted it about the regularity of
supplies of Militant to Britain a correspondence began in which the CLA, tried to capitalise on its opportunity. [55]
For the Americans, Arne Swabeck [56]
argued forcefully for the establishment of an Opposition group within
the CPGB which would advance Trotsky’s critique of Comintern policy. [57]
Groves was not convinced that discontent with the CPGB necessarily
implied an alignment with Trotsky. Swabeck sought a fraction within the
CPGB where a cadre might be built around criticism of the party line.
“Is it the desire of the Left Opposition to make any split? We believe we must say decidedly: No”. [58] To the British, who had not, in any case, “assimilated the litany of organised Trotskyism” [59], the prospects for making this critique and staying party members, appeared far less auspicious.
The British view diverged from that pressed upon them by the CLA.
Groves and the others appear in 1930-2 as guardians of the new line
proposed by the Comintern and its supporters at the special congress.
They had played no part in the development of the ILO critique. [60] Unlike the CLA, they held that the party should not control the Minority Movement and that professional revolutionaries should not
run the party. In the next year, they were to counterpose factory work
to trade union work and thus make a mistake the CLA had been careful to
avoid. [61]
Following the August crisis, Groves foresaw a new 1926. He proposed
Councils of Action and preparation for a new General Strike, fearful
that the Left, as in that year, would again make the running in view of
the failure of the Daily Worker to make the party’s role clear. [62]
The critics were now an identifiable entity. The “Balham Group” existed from some time in the later months of 1931 [63],
though most of its members had been working in South-West London before
that. From the end of 1930, Wicks, now returned to Battersea, was
cooperating with them. Faced with the economies programme of the
National Government, the Balham Group approached local ILPers, notably
the Clapham branch, for joint resistance activities. This was a limited
local united front and one tangible gain was Hugo Dewar, who split with
the Marxist League and, effectively, followed Trotsky’s advice by coming
over to the Tooting Communist local from the Clapham ILP.
In the Autumn of 1931, the Americans began to force the pace. They
had noted that these South London communists, for all their
reservations, were more solid in their support than the other British
contacts. The proposal for a CLA leader to visit England for a lengthy
spell had been under discussion earlier in the year. [64]
In September Swabeck called on Groves to begin a definite group in
Britain, albeit cautiously, and proposed a gathering of all CLA contacts
to meet Albert Glotzer, who was about to visit Britain. [65] Glotzer [66],
in fact, went first to Turkey, where he met Trotsky, and wrote again to
Groves. In October another letter from America promised that Max
Shachtman also would visit Britain. [67]
In November a meeting was convened in the flat of Flower at which Groves, Sara, Purkis and Wicks [68] agreed to establish a British Section of the Left Opposition. [69]
Shachtman urged the need for someone to be sacrificed in order to
dramatize the existence of the group, but both Americans argued against a
split. There was unease at Shachtman’s suggestion, but agreement on the
need to restore inner party democracy, reduce Russian influence and
return to basic principles. It was later asserted that the Americans’
anxiety to establish a group overrode the achievement of political
unity, that organisational steps were taken, but that the group remained
a circle of friends. [70]
The plan was for Shachtman to visit Montagu, Ellen Wilkinson and perhaps others. [71]
Nothing tangible emerged from this. A British Section constructed more
widely from those with whom Trotsky and others were in contact, might
have been a very impressive body indeed. [72]
What actually crystallized was a tiny body which, like the young CPGB
was entirely working class and had only made a limited critique of
Comintern theory.
It is arguable that the Balham Group was a product mainly of domestic
discontents. The prime movers were fairly well known to each other,
they had a common industrial background, and many were concentrated in
South London. Inevitably they were a group held together by personal as
well as political ties. The political ties centred on dissatisfaction
with the performance of the CPGB, first before the imposition of the new
line at Leeds and after. But the Balham Group reacted to the impasse of
the CPGB in its own way. By 1931, it is argued, it was closer to the
“class against class” line than the party itself. [73]
It rejected the catastrophism of Ridley and Ram, as had the CLA, yet it
shared the belief that communist growth was imminent. But just as
communist theory had in the CPGB of the 1920s largely been imposed from
without, the new Oppositionists themselves were confronted with a mass
of doctrine which they were expected to digest. Some of it, like the
argument for the United Front, appealed at once, and those parts of
Trotsky’s critique, of which the Group were aware, acted as a yeast on
its development. Balham’s interests in Trotyskyism were not abnormal [74] but the immediate future was to reveal a mutual lack of confidence between it and the international movement.
Notes
1.
This meeting, known as the preliminary conference of the ILO, elected a
provisional International Secretariat and agreed to establish an International Bulletin.
Representatives from France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Hungary,
the United States, Czechoslovakia and a French Jewish Group attended.
Groups in Russia, China, Austria, Mexico, Argentina and Greece endorsed
the steps taken. (L. Trotsky, A Big Step Forward. Unification of the Left Opposition, April 1930, Writings 1930, 187-90, 419-20n.) There is a critical discussion of the early ILO in I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 57-60.
2. How the I.L.O. is Doing, 1930, Writings: 1930, 304.
3.
Dick Beech was a former Wobbly who had in 1920 accompanied the British
delegation to the first congress of the Comintern. He ran a book society
which, inter alia, circulated Trotskyist material. He had contributed
articles to the Militant of the Communist League of
America. Beech corresponded with Trotsky up to the end of 1931 and
helped the Trotskyist movement subsequently from time to time. He later
became president of the Chemical Workers Union.
4.
Jack Tanner was a foundation member of the CPGB, national committee
member of the AEU, and a leading spokesman of the Minority Movement in
the 1920s. He left the Communist Party and rose as a right wing
spokesman to the presidency of his union.
5. Interview with Harry Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979.
6. Trotsky gave Shachtman a letter of introduction to her the following year. (L. Trotsky, To Help in Britain, 9 Nov. 1931, Writings Supplement (1929-33), 99)
7. Interview with Harry Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979.
8. Trotsky sounded him out about a new edition of Where is Britain Going? in that year. L. Trotsky to Shachtman, To Help in Britain, Writings: Supplement (1929-33).
9.
Nov. 1931, 99. Both women watched the demotions and dismissals for
political reasons which took place in Russia with incomprehension, a
legacy perhaps of the lack of knowledge in the CPGB of the debate in the
Russian Party. Freda Utley might have openly joined Trotsky in 1931 but
was dissuaded by Bertrand Russell, with whom she was staying. (F.
Utley, Lost Illusions, X1949), 11, 57;; M. McCarthy, Generation in Revolt, 1953, passim.)
10. F.A. Ridley (1897-) was a writer, secularist and historian who had left the ILP in 1930.
11. Chandu Ram (d. 1932) was an Indian law student and member of the London branch of the Indian National Congress.
12. Hugo Dewar ( -1980) joined the ILP around 1929.
13. R. Stephenson (ed.), The Early Years of the British Left Opposition, 1979.
14. F.A. Ridley, A Communist Party – The Problem of the Revolution in England, The Militant (NY), 31 Oct. 1931, quoted in R. Stephenson, op. cit.
15.
“Therefore, when capitalism reaches that stage of decay when no further
reforms are possible – and that stage is here now (witness the
coal-mining industry) – the “raison d’etre” of trade unionism is gone.
The end of trade unions as known at present is within sight”, (D.E.W.
[Dr. Worrall?], Trade Unions and Revolution, The New Man, 1 Jan. 1932, 5).
16. The theses perished with other of Ridley’s papers during the blitz, but Trotsky quotes from them in his reply, Tasks of the Left Opposition in Britain and India, 7 November 1931, Writings (1930-31), 337-43. For factual data on the Marxist League, see A. Richardson, Some Notes for a Bibliography of British Trotskyism, dupl. (1979?), no pag.
17. Tasks of the Left Opposition in Britain and India. Some uncritical remarks on unsuccessful theses, 7 Nov. 1931, Writings (1930-31), 342.
18. ibid., 342.
19. L. Trotsky, Better to seek the Solid, 30 Nov. 1931, Writings Supplement (1929-33), 101-2.
20.
Held in or before October 1931. (A. Glotzer to R. Groves, 27 Oct.
1931.) Here and on other occasions Ram used the pseudonym “Aggravaila”
or “Aggar Wala”.
21. A. Glotzer to R. Groves, 27 Oct. 1931. Minutes were forwarded to all English contacts of the ILO.
22. I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 43-4.
23. L. Trotsky to M. Shachtman, What Is Fascism?, 15 Nov. 1931, Writings: Supplement (1929-33),
99-101. In 1929 the CPGB adopted a resolution that social fascism (i.e.
the Labour government) was preparing the way for fascism, that the
crisis was sharpening, and that “militancy and solidarity similar to the
great days of the General Strike are being displayed”. Stimulated by
the protracted social crisis in Germany, Trotsky was at this time
developing his analysis of the conditions under which fascism might
grow. In England, Fascism was not ruled out, but would grow only with
difficulty because of the social weight of the country’s proletariat.
24.
A Glotzer to R. Groves, 27 Oct. 1931. “Several fundamental questions”,
Glotzer told Groves, divided the I.S, from the Marxist League and “the
other groups in England”. Arne Swabeck conceded Groves’s complaints
about Ridley’s article in The Militant, (A. Swabeck to
R. Groves, 6 Nov. 1931), and told him that the CLA had been compelled to
excise from Ridley’s article the view that the 1931 general election
was the last Britain would have, (A. Swabeck to R. Groves, 24 Nov.
1931).
25. H. Dewar to P. Thwaites, 24 Sept. 1975, lent to author by Mr. Thwaites.
26. R. Groves, The Balham Group, 1974, 61.
27. A.M.R. Penn, (A Bibliography of the British Trotskyist Press, University of Warwick M.A., 1979, 22), was unable to locate any copies of The New Man.
But Vol.1, No.1, 1 Jan. 1932 has survived and is located in the Watson
collection of the University of Stirling. It was intended to publish the
journal, which had eight pages, fortnightly. This issue contains
articles by Ridley, D.E.W., [Dr. Worrall?] and “Caius Gracchus”. It
continued the catastrophic theses of the League and offered to provide
leadership of a revolutionary character, but made no call for a Fourth
International.
28. See Below.
29. “One or two individuals were already moving towards an Oppositional position by 1929”, writes Hugo Dewar, (Communist Politics in Britain,
1976, 150). Reg Groves only appeared as a critic of the group now
controlling the party in February 1930, however, though the London
membership did have some independence of the Comintern supporters. (R.
Groves, op. cit., 21-2; H. Wicks, loc. cit., 27-8.)
30. Reg Groves, (1908- ) joined the ILP as a youth in 1924.
31. (1885-1969).
32. E.S. ’Billy” Williams, (d. 1963).
33. R. Groves, op. cit., 12-16.
34. “Mondism” and our Industrial Party, Communist Review, July 1929, 409-14.
35. Like Murphy, he demanded a struggle against the “Right danger”, (Our Party and the New Period, Communist Review, Nov. 1929, 604-9). Groves was also corresponding with Dutt,(op. cit., 23). The interest Groves was to show in working class history was already in evidence in his Labour Monthly articles on Chartism.
36. He contributed to Labour Monthly
on railway and Minority Movement problems on occasions in 1929 and
1930. He also obscurely challenged Dutt’s interpretation of the 1929
general election result, (Workers” Weekly, 23 Nov. 1929). He was expelled from the RCA for political activities and was joint editor, with Billy Williams, of The Jogger, a cyclostyled rank and file party bulletin.
37. For Henry Sara see R. Groves, op. cit., 19-20; R. Challinor, The Origins of British Bolshevism, 197), 142.
38. Sunday Worker, 11 Oct. 1925.
39. See The Class War, Communist Review,
April 1926, 538-42. In 1927 Sara attended the Hankow conference of the
CCCP in company with Tom Mann, on whose friendship he would still be
able to call after breaking with CPGB (H. Sara to C.A. Smith, 14 Sept.
1937, Warwick MSS. 15/4/1/27).
40. Compare his Further Jottings on R.W. Postgate, (The Communist, (May 1928), 290-6) with Harold Heslop’s attempt the previous month to dismember the eclectic ex-communist.
41. Harry Wicks (1907- ) joined the party in 1921 with most of the Daily Herald League and helped form the Battersea YCL, and joined its national executive in 1926. (R. Groves, op. cit., 34-5).
42. R. Groves (op. cit., 19) argues the Lenin School had a harmful effect. A contrary view is put by S. Macintyre in Marxism in Britain, 1917-1933, 44.
43. This created a strong impression. Interview with H. Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979.
44.
He proposed that the paper be reduced in size, that its articles be
more educational, that more argument and less stridency be apparent in
its pages. He was told in reply that reference resources were weak and
that it was the application of policy, not policy itself, that was at
fault. (R. Groves to Secretariat, 26 Feb. 1930; Daily Worker editorial board to Groves, 24 March 1930).
45.
He resented alteration of his text without consultation and threatened
to suspend the column (R. Groves to Secretariat, 22 April, 14 May, 30
May 1930). The Secretariat supported the Editorial Board in seeking a
full text that it could defend (W. Rust to Groves, 1 June 1930;
Secretariat to Groves (4), 8 July 1930).
46. Purkis had backed him against editorial changes (Secretariat to Groves, 8 July 1930).
47.
Groves requested of David Riazanov, director of the Institute and
biographer of Marx and Engels, paid work in London on its behalf.
Riazanov countered with the offer of a post with the English Cabinet of
the Institute in Moscow. Groves accepted but was barred by the British
Party. (D. Riazanov to Groves, 30 March 1930; R. Groves to Riazanov, 13
April 1930; draft by S. Purkis of letter to Riazanov explaining the
block, Warwick MSS.). Later Jane Degras filled a vacancy at the
Institute (Interview with Harry Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979).
48. He carried the controversy on Bukharin from The Daily Worker into the theoretical press. See his review of The Economic Theory of the Leisure Class, (Communist Review,
Feb. 1930, 84-8) for which he was criticised by Rathbone and the
Politbureau. For a discussion of CPGB reactions to Bukharin’s disgrace,
see S. Macintyre, op. cit., 179-80
49. The Theoretician of “Left” sectarianism and Spontaneity, Communist Review, Jan. 193), 11-19. Groves relates the views of Utley and Purkis in The Balham Group, 30-1. For a discussion of Utley’s views and the impact on the party of the late availability in English of Lenin’s What Is To Be Done? 1902, see N. Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals, 1959, 167-71 and S. Macintyre, op. cit., passim.
50. Interview with Harry Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979.
51. The Red Flag, Jan. 1937.
52. R. Groves, op. cit., 48, explains that he saw Militant and Labor Action for the first time at Henderson’s bookshop in March 1931.
53. Twentieth Century, (May 1931).
54.
J.P. Cannon and M. Spector led about 100 communists out of the CPUSA of
Jay Lovestone in late 1928, to which were added some intellectuals
influenced by Max Eastman. The catalyst in the political evolution of
Cannon and Spector from critics to Oppositionists had been the smuggling
out of the Sixth World Congress, which they attended as delegates, of
Trotsky’s critique of The Draft Programme of the Comintern. (J.P. Cannon, The History of American Trotskyism, New York 1972, for the early CLA see J.A. Bobbins, The Birth of American Trotskyism, 1927-1929, U.S.A., 1973, C.A. Myers, The Prophet’s Army. Trotskyists in America, 1928-1941, Westport, Conn., 1977, 27-38)
55. R. Groves, op. cit., 46-7.
56.
Arne Swabeck was a founder member of the CPUSA who became secretary of
the CLA in 1932 and was a delegate to the Paris conference of the ILO,
in Paris, February 1933.
57. A. Swabeck, To Our English Comrades, (n.d., 1931?).
58. A. Swabeck, ibid.
59. S. Macintyre, op. cit., 238.
60.
In 1934 Groves wrote of the part he and other London militants had
played in attacking the pre-1929 party leadership. They did so partly
out of revolt against the previous policy with its merging of the
Communist Party in the loose Labour Left and partly because the struggle
begun by the London membership against bureaucracy in the party was
taken up by the Comintern and used by it, as part of its war with the
party’s own Right Wing. It must also be remembered that we know nothing
of the struggle going on within the CL and nothing of the policy of the
Left Opposition. Reg Groves, (Our Attitude to the Labour Party (draft), Warwick MSS, 2.
61. J.A. Robbins, op. cit., 76.
62. R. Groves to the Secretariat, 25 Aug. 1931; Daily Worker to Groves, 27 Aug. 1931; R. Groves to Editorial Board of Daily Worker
26 Aug. 1931, (Warwick MSS). The party secretariat refused to publish
his letters, feeling that “the opening of a party discussion at the
present moment is in no way desirable”. The assumption underlying
Groves’s argument seems to be that economic developments would stimulate
militant movements which Councils of Action would harness, a concept
the party, perhaps influenced now by What Is To Be Done?, increasingly rejected, (S. Macintyre, The Balham Group, Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists, B.R. 8-10).
63.
Members included Reg and Daisy Groves, Cyril Whiting, Maurice Simmonds,
Bill Pyne, Isabel Mussi, Steve Dowdall and Neil Dowdall, a number of
whom had been in the party for some time, (R. Groves, The Balham Group, 1974, passim).
64. L. Trotsky to Shachtman, Will Help New Publishing House, 4 April 1931, Writings: Supplement (1929-33), 78-9.
65. A. Swabeck to Groves, 29 Sept. 1931, Warwick MSS.
66. Albert Glotzer (1908- ) was a youth leader of the CLA.
67. A. Swabeck to Groves, 26 Oct. 1931, Warwick MSS.
68. H. Wicks, British Trotskyism in the Thirties, International, No.1, 1976. Groves, op. cit.,
49, writes that Billy Williams was present. Also in attendance may have
been Weston (alias Morris), who had been with Wicks in Moscow and not
allowed back into the party on his return to Britain (Interview with H.
Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979).
69. Though the Section seems not to have been recognised as such until the New Year, (R. Groves, (op. cit., 49)).
70.
“The foundation meeting of the British Group was lamentably unconcerned
with politics. It was marked by a vigorous determination to get an L.O.
group set up in Britain at all costs, and also by the absence of any
attempt to ensure political unity on the basis of an LO platform.” Statement From Members of the 1931-1933 Committee of the British Group of the Left Opposition, 18 April 1933, 1, Warwick MSS.
71. L. Trotsky to Shachtman, To Help in Britain, 9 Nov. 1931, Writings: Supplement (1929-33), 99. Montagu had to be contacted discreetly, Trotsky advised, in view of his job connections with Russia.
72.
The closed section of Trotsky’s archive was opened to the public on 1
January 1980. Folders 165-75 of the archive contain documents and
correspondence on Britain (I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast,
530). Attempts to elicit any information about their contents before
that date failed, though it is likely that they contain further
information on Trotsky’s British contacts at this time.
73. S. Macintyre, The Balham Group, Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists, B.R. 8-10. A good example is Groves’s insistence, during the dispute over Workers” Notebook,
that the Congress would be incapable of carrying forward the struggle
in India against the British, the very view advanced by the Comintern
against the Old Guard in 1928.
74. J. Jupp, The Left in Britain, (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of London, 1956), 229.
PART ONE
(1929-1938)
III
THE BRITISH SECTION OF THE LEFT OPPOSITION
(NOVEMBER 1931–DECEMBER 1933)
In they two years after the formation of the British Section, the
Trotskyists made modest progress. Six months aggressive presentation of
their views led to their expulsion in the summer of 1932. This event
had only a limited impact on the CPGB though the Trotskyists had a
cadre within the ILP. For a year and a half they functioned
independently of parties but with an ILP fraction. At the end of 1933,
however, the organization split over the tactical issue of whether or
not to commit itself entirely to entering the ILP.
In 1932 the CPGB began efforts to break out of its sectarian
enclave. Under Comintern guidance the “January resolution” was drawn up
rejecting the excesses of the previous year which, supposedly, arose
from misapplication of the line. The Balham Group challenged the
resolution on two points: its thesis that trade unions might be
transformed into instruments of class struggle, and the absence of any
guidance for work on Germany and the Far East. [1]
Balham did not reject trade union work, but it believed the principal
emphasis ought to lie on an approach to the shop floor. The unwisdom of
making this its main charge was illustrated by coverage of the
disagreement in the Daily Worker [2],
and the tone of comments by communist leaders. It was in vain for
Balham to protest that its objection was to the belief that unions
might be transformed into instruments. of class struggle. [3] It was equally naive to cite Dutt and Lozovsky in support. [4]
The party replied that Balham’s line was sectarian and hindering the
work of the Minority Movement, and that it was not, in any case,
carrying out factory work. [5] It was also relatively easy to put the record straight both about Dutt and Lozovsky [6];
with the passing of time the Balham Group began to be presented as an
ultra-left faction which first deviated by its hostility to trade
unions. [7]
Far more efficacious would have been a drive on the United Front,
Trotsky’s main preoccupation of these years. The criticisms that Wicks,
Groves and Sara were making of the leadership might have obtained a
stronger echo had they hit at this weakest point. In May the first
issue of The Communist, published not without misgivings [8], sensibly played to their strong suit by leading with Trotsky’s 1931 article, Germany: the key to the international situation.
But while calls were made for a discussion on the January resolution,
and for the convening of the party congress, it was its trade union
appraisal which identified the Balham group.
Sharp attacks on the leadership by Groves, Wicks and Sara at
aggregates in Battersea on 20 April and 30.May, together with the
publication of The Communist as the journal of the
British Section of the Left Opposition, inevitably brought down the
wrath of the party apparatus. Sara, who had a separate dispute with the
Daily Worker [9],
Groves and Wicks were all condemned by the Battersea political
committee of the party for underestimation of the party’s role,
defeatism, social democratic practices and “unjustifiable and
unsubstantiated attacks on the leadership”. [10]
They continued as party members, however, pursuing unusual cooperation
with the local ILP and gathering an anti-war movement in South-West
London which had genuine support. Parting of the ways with the CPGB may
have been delayed by the party decision to close the discussion on the
January resolution, on 24 June.
It was the war issue which finally brought matters to a head. Balham
had criticized the Comintern drive for the World Congress Against War
which was to be held in Amsterdam later in 1932 with strong support
from non-party intellectuals. In South West London, Balham was
advancing a strong Leninist line. Trotsky was arguing that unity with
writers such as Henri Barbusse implied pacifist concessions and that
this approach was a substitute for a working class united front. [11] Pollitt and leading party members had seen The Communist
and on 17 August they confronted Groves, Wicks and Sara, demanding of
the first two that they submit to discipline. They would not commit
themselves and were expelled. [12]
When a majority of the Balham Group refused to disown Groves, it was
liquidated. and surviving members left in a party branch covering the
Battersea and Wandsworth area. Hugo Dewar was expelled soon after for
his defence of the Balham line at his Tooting local. Stuart Purkis, who
identified himself with Balham and The Communist was also expelled. [13] Twelve members of the dissolved Balham Group circulated a statement as widely as they could setting down what had happened [14],
but the repercussions were limited. The only leader who departed around
this time was J.T. Murphy and he left over an entirely unrelated issue,
though attempts were made to construct a link. [15] The second issue of The Communist appeared in September and the group set about building itself up.
The Balham Group found itself outside the party, with less than a
dozen supporters. It was classified as a Trotskyist faction but it had
a strong foot in the camp of the “third period”. [16] It was criticised by the Americans for its trade union stand [17], but Trotsky approved its intention, after the expulsion, to continue to project itself as a communist faction. [18] It was to emerge that the British and Trotsky had a different understanding of what this meant. [19] The Communist
remained the voice of the party members in exile. It even declared its
interest to be confined only to those prepared to join the party. [20]
Trotsky wanted the British to go as communists into the wider labour
movement. The Balham Group sought to restore the Communist Party to
health.
This was particularly so up to the time of the Twelfth Congress of
the CPGB in November 1932. Chance convened this gathering in the
Battersea Town Hall, heartland of so many of these first Trotskyists.
They made a written intervention, but not a verbal one [21] and were denounced from the platform by Pollitt. [22] The absence of a significant response left little room for illusions about a fight back [23], although the tone of some distributed literature suggested illusions were still nourished at least in the breast of Groves. [24] The Communist [25]
reflected that torpor in the CPGB, was created by the physical absence
of opposition, right (defined as Horner and Hannington), and left. It
added that sluggishness also arose from the resolving of disagreements
by references to decisions of the Comintern as expounded by the Party
Central Committee. This was an anticipation, in microcosm, of Trotsky’s
argument for breaking with the German Communist Party when it did not
analyse its own failure to prevent Hitler taking power [26], but not of the conclusion he drew.
What impact did the emergence of an open Trotskyist group have? The
unavoidable answer is very little. The extent of communist attacks may
reflect insecurity of the CPGB leaders at this time, however small the
secession. Factors bearing on the reception the Balham Group received
included the timing of the expulsions [27] and the issue over which they took place. [28]
This may explain in part the disparity of Trotskyism in Britain and
abroad. A consideration that must also be weighed is the phase of its
fortunes the CPGB had sunk to by 1932. The expulsions caused no crisis
within it and were barely noticed elsewhere. [29]
The turn of the year saw the British Section building up its
independent activity. Most promising was the South-West London Anti-War
Committee, where the Balham Group was represented through trade union
and Co-op Party members and had even been unintentionally complimented
by Robson, the local CPGB organiser. [30]
Even at this point however, a conflict was evident between those who
still looked towards actively reforming the CPGB, an approach reflected
in Purkis’s Open Letter to Harry Pollitt, and those who
followed the tactics of the Balham Group in more complete opposition to
the party. At this time the Opposition numbered less than thirty, all
of them in London. It had about a dozen contacts. About half the
membership of the former Balham Group was within it and this was still
the main base of activity. It had established an existence, though a
regular press only came with this New Year. [31] Yet it was hampered by a semi-legal existence which created a dispute over future tactics.
Politically, the Opposition had begun the task of making available
in Britain Trotsky’s own writings, notably on Germany, the issue of the
hour. But this did not yet imply the integration of the British within
the International Left Opposition. Wicks was present at the informal
international gathering convened in Copenhagen during Trotsky’s lecture
visit to the city in November 1932. Groves attended two days of the
international pre-conference held in Paris on 4-8 February 1933.
Neither visit led to a satisfactory discussion about the problems the
British now faced. [32]
These problems centred on the intimidating disparity between the
agenda set for itself by Trotskyism in Britain, and the forces
available to it. This was to cause a severe tactical dispute which
would in the end destroy the group. At the beginning of 1933 there were
within the British Section not only the former members of the Balham
Group and their associates, but also members of the ILP who supported
Trotsky’s policy.
These ILP Trotskyists traced their provenance to the Marxist League
and to the formation in 1930 of a faction within the ILP which sought
to disaffiliate it from the Labour Party and make it a revolutionary
organisation. This faction, the Revolutionary Policy Committee, later
became dominated by fellow travellers of the CPGB At this time however,
it was dissatisfied with the communists and open in its views. Its
leading members were aware of the ideas of Heinrich Brandler, former
general secretary of the KPD. deposed after that party’s failure to
seize power in 1923, and also of the critique developed by Trotsky and
the Left Opposition. Early members included Bert and May Matlow, Ernie
Patterson and Sid Kemp. Harry Wicks had attended RPC conferences [33],
which of course had only a semi-legal character. In 1931, Patterson and
Kemp were, as members of the Clapham ILP, working with Reg Groves and
the Balham Group in local campaigns against imperialist war. [34]
Disaffiliationist pressure actually led to the calling of an ILP
conference to discuss the matter in November 1931, but it was cancelled
in the belief that the secession of MacDonald, and the holding of the
general election, might impel Labour to the left. [35]
At a meeting of the Party’s National Administrative Council that month
Fenner Brockway urged careful choice of the time for a split and the
issue over which to break. [36]
In the months to come his phrase “a clean break” was to dramatize a
widespread feeling in the party that it must cut itself completely free
of Labour if it was ever to make progress. [37]
The April 1932 Conference of the Party did not pull out but brought to
the fore the essentially secondary issue of Labour Party Standing
Orders which were inhibiting ILP M.P.s from pursuing ILP – as distinct
from Labour Party – policy. A special conference of July 1932 resolved
to come out [38],
and the ILP, set about cutting itself off not only from the Labour
Party but from the labour movement in suicidally sectarian fashion.
Disaffiliation occurred over the relatively unimportant issue of the
obligation of ILP M.P.s to observe Labour Party Standing Orders. It was
also exceedingly ill-timed, since it occurred when the Labour Party was
surrendering itself to just the kind of maximalist programme so many
ILP members favoured. Instead of leading to the erection of a mass
socialist base, the “clean break” was an almost total disaster. [39] Those RPC members who looked kindly upon Trotsky’s programme favoured it however as did the Opposition leader himself. [40]
It was felt that the ILP might be won for revolution, but only if it
freed himself from the reformist embrace. This belief on the part of
Trotsky and some, of the Opposition was to become increasingly
important in 1933.
Complex differences developed within the British Opposition during
this year. Although there were now ILP members within its ranks, these
debates were conducted largely by the ex-communist cadre. Were the
members of the Opposition to content themselves with publishing the
views of Trotsky or were they aiming more ambitiously to build up a new
organisation? If the second, what were the tactical means to this end?
Wicks and Weston (Morris) [41]
seem to have favoured the view that the aim was to build up an
Opposition group, perhaps through work in the CPGB. Purkis favoured
advocating a critical but positive platform in communist circles.
Critics of this second view saw it as merely a propaganda exercise. [42]
Should the British Section try and rival the CPGB in all spheres of activity? [43]
This was a utopian aim for such a tiny group, even faced by a weakened
Communist Party. Less ambitiously it could use its press to expound a
revolutionary alternative to CPGB policy which might guide communists.
Would that mean ceasing to publish Trotsky’s articles plus material on
Germany and historical issues? [44]
Davis, Purkis, Wicks and Williams came together to propose that the
Opposition’s main tasks were to publish essential ILO documents, train
cadres in Opposition theory, organize Opposition work in the CPGB and
project general “Bolshevik-Leninist” propaganda at the mass
organizations. [45] Typically of the discussions of this time, the authors blurred their priorities. [46]
Mixed in with this confusion was unease at the slant Groves,
effectively the leader of the Opposition, gave to its work. His critics
thought he made the wrong criticisms of communist policy and attacked
its leaders too strongly. [47]
The composition of the executive changed twice in the early months of
1933, first to increase Groves’s influence and then to reduce it. [48]
Part of the problem was that the group had continued to function
informally since its establishment and proper conferences had not been
convened. On 18 June a gathering was held, (called variously a members”
meeting and a conference), which had before it an ambitiously detailed
constitution [49]
and a national committee resolution specifying the group’s main tasks
as: clarifying ideas and holding regular conferences; a continuous
intensive campaign on the CPGB; paying attention to the left wing youth
and especially the YCL; selling a minimum 1,000 Red Flags; publishing The Communist when necessary; participating more fully in the ILO.
The National Committee had followed Trotsky when the Opposition
leader called for a radical reappraisal following Hitler’s seizure of
power. [50]
Trotsky advised that summer that if the Comintern failed to conduct an
honest inquest on such a serious defeat it was moribund. He concluded
that it was time to prepare a new international. The NC presented this
view to the League with an individual gloss. It suggested that a
discredited KPD leadership could not be entrusted with organizing
illegal work under Nazism, that ruin of the USSR or Comintern collapse
would signify the need for a new international. Trotsky had gone
further by arguing that the time to rebuild had arrived already. With
few exceptions however, the British Section seems to have accepted this
turn [51], recognising explicitly that a new party was needed in Britain.
The British Section celebrated May Day 1933 with the first printed Trotskyist newspaper the country had produced, The Red Flag. [52]
It did not normally report the work of the British Section. It was a
propaganda vehicle, aimed at a revolutionary audience. The stress on
Trotsky’s articles on Germany and (later) Austria reflected the
interests of the International Left Opposition, though from July
unsigned British articles begin to appear. [53] In the first three months of publication sales of The Red Flag
advanced from more than 900 to nearly 1,250. Sales, which had been
divided 3:1 in London’s favour were now more healthily distributed in
the ratio of 7:5. [54] In the autumn however, The Red Flag entered a decline [55], perhaps as a casualty of the factional struggle.
In its short life the British Section of the Left Opposition achieved four publications which aspired to regularity. The Communist continued despite the appearance of The Red Flag, though there was discussion about retaining it for occasional needs. [56] For Discussion, the internal bulletin, appeared in sixteen issues up to 24 October 1933. [57]
The League had also undertaken in August 1932, to supply Trotsky with
clippings from the British press and in the autumn of 1933, it offered
these to members as an information service under the title Excerpts and Summaries. [58] While a successful press was clearly essential, there was a tendency that such a small group might overreach itself. [59]
The life of the British Section of the Left Opposition was
dominated, during the six months following the June members” meeting,
by a radical shift in international policy and the implications of this
for its tactics in Britain. From July 1933 Trotsky was urging the
sections of the ILO to follow closely the evolution of new parties;
which had in Western Europe split from social-democracy to the left. [60]
He next argued that the Comintern, generally, was beyond revival and
that the orientation towards reforming it must be abandoned. [61]
The National Committee of the British Section supported Trotsky’s views
but interpreted them to prescribe independence without foreseeing the
full tactical implications they carried. [62] The late development of Trotskyism in Britain scarcely left it time to learn the old perspective before it adjusted to the new.
The British example of a “Left Socialist Organisation” was the ILP.
Groves was alive to developments within it but when called on to
produce a guiding document proposed no special emphasis. [63] Calls for greater emphasis on the ILP came from Graham [64] and the Translators’ Group of the British Section. [65]
From abroad Trotsky and the ILO began to exert pressure on the British
to take up urgently work within the ILP. They were in closer and closer
contact with it on the international plane and sought to group it with
those other Left Socialist parties who were prepared to work for a
Fourth International. The Declaration of Four was to be the link between the open work of the ILO and the more covert activities of its British members. [66]
On 19 August 1933 a plenum of the ILO unanimously resolved that its
British Section should enter the ILP. Trotsky began at once to press
the point in private correspondence [67] and devoted public space to discussing the fate of the party. [68]
The ILP sent delegates to the conference of Left Socialist
Organisations held in Paris on 28 August, but did not adhere to the
Declaration of Four. [69]
Yet Trotsky met John Paton and C.A. Smith the next day and gained a favourable impression of Smith. [70]
Time was to show that the ILO was not in fact homogeneous in regarding
an ILP turn for the British Section, and the Declaration of Four as
auspicious tactics. [71]
This had implications for the development of debate within the British
Section, but the IS pressure was unrelenting. Its case was that the
Section must face not a declining CPGB, but the ILP, that it must help
the ILP to become “the revolutionary lever influencing the masses of
the Labour Party and of the trade unions”. There was a detailed
difference between Trotsky’s view and that of the IS, which had
formulated its own by amending an original proposal from Trotsky
himself, but the general argument was the same. [72]
On 5 September the IS repeated its plea, arguing that the race with the
communists would fall to the swiftest and that a prolonged dispute
would be a luxury.
The injunction “our comrades must actually enter the ILP and give
full effort to building up the revolutionary element in this party” [73]
did not meet with clear assent in Britain. Initially there was a
failure to communicate clearly, due to a lack of direct contact. [74]
As it became clear that the Communist League – as the British Section
was known from late August 1933 – was faced with a firm proposal, it
began to define its own tactical position in response. Publicly it
recorded its interest in the ILP but did not elaborate a detailed
programme for transforming it into a revolutionary party. [75] Privately it interpreted the IS proposal as further support for a perspective of achieving independence. [76]
In its reply the National Committee of the Communist League challenged
the impression the ILP had created abroad, dismissed the specific IS
proposal for an outside presence, and suggested that apparent surrender
of Bolshevik-Leninist principles to the ILP “would deal a serious blow
at the prestige of the Opposition”. [77]
ILP entry was a major preoccupation of Trotsky’s during September
1933 when he made four separate contributions to the discussion, [78]
combining public argument with private cajolery. His case to the ILP
was that it must now break with Stalinism just as the Opposition had,
but after a decade of struggle. [79]
He first anticipated the objections of the CL. Independence, he
suggested, must be striven towards but could not always be immediately
achieved and there was, moreover, a desperate need to act swiftly to
forestall Stalinist penetration of the ILP. [80]
The Bolshevik-Leninists, he later urged, would be the conduit for
Marxism into the ILP, the only means whereby that party’s further
disintegration might be prevented. On 2 October 1933 he applied further
public [81] and private [82]
pressure. He analysed the position in the British labour movement as a
series of potential levers. The tiny CL might shift the larger ILP. The
ILP, in turn might move the Labour Party. ILPers would not abandon
their party for an organisation forty strong but within its
heterogeneous environment the CL might have great effect. He handled
the practical arguments of the National Committee with only limited
patience and clearly regarded the actual mode of entry into the ILP as
a secondary question. [83]
Salient points in his case were that penetration of the ILP should be
for a brief period, aimed at recruiting the ’revolutionary kernel”
(sometimes called the revolutionary majority) of the party, and that it
was a viable proposition because the party was factionalised. The
October-November 1933 issue of The Red Flag led with the Declaration of Four.
October also saw factionalism develop within the Communist League.
It emerged that there was a minority on the national committee, which
supported Trotsky’s view while initially having little of its own to
add. [84]
At a second attempt this minority tried to develop a case which centred
on the responsibility of the CL to ensure that the ILP retained its
independence (from Stalinism). [85] The earlier the disintegration of the ILP the greater the benefit to the CPGB. [86]
A battle must therefore be fought, it reasoned, on the ground where
Trotskyism was strongest – that of principle. Its most powerful
argument however was a negative one: a challenge to the majority to
demonstrate where prospects were brighter than in the ILP – and the
best chance of winning the party lay on the inside. [87]
When the National Committee replied, it was clear that they were on the
defensive. The attempt to marshall concrete alternatives to ILP entry
served only to reveal how threadbare the case for independence was. [88] The ILP, it was claimed, was best influenced from the outside, nor would its fate be settled in the short term. [89] The Communist League ought to continue with its fingers in several pies and not confine itself to the ILP. [90]
Finally, either mode of entering the ILP would discredit the Communist
League. Definite positions on the National Committee were established
at its meeting of 5 October 1933 [91]; after that it was essentially a question of the membership delivering its verdict.
The decisive members” meeting was convened in London under the
chairmanship of Groves on 17 December, with at least three quarters of
the British Section in attendance. [92] On the proposal of Max Nicholls, the meeting endorsed the Declaration of the Four Parties (for the Fourth International) and called on the National Committee to detail how this might be implemented in Britain. [93]
This decision put the Communist League within the movement of the
Opposition towards the Fourth International; it now had to face the
tactical recommendation of most of its international comrades.
The debate opened with speeches by Sara and Graham. [94]
Sara moved the rejection of Trotsky’s proposal to enter the ILP,
arguing that the Opposition leader valued it more highly than the
League [95]
and did not appreciate the technical difficulties of working within it.
Allen, who formulated the Minority view was only repeating Trotsky’s
opinions. Graham’s speech was a frank reply to Sara. [96]
ILP members would be far more likely to join a Communist League which
fought with it side by side. He developed the “split perspective” of
working within the ILP, in anticipation of a break and rejected in
advance the compromise proposal of the International Secretariat.
Matlow it was who advanced the IS view that those who agreed on
entering the ILP should do so and formally repudiate the Communist
League. Once within the ILP, they could make themselves an organised
fraction. Wicks, less realistically, urged the transformation of the CL
into an open organised fraction [97] which would then join the ILP. If the ILP refused, he added, present policy should be continued.
There was thus four proposals before the membership. Sara had backing from Barrett, Hanton, “Oscar”, [98]
for insisting on independence from the ILP The CL, they argued, and not
this muddled party, would be the future new revolutionary organization.
Minority spokesmen included Kirby [99], Worrall, Kaye, Nicholls and Harber. [100]
who felt that the importance of a continued existence for the Communist
League was not great. Wicks’s proposal, advanced on behalf of the
Battersea and Chelsea groups of the League, received support from
Dibden, Temple, Lee Bradley [101] and Rowlands. [102]
They insisted that work in the ILP could not be efficacious without an
organized fraction and differed also from the Minority in disbelieving
that the party as a whole could be won.
Sara replied to the debate, restating his view that Trotsky undervalued the Communist League [103]
and that the ex-communist members had taken a far larger step than had
the ILP members because they had split with their party. His speech
expressed the disquiet felt from the start by the leading cadre about
aligning themselves with Trotsky. [104]
Only two votes were cast for Matlow’s compromise amendment, all the
other 35 delegates voting against. The Battersea-Chelsea amendment was
also lost, but more narrowly, with 10 in support and 14 against. The
Battersea-Chelsea votes then moved almost entirely behind the Majority
whose resolution was passed 26:11. [105]
Harber, for the Minority members now declared they were going to
join the ILP, guided by a letter from the International Secretariat to
Groves which had not been published. [106] Groves countered that the letter had been read at the NC [107] but Harber then proceeded to read its text to the effect that the Minority must be allowed to follow its own star.
By withdrawing from the meeting the Minority made its feelings
clear. Then with only the Majority voting, Wicks and Lee Bradley were
put on the National Committee in place of its Minority members. This
separation in the voting procedure was the parting of the ways and the
meeting closed.
There was a brief time for obituaries. The Majority referred to the weighty and decisive vote of 17 December. [108]
In its view the Minority argument that organisational unity could not
exist without policy agreement, could not be sustained for a tactical
quarrel. As a general rule majority decisions had to be respected. If
they did not prevail in the ILP fraction, there would be a split at the
first disagreement. Prophetically the Majority warned:
We are aware of the difficulties that many of the sections have
experienced from weakness on matters of this kind. The history of many
opposition sections has been and still is one of continual factional
struggles and breakways. One of the reasons for this is undoubtedly,
(Sic) an absence, both internationally and nationally, of a leadership
which has earned the respect of the members. [109]
The Majority made a final offer: let the Minority enter the ILP and
make a formal repudiation of the Communist League. It could still work
under the direction of the National Committee. Refusal must mean
exclusion from membership. There is no record of any attempt to take
the offer up.
So ended the first phase of British Trotskyism. It had been a brief
marriage of very different experiences. In the end most of those who
had not been in the CPGB remained in, or returned to, the ILP. The
ex-communists opted for an open organisation.
There was also a differential willingness to follow Trotsky’s advice
and that of the International Secretariat. By the end of the discussion
the Majority were speaking of both in very critical terms. They had not
participated in the long struggle of the Left Opposition against
Stalin, and they did not feel under compulsion of loyalty. Did Trotsky
himself see more future for the ILP than for the Communist League as a
revolutionary alternative? His writings underpin this accusation to a
certain extent. Ironically, none other than Trotsky himself had
criticised Stalin for expecting in 1926 a mass revolutionary current
from left wing members of the General Council of the TUC rather than
from the CPGB, and Minority Movement. The first split had come
ominously soon. It occurred over an issue which history failed to
resolve and was to bedevil Trotskyist politics for many years. The
Majority’s darker predictions were borne out. This phase of Trotskyism
in Britain has not been well treated. “This initial split took place
without any thorough discussion or preparation, the factional lines
running parallel to the personal alliances of the various individuals. [110]
But the Communist League spent quite a long time debating whether or
not to enter the ILP: indeed Trotsky’s complaint was that they spent so
long that crucial months were allowed to pass while the CPGB built up
its influence. As for the second charge, which smacks of the folk-lore
of the movement, it does seem to be true that no one changed sides
during the debate, but this seems attributable to political alliances.
Almost all those who were still or formerly in the Communist Party
opted for an independent League [111],
while those who had been won from nowhere or from the ILP set up the
Marxist Group. The Communist League was an unconsummated marriage but
it was politically and not personally dissolved.
WIL. was also to charge that it was the transition from critical
circle to real organizing which ruptured the Communist League. Without
doubt there was an element of posturing in the “independence” of Groves
et. al., who seem to have hoped for an extended period in which they
might develop a leisurely critique of the CPGB, but such opportunity
was unlikely to arise. And it was in any case unlikely that they could
make an original contribution to Opposition thought ten years after
Trotsky had written the Platform of the Left Opposition.
Trotsky rebuked Ridley and Ram in 1930 for making a separate
experiment from the Communist Opposition. Yet the Opposition made no
headway in the CPGB and was forced out where it surfaced. Progress
became possible only because the ILP existed, a confused ocean in which
many exotic revolutionary specie could flourish. Was an error committed
by discouraging Ridley and Ram? Surely not. The ILP of 1930 was not
that of 1933. It was two years from its split with the Labour Party and
did not then see itself as a revolutionary organisation. By 1933 the
ILP, was in transition: to what destination turned on the strongest
political influence. Trotsky foresaw working within it only until its
fate was resolved. The intervention of Trotsky and the ILO had been
decisive. Otherwise a minority with support short of a third of the
Communist League could hardly have expected to survive. They had forced
the issue at the time of the break with the CPGB and now did so again,
though it seems implausible to suggest that international influence
turned Trotskyism onto an unnatural path. [112]
The work of building a viable British Section had scarcely begun when
the split took place, reflecting the absence of a tradition of joint
work among these dissident CPGB and ILP members and of a shared
experience with international Trotskyism.
Notes
1. The Balham Group to the Secretariat, 1 April 1932.
2. The Vital Importance of our Work in Trade Unions, Daily Worker, 14 April 1932.
3.
“The machinery remains cumbersome, reformist in structure, and useless
for the waging of struggle under the new conditions.” (Balham Group to
Secretariat, 12 May 1932, Warwick MSS).
4.Groves
continued to admire Dutt for some years, and the Balham Group had
called, not for a new communist leadership but for the introduction of
new elements into the leadership, (Balham Group to Secretariat, 1 April
1932, Warwick MSS.). The illusion that some leading communists might
back the Opposition took a long time to die (see below).
5. The Daily Worker, 14 April, 27 May 1932.
6. ibid., 9, 10 June 1932.
7. ibid., 7, 10 June. See also J. Shields, Economic Struggles and the Drive Into The Trade Unions, Communist Review
(Dec. 1932), 57-23. But Purkis, who had been condemned the previous
year for holding local industrial work in disdain, was still covering
affairs in the RCA for the Daily Worker on 30 May.
8. R. Groves, op. cit.,
58-9. This was the first public statement that the Left Opposition
existed in Britain. Trotsky was to congratulate the British on such an
“excellently hectographed” product, and indeed the typing and
reproduction are superb.
9.
He had been charged with spreading “pacifist stuff” for his view that
the paper had overestimated the prospect of war (Secretariat to Sara,
13 April 1932; H. Sara to Secretariat, 16, 23 April 1932, Warwick MSS).
10. R.W. Robson (London District Organizer, CPGB) to Sara, 31 May, 13 June 1932;H. Sara to Robson, 7 June 1932 (Warwick MSS).
11. His case against the congress is set out in The Coming Congress against War, 13 June 1932, and Declaration to the Antiwar Congress at Amsterdam, 25 July 1932, (Writings, 1932,
113-7, 148-55). 2,200 delegates attended the Amsterdam Congress. Ten
were Trotskyists but none of these were British (D. Caute, op. cit., 107).
12. R. Groves, op. cit., 66-9. Sara was suspended on 17 August, the same day,anticipating expulsion, he wrote for The Plebs an article defending Trotsky’s role in 1917 which J.P.M. Millar attempted to advertise in the Daily Worker. Sara was expelled a few days later. (J. Robson to Sara, 17 Aug. 1932; J.P.M. Millar to Sara, 3 Sept. 1932; H. Sara, Trotsky and the Russian Revolution, The Plebs, Sept. 1932, 196-8.)
13. His letter of affirmation to Harry Pollitt is given in full in R. Groves, op. cit., 86-90. See also L. Trotsky to Groves, After The British Expulsions, 6 Sept. 1932, Writings: Supplement (1929-33), 149, for comment on Purkis’s estimate of Dutt, Pollitt and Burns as “men of outstanding gifts”.
14. To Our Comrades in The Communist Party From the “Liquidated” Balham Group, given in full in R. Groves, op. cit., 81-5.
15. L. Trotsky to Groves, 27 May 1932, (Warwick MSS.). See also the Daily Worker
for 10 May 1932 where the political bureau alleged, “Murphy has left
the line of the International and moved towards the camp of the
counter-revolutionary Trotskyists, who have always denied the
possibility of building up socialism in one country and continue to
assert that the Soviet Union is an integral part of the world
capitalist economy”. Shortly afterwards the theme was developed by
Idris Cox, (17 May), the Scottish District Committee of the Party (18
May) and Hasleden (19 May). See also W. Joss The Expulsion of J.T. Murphy and its Lessons, Communist Review, June 1932, 298-301. For Murphy’s own case for trade credits and democracy within the party see Why I Left the Communist Party, Forward,
20 May 1932, where he condemned “the unthinking automatic way in which
the party regime operates and churns out its approval of resolutions –
a process against which I have constantly fought”. Ironically, it had
been Murphy who moved the expulsion of Trotsky from the Comintern five
years earlier.
The other leading figure who might have been connected with Balham
was Bell, an irregular attender at Group meetings, who had been deposed
with the 0ld Guard in 1929. (R. Groves, op. cit., 52). However Bell made a hostile reference to the emergence of Trotskyism with the Group in The British Communist Party: A Short History, 1937, 150.
16.
Groves’s call for the introduction of new elements into the leadership
(Balham Group to Secretariat, 1 April 1932, Warwick MSS) repeated the
call he had made on the eve of the eleventh congress in 1929.
17.
M. Shachtman to Groves, 17 August 1932. Shachtman warned Groves against
falling into an ’ultra-leftist pit”, arguing that the International
Left Opposition’s view of trade unions was unchanged from that advanced
by the first four congresses of the Comintern.
18. L. Trotsky to Groves, After the Expulsion, 6 Sept. 1932, Writings: Supplement, (1929-33), 149.
19.
On 27 May 1932, Trotsky had invited Groves to set down his views on the
left of the ILP, now about to force disaffiliation from the Labour
Party. Now, (6 September, above) he called for the devotion of “a great
and growing part” of Balham’s forces to a speedy intervention in the
mass organizations.
20. The Communist, (Sept. 1932), 1
21. Leaflets were distributed from the Left Opposition and from the Balham Group, and slogans painted on nearby walls. The Communist
was sold. But it was thought wise for the Opposition delegates in the
Hall not to speak (Groves to A. Graham [Chicago], 7 Jan. 1933).
22.
Unlike others Pollitt did not link Murphy and Balham. Their defections
were the removal of ’poisonous elements”, right and left. The
Balhamites had the full Trotskyist line, he stated: socialism could not
be built in one country; united fronts should be made with Social
Democratic leaders; factory councils and committees should be built and
unions ignored; and war could be prevented only in alliance with those
helping war preparations. Pollitt made it clear that he know of
Balham’s French and American contacts and alleged, ’if they wanted to
raise genuine bona fide political questions in the ordinary way of
communist discussion on a footing which was up and above board it would
have been allowed”.
23. The Congress was “the most docile in the history of the party” (Groves to Graham, 7 Jan 1933).
24.
“We were told that we were “quibbling”. Yet the party discussion has
revealed acute differences within the leadership on this question, and
has found R.P. Dutt defending a view very similar to ours”, An Appeal to Congress Delegates from the Balham Group, reprinted in R. Groves, op. cit., 92.
25. In its issue for January 1933.
26.
“Only one valid objection to this writing off the KPD-MU could have
been raised at the time: perhaps the party will save everything if,
under the influence of the terrible defeat, it clearly and sharply
changes its policy and regime, beginning with an open and honest
admission of its own mistakes. On the contrary, the last sparks of
critical thought: has been stifled” (The Fourth of August, Writings: 1932-33, 260).
27.
Groves argues that the party leaders had to clear up Trotskyism before
a party congress could be convened, and points out that pre-congress
discussions were opened on the Monday following the expulsions (op. cit., 69). Wicks reverses this order of events (loc. cit.,
29). A more general argument must be the time-lag of four years between
Britain and the USA, and even longer between Britain and France,
bringing a British following for Trotsky at a time when his wider
reputation was in decline.
28. It has been suggested that the CPGB was anxious to prevent Trotsky’s critique of Germany becoming known (B. Pearce, British Communist History, M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce [eds.], Essays on the History of Communism, 138-9). In 1932 and 1933 criticisms of Trotsky’s views were published by the party: A. Thaelmann, On our Strategy and Tactics in the Struggle against Fascism, Labour Monthly, Sept. 1932, 583-90; R.F. Andrews (A. Rothstein), The German Situation, Labour Monthly, April 1933, 252-6.
29. Emrys Hughes, editor of the Glasgow Forward, first acknowledged the existence of organised Trotskyism at the time of the appearance of The Red Flag. He greeted it under the title Another Sect, but wrote: “... if the Red Flag
could eradicate Stalinism from the working-class movement in Britain it
would please many more than the adherents of the ‘International Left
Opposition’.” (Forward, 9 May 1933) At the time of the
expulsions however, Hughes argued that Trotsky had exaggerated Stalin’s
policy setbacks and regretted that the two had not worked together (Forward, 16 April, 2 and 9 July 1932).
30.
Groves to Graham, 7 January 1933. For the anti war campaign of the
Balham Group at this time, in conjunction with the ILP, see R. Groves, op. cit., 72-6.
31. The January 1933 issue of The Communist was only the third to appear in eight months, but it now came out monthly. In May The Red Flag, British Trotskyism’s first printed paper was to appear.
32. Purkis criticised Wicks for not presenting accurately differing British views on how to approach the future, (For Discussion, 8, 6 July 1933). For Wicks’s involvement at Copenhagen, see Writings: 1932, 405-6n and Writings: Supplement (1929-33), 390, and I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 181-7. Groves recollection of the pre-conference is to be found in The Balham Group,
1974, 74-5. The pre-conference wished to hold a discussion about
Britain but was constrained by the absence of written documents.
Despite plans to convene a more representative gathering in July 1933
no conference was held until 1936.
33. Interview with author, 30 Nov. 1979.
34. R. Groves, op. cit., 60-2.
35. R. Dowse, Left in the Centre,
1966, 178. There were some grounds for this hope. In October Herbert
Morrison, recently in the Cabinet, had written “Labour must move to the
Left in the true sense of the term – to the real socialist left. Not
the spurious left policy of handing out public money under the
impression that we are achieving a redistribution of wealth under the
capitalist system. That is one of the illusions of reformism”, quoted
in B. Donaghue and T. Jones, Herbert Morrison, Portrait of a Politician, 1973, 183.
36. R. Dowse, op. cit., 179.
37.
Later Brockway wrote that he was “not greatly excited over the
disaffiliation issue” and placed first emphasis on the development of
revolutionary policy, (Inside the Left, 1942, 239-40).
38.
The hand of the RPC can be discerned continuously in the events leading
to disaffiliation, and much care should. be taken over the suggestion
that the loss of Clydeside ILP votes to the CPGB in the November
municipal elections was an influential factor. (See J. Foster, The Industrial Politics of the Communist Party, BSSLH, Spring 1979, 57).
39.
653 branches at the July conference were reduced to 450 by November.
One third of the Yorkshire branches and 128 of those in Scotland were
lost. London however lost only one of its 89 branches and formed. most
of the new ones (R. Dowse, op. cit., 185). London was the centre of the RPC.
40.
The following year Trotsky wrote, “True, one can object that the ILP
just recently broke away from the Labour Party, and that we evaluated
this as a step forward. That is absolutely correct: And of course we
are by no means suggesting now that the ILP go back into the Labour
Party and submit to its discipline. Such a policy would be a complete
betrayal of the revolutionary tasks facing the British proletariat.” After the British Municipal Elections, 14 Nov. 1933, Writings: Supplement (1929-33),
323-4. Trotsky did add however that the ILP having established a
separate identity, must turn towards the Labour Party and trade unions
or disappear.
41. Weston had not been a founder member of the British Section but had joined by the summer of 1933.
42. For Discussion,
6, 20 July 1933. Purkis believed Wicks to have presented the
differences this way at the Copenhagen gathering of November 1932. He
believed that there were three positions within the League: that work
should be confined to the CPGB (this he thought was held only
tentatively); that work should centre on aggressive presentation of
Opposition material, and the recruitment of Oppositionists to the CPGB;
that the main task was to build a new organization which involved work
within the CPGB (For Discussion, 6 July 1933).
43. An anonymous document Mass Work (3 Feb 1933) suggested such a course.
44. An anonymous resolution of the. time suggests devoting The Communist
regularly to England and agitational articles, establishing the nuclei
of firm Opposition groups, contacting the “Left Wing Youth”, and
preparing a pamphlet setting down the views of the Left Opposition. It
proposed deadlines for the appearance of The Red Flag, The Communist and bulletins.
45. Statement from Members of the 1931-33 Committee of the British Group of the Left Opposition, 18 April 1933, 1. No evidence as to the identity of H. Davis has been located.
46. An example of this is that an experiment issue of The Red Flag
was produced probably in October or November 1932. Swabeck, when he saw
it expressed disquiet that publication of this together with The Communist might tend to “diffuse the energies of a small group”. (A. Swabeck to Groves and Sara, 29 Nov. 1932, Warwick MSS)
47. The manifesto Even now they blunder,
(Spring 1933), a collection of compromising quotations from CPGB
leaders, was thought to have neglected to provide an explanation of the
united front and therefore to be anti-party in content.
48. Davis et. al., loc. cit.
49.
This constitution, several pages long, put a ceiling of 20 on local
membership, though this would have represented half the national
figure; it proposed a developed distinct structure, though there were
no members outside London; and it recalled recent experience in the
CPGB with its devotion of a whole article, (Article VII) to Organisational Democracy Safeguards (For Discussion, 6 June 1933).
50. Trotsky’s thinking can be followed in the articles KPD or New Party?, I and II, March 1933, Writings (1932-33), 137-40 and The Collapse of the KPD and the Tasks of the Opposition, 9 April 1933, Writings (1932-33), 189-97. He returned to the subject of a complete break with the Comintern and its sections several times that year.
51.
The members were invited to submit statements on the proposition that a
new party was necessary in Germany. Only the Battersea group and Purkis
demurred. For the statements of the National Committee and Purkis see For Discussion, 24 May 1933, n.p.
52. Number One, Vol I, Sub-titled, Monthly Organ of the British Section, International Left Opposition. In June (Bolshevik-Leninists) was added to the sub-title.
53. In May The Red Flag carried Trotsky’s The German Workers Will Rise Again – Stalinism Never! on its centre pages, and in the June issue It is now the turn of Austria!.
July brought a domestic contribution on the differences of Brockway and
Pollitt over foreign policy, but also carried Trotsky’s A Letter on the Work of the British Section and The Problems of the Soviet Regime. One minor coup was the eliciting of a reply from Tom Mann to an open letter in The Red Flag
for September 1933 calling on him to speak out for Chen Du Siu, a CCCP
leader who backed Trotsky and was now in a Nationalist jail (The Red Flag, Oct.-Nov. 1933).
54. For Discussion, 28 Aug. 1933, n.p. The July Red Flag carried an impressive list of nine bookshops where it was on sale.
55. October’s issue appeared, late, as a joint issue with November – December’s issue did not appear at all.
56. The ninth issue of The Communist appeared on 6 January 1934, after the split in the Communist League, leading with Trotsky’s article A Letter to an ILP member. It is thought that circulation of The Communist reached 4-500 (A. Penn, op. cit., 86).
57. Sub-titled Internal Bulletin – British Section – International Left Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninists). Some of these were double issues.
58. For Discussion,
28 Aug. 1933. After numbers 1 and 2, (September and October 1933) no
more seem to have appeared despite the promise of No.3 “early in
November”.
59.
An August statement of the N.C. called for the raising of a £50 press
fund. Late that month the League was considering further expenditure to
produce The Communist. It also planned to publish a translation from the German by D.D. Harber of Oskar Fischer’s Leninism Versus Stalinism, a compilation of quotations.
b60. In The Left Socialist Organizations and Our Tasks, 15 June 1933, Writings: 1932-33,
274-8, Trotsky analysed such parties as the German SAP, and the British
ILP, as centrists moving to the left and predicted that some
Oppositionists would refuse to take them seriously.
61. See It is Necessary to Build Communist Parties and an International Anew”, 15 July 1933, Writings: 1932-33, 304-11. The article was published in For Discussion, 12 Aug. 1933.
62.
In a statement dated 9 September 1933 the National Committee declared
its intention to go further along the path of “independent action”,
with the perspective of anew party. The Section now styled itself
Communist League, a terminological change made also by the
International Left Opposition, (see For Discussion, 27 Sept. 1933). First public evidence of this was The Red Flag for Oct.-Nov. 1933.
63.
The national committee of 20 June 1933 instructed Groves to draw up a
document on the ILP. His response noted that revulsion from the CPGB
had led some ILPers to make a doomed attempt to turn their party’s
revolutionary one. He proposed special Opposition material dealing with
both parties, the formation of fractions within the RPC and “other ILP
units” and joint activities with the ILP where possible. (Our Attitude Towards the ILP, 6 July 1933, For Discussion, 20 July 1933). A special committee of the British Section was established to watch the ILP.
64. W. Graham, Statement to the NC re the Resolution of 23 June on the ILP, 11 July 1933, For Discussion,
20 July 1933. Graham had been a member of the Hackney local of the CPGB
for fourteen months to June 1933 when he was expelled for anti-party
work and association with the Balham Group, (Red Flag, July 1933). Graham singled out the RPC as that part of the ILP deserving of special attention.
65. The New Content of the Slogan “Reform of the CPGB”, 3 July 1933, For Discussion, (3 Aug. 1933). It seems likely that D.D. Harber (q.v.) was a member of this group.
66. Trotsky noted in August that Inprecorr was already attacking the ILP for its association with expelled Trotskyists.
67.
He told J.P. Cannon (and also Shachtman) the ILP was a young party led
by “a few old men” which had executed “an enormous shift towards a
revolutionary position”. The more established Americans had to help the
British concretize their already good connections with the party. (The ILP and the British Section, 22 Aug. 1933, Writings: Supplement (1929-33),
276-7) To Jacob Watcher of the SAP he wrote linking ILP hesitation over
aligning itself with the Fourth International to its domestic fate.
Entry of the British Section would create urgently needed pressure, he
argued. “A few more months of vacillation and there will be nothing
left of the ILP, but a memory”. (“As It Is” and “As It Should Be”, 26 Aug. 1933, Writings: Supplement (1929-33), 283.)
68.
His thrust was at the ILP conception of the united front (with the
CPGB) and what he considered its vagueness on international issues.(Whither the Independent Labour Party?, 28 Aug. 1933, published in The Red Flag for Oct.-Nov.1933.)
69. The Declaration of Four,
signed by the Independent Socialist Party (OSP) and the Revolutionary
Socialist Party, (both of Holland), the Socialist Workers Party (SAP)
of Germany, and the International Left Opposition called for
revolutionary forces to build a new international. The ILP never signed
it, but the British Section. published it as The New International: a document of the Paris Conference, (Warwick MSS/15/3/1/15). For Trotsky’s high expectations of the Declaration of Four, see A Discussion with Pierre Rambert, Writings: Supplement (1929-33), 287-8.
70.
They travelled to meet Trotsky at Royan after the conclusion of the
Left Socialist conference. Maxton, another ILP, delegate had originally
intended to make the trip but had to return home. Smith’s account of
the interview was published in The New Leader,
13.Oct. 1933. The circumstances of the meeting between Trotsky and the
ILP leaders were to be recalled for forensic purposes by the Trotsky
Defence Committee at the time of the Moscow Trials, (The New Leader, 9 April 1937). It has been suggested that Jennie Lee was also of the party, (I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 263). Smith was the ILP leader who most impressed Trotsky, (From A Letter of L.D., 3 Sept. 1933, For Discussion, 24 Oct. 1933).
71.
Witte, leader of the Archio-Marxists of Greece and secretary of the ILO
was despatched to inform the British of the IS proposal but appears to
have communicated instead his own misgivings. (Comrade Witte’s Violations of Bolshevik Organizational Principles, 28 Sept. 1933, Writings: Supplement (1929-33), 308-11.)
72.
The distinction was that the IS, lead by Bauer its other secretary,
believed two members should stay outside the ILP, and publicly maintain
an independent press. Trotsky thought an external presence would lead
to charges of factionalism being levelled by the ILP Suspending
publication would avoid an occasion for expulsion. (From a letter of L.D., 3 Sept. 1933, For Discussion, 27 Sept. 1933. In Writings: 1933-1934, 71, this appears as How to Influence the ILP).
Trotsky seems to have weighed the consideration that the articles
published by the British would still be available in the American Militant.
73. L. Trotsky, To Jacob Walcher On the Declaration of Four, 21 Aug. 1933, Writings: Supplement (1929-33), 275.
b74. In Trotsky’s correspondence there is mention of proposed discussion on the ILP with a delegate from “the English Section” (ibid.,
275). But the ILO plenum had already been held and this may be a
careless reference to the impending visit of Smith and Paton. If so,
then Trotsky had met no CL members since Wicks attended the Copenhagen
gathering of late 1932. This may have made it easier for Witte to give
the impression that joining the ILP was a proposal of individuals not a
firm directive and even as Trotsky believed, to put the British into
opposition, (Comrade Witte’s Violations of Bolshevik Organizational Principles, 28 Sept. 1933).
75.
It was argued that the ILP, could staunch losses of membership on its
right and its left, but only by standing for a Marxist policy. Abstract
proclamations would prove no more efficacious for it then they had for
the CPGB,(The Red Flag, Sept. 1933 ).
76. The arguments of Trotsky and those of the IS were held to be “irrefutable” by the CL National Committee on 12 September (Statement of the National Committee upon the Question of New Parties and a New International, For Discussion, 27 Sept. 1933).
77. Our Relations With The ILP, 5 Sept. 1933, For Discussion, 27 Oct. 1933.
78. How to Influence the ILP, 3 Sept.; The ILP and the New International, ( Sept.; Principled Considerations on Entry, 16 Sept.; The Fate of the British Section, 25 Sept. See Writings: (1933-34), 71-8, 84-7, 100. A further minor confusion was introduced into the debate when Trotsky wrote Principled Considerations on Entry over the pseudonym G. Gourov. It seems clear from For Discussion that the CL was unaware that Gourov and Trotsky were one.
79. C.A. Smith’s account of his interview with Trotsky appeared, late, in The New Leader
for 13 October 1933. Trotsky advised Smith that the ILP, must retain
its independence at all costs until it had become revolutionary which
meant a transition “from an empirical to a theoretical basis” and,
concretely, recognition that formation of the Fourth International was
the task of the hour. In December Sara and other CL leaders were to
allege that Trotsky, following his meeting with Smith, looked to the
ILP rather than the CL. Though he later disclaimed it, he seems to have
entertained some hopes of at least a section of the ILP leadership.
80.
“Another couple of months and the ILP will have completely fallen
between the gear-wheels of the Stalinist bureaucracy and will be lost
leaving thousands of disappointed workers”. (Principled Considerations on Entry, Writings: 1933-34, 86.)
81. In a letter to The New Leader
Trotsky corrected what he considered was a fallacious impression of the
Paris Conference of Left Socialist Organizations given by C.A. Smith to
The Daily Worker, (To Dispel Misunderstandings, 2 Oct. 1933, Writings: 1933-34, 123-4.)
82. When he had received the CL letter of 5 September Trotsky replied under the title of The Lever of a Small Group (Writings: 1933-34)
83.
Trotsky favoured a public approach but considered that however it was
achieved the CL, once in the ILP, would in practice be a faction with
common discipline. In practice this was to take some time to achieve.
84.
“H. Allen”, possibly a pseudonym for an American Trotskyist resident in
Britain, advanced an argument leaning on the threat from the CPGB, and
was much impressed that the ILP had broken with social democracy before
Hitler came to power (The Struggle to Win the ILP from the control of the centrists, hand-dated 5 Oct. 1933, Warwick MSS 15/3/1/50 [1]). This document is incomplete).
85. H. Allen, F. Chalcroft, W. Graham, Statement On The ILP, 12 Oct. 1933, For Discussion, 24 Oct. 1933.
86.
“The basic strategy of the Stalinists is to rob the ILP of its
independence as a party in one way or another and to accomplish this
task at the earliest possible moment, before these ‘Trotskyist
objections’ have time to become more deeply rooted in the rank and
file.” (ibid., Mi. 3)
87. Chalcroft, one of the authors, recorded his scepticism that the whole ILP could be convinced.
88.
“All the many phases of work which have been possible through our
independent organisation would also cease (in addition to losing the Red Flag and withdrawing fraction members from the CPGB – M.U.) and we should become a fraction, a very crippled fraction, in the ILP” (H. Sara, R. Groves H. Dewar and S. Dowdall, The Work In, And Relation To, The Independent Labour Party, n.d., For Discussion, 24 Oct. 1933.)
89.
The majority believed that the decisive moment was far more likely to
strike at the 1934 annual conference of the ILP at which time the
Party’s National Administrative Council would have to explain the
deterioration of relations with the CPGB.
90.
It was claimed by the majority that a quarter of the CL was still
working in the CPGB, and that a Scottish contact, not an ILP member,
was selling the remarkable number of 300 Red Flags. It seems possible that this was Frank Maitland (q.v.), then running an Edinburgh socialist bookshop.
91. Jottings of one majority member for the meeting have survived: Notes for Discussion of ILP questions at National Committee meeting, 5 Oct. 1933, Warwick MSS, 15/3/1/49.
92. Near the end of the year there were 40-50 members of the Communist League (anon., On The ILP,
n.d., Warwick MSS 15/3/1/18). 37 members participated in the final vote
on 17 December. The meeting supported a proposal from Kaye that the
majority and minority should both keep minutes.
93.
The way had been prepared for this step by the National Committee which
had asked each member for his or her views. No reply had been received
from Williams, in whose residence the League duplicator was situated,
and he now disappeared from the scene. There was controversy at the
meeting over the views of Wicks, who had also failed to indicate clear
support for steering towards the Fourth.
The meeting know of a report by Witte, joint secretary of the ICL,
that Wicks and Purkis had both retained contacts with the Third
International. But Witte was becoming discredited at this time, and
while Purkis was to withdraw from the League the following year, Wicks
continued to be a member. For Trotsky’s estimate of Witte, see A False Understanding of the New Orientation, 8 Oct. 1933, Writings: 1933-34, 127-8
94. W. Graham had been expelled from the Hackney local of the CPGB in June for criticising the party’s line on Germany.
95. (Majority), Minutes of Members Meeting, 3
96. (Majority), Minutes, 4-5.
97. (Minority), Minutes of the Members Meeting, 1.
98. A member of the Translators” group, possibly a foreign Trotskyist.
99. There is a conflict in the minutes as to whether or not he accepted the Minority concept of fractional work.
100.
Dr. Worrall and Max Nicholls were former members of the Marxist League.
Max Nicholls was a garment worker, then a member of the Hackney local
of the CL. Denzil Dean Harber (1909-1966) went to the LSE in the late
1920s and took a degree in Russian Commerce. As a boy he taught himself
Russian and he joined the CPGB, perhaps while at the LSE. In 1931 he
travelled as interpreter with a Canadian journalist on a trip to
Russia. He stayed there for three months and contemporaries recall his
disillusionment on his return. He discovered the Russian Bulletin of the Opposition in bookshops, however, and made contact with the Balham Group. (Information kindly supplied by Mr. Julien Harber; Obituary, British Birds, 60, 1967, 84-6; interview with Mr. John Archer, Nov. 1973.
101.
Lee Bradley, who like her husband Gerry had been a member of the
Marxist League, was a member of the Chelsea local of the CPGB expelled
earlier in the year.
102. A member of the Hackney group.
103. Sara alleged that Trotsky thought The Red Flag a mere reprint of the American Militant, (Minority), Minutes, (8). There is no definite evidence for this, but see above.
104. Problems of international organisation have never been LT’s strong point, (Majority), Minutes, 10.
105. Three absentee votes included in the Majority total, and two among the Minority, (Majority), Minutes, 11.
106. This letter has not been located.
107. The Minority had, seemingly, withdrawn from the National Committee, (Majority), Minutes, 11.
108. Draft Statement of the present Position of the Majority and Minority, 19 Dec. 1933, Warwick MSS, 15/3/I/52i, 1.
109. ibid., 1. This view was to be echoed from abroad.
110. WIL, Internal Bulletin, [Sept.? 1943], H.P., D.J.H., 14 A/8, History of British Trotskyism.
111. Allen was the exception. Dewar hardly counts in view of the brevity of his sojourn in the Party.
112. This is, of course, the thesis of W. Kendall in The Revolutionary Movement in Britain, 1917-21, 1969, an account of the early years of the CPGB.
IV
THE MARXIST GROUP IN THE ILP
(1933-1936)
Trotskyists were present in the ILP in significant numbers for three
years, Those who followed Trotsky’s advice to join the party were the
least experienced of his followers in revolutionary activity. There was
little prospect of converting the whole party into a following of the
International Left Opposition and the Trotskyists were always weaker
than the various advocates of joining the CPGB. After two years of
working within the ILP, the Trotskyists ceased to advocate critical
support for the Labour Party in the belief that the ILP was the only
truly anti-war party. This hope was falsified and they left the ILP, as
individuals and small groups throughout 1936.
Ten branches supported the Trotskyist line at the January 1934
conference of the London ILP. This represented the influence of thirty
members of the secret Bolshevik-Leninist fraction which had been
established [1], but not of those CL Minority members who were to join the ILP. [2] A handful of the fraction had some training in the Communist Party behind them, but many had known only the ILP. [3]
The task they faced required great sophistication; they brought to it
only part of what was in any case one of the weakest and least tested
national sections of the International Left Opposition. They had to
pioneer a trail. that the French, Belgians and Americans were to follow
in the next two years. [4]
Nor had they, in Trotsky’s view, started well. He fretted over the
delay which occurred early in the year before there was a full entry
into the ILP The Minority was holding back because of inhibitions over
the continued activity of the Majority under the name Communist League.
Trotsky urged it not to delay over practical considerations, but to
repudiate the League and justify its split by energetic work in the ILP.
[5]
It finally took his advice and wrote to Brockway to ask if it could
join as a group. When this was refused it announced the “liquidation” of
the Communist League and those still outside the ILP joined as
individuals. [6]
ILP interest in Trotsky had grown after disaffiliation. No party
leader was ever a Trotskyist, despite accusations from the CPGB But the
party did publish and review Trotsky [7],
and the imprint of his thought is apparent on Brockway and other
leaders. For his part, Trotsky used the ILP’s interest in him and the
friendly relations he had developed with some leaders to put his
analysis before the party membership. Throughout the presence of the
Opposition in the ILP his prestige and thought were, arguably, its
strongest weapons. [8]
Trotsky attributed the decline of the ILP after disaffiliation, a
step he supported, to its decision to face not the masses but the CPGB [9]
Being formless itself, representing no distinct idea, the ILP, was
certainly in no condition to reform the Comintern. He was particularly
savage with ILP oscillations between the internationals. [10] The ILP should stop seeking a formless unity for which there was no political basis. Otherwise it faced extinction.
Within the ILP communist influence was strong and grew up to 1934.
The CPGB sought at first a united front with the ILP to be, followed by
actual unity. [11]
Up to sometime in 1933, the Revolutionary Policy Committee, while
favouring a united communist party, still made criticisms of the
communists. [12] In the next twelve months this began to change. The leaders of the CPGB, were sensitive to Trotskyist influence in the ILP [13] and to a certain extent had to engage in a rare debate with it in the party press. [14]
The most rapid success achieved by the Communists was in the ILP Guild
of Youth which declared for the Young Communist International at its
Norwich conference in 1934. [15] But it was the party itself which was most promising to the CPGB.
The Revolutionary Policy Committee was to become an outpost for the
communists. At first, however, it preserved its independence. RPC
leaders hoped initially that the ILP would outstrip the CPGB as the
revolutionary party of British Workers [16], and that was the motivation behind the drive to disaffiliate from the Labour Party. [17]
In this period, with several of Trotsky’s supporters working within it,
the RPC was, if anything, nearer to the Right Opposition of Heinrich
Brandler than to the CPGB. [18]
After the 1933 Derby conference of the ILP, the RPC began to aim at a
united communist party. This objective was not shared by the Trotskyists
on the Committee, four of whom resigned. [19]
The RPC faltered, and then after Spring 1934 resumed activity steering
closely towards the CPGB. It was noticeable that the party’s attitude
towards the RPC underwent a change. [20] In December 1933 it was warning of Trotskyist influence in the RPC [21] and it set up the Affiliation Committee with the aim of rallying all those who were steering towards the CPGB. [22]
After this hopes in the RPC were renewed and Cullen – plus to a lesser
extent Jack Gaster – became a direct communist spokesman. [23]
It is impossible to make sense of Trotskyist behaviour within the ILP
without allowing for the effects of communist policy. The ILP as a
whole was drawn towards the CPGB because it apparently embodied the
Russian Revolution and Marxist authority. Close cooperation in a united
front was another matter and revolts in Glasgow, Wales and Lancashire
were all traceable to association with the communists. The Trotskyists
noted this, and some of them were to strive to appear as a loyal
opposition within the ILP. And some ILP leaders, notably Brockway, found
Trotsky’s thought a useful proof that King Street did not possess a
monopoly of revolutionary wisdom.
The 1934 conference of the ILP at York was a disappointment to the
CPGB and an encouragement to the Trotskyists. Trotskyists in the Holborn
and Finsbury, South Norwood, Clapham and Islington branches all came
together after the London divisional conference at the beginning of the
year and formed a Bolshevik-Leninist faction. They called for an
organisation which could advance a clear revolutionary line as an
alternative to that emanating from the RPC and the NAC. [24]
It was clear that in the present state of the ILP there might be a
response to such a stand even from those who did not consider themselves
Trotskyists. At York, in the debate on international affiliation, the
communist motion was rejected almost four to one and the RPC motion
(putting conditions on affiliation to the Comintern) by nearly two to
one. The Trotskyist motion called for direct support for the Fourth
International and fell 20:137. The encouragement to be derived from this
vote lay in comparing it with the thirty four votes cast for direct
Comintern affiliation as advanced by CPGB, supporters. Moreover, when
conference was invited expressly to condemn affiliation to the Fourth International. It declined to do so by 107:64.
This was an uncomfortable jolt for the CPGB. [25]
Among the Trotskyists there was some elation. They had been led to
believe that the ILP must come over to the Fourth International or
collapse, a prognosis which determined that entering it must prove a
short-term venture. Instead the ILP had vacillated on the Fourth
International and survived communist encroachment. D.D. Harber concluded
that it had been wrong to anticipate the party’s early demise, that a
definite field of work remained open for Trotskyists. He counselled
setting the target of a majority by the next ILP conference or even
forcing an extraordinary conference if support grew sufficiently fast.
The communists, he believed, would now withdraw. The Bolshevik-Leninists
ought to support the NAC if it took disciplinary measures against
communists and after that make the centrist NAC itself the main target
of criticism. [26]
Harber deceived himself and others about the possibilities in the
ILP. Communist withdrawal was eighteen months off; so was disciplinary
action, and when it arrived it was not aimed only at the communists.
There was also a tension among the Trotskyists as to the node of
organisation they needed to achieve their ambitious end. They were able
to use single ILP branches as activity and publishing centres, and would
continue to do so. [27]
Should they coalesce in a form to which others who were not
Trotskyists, but supported particular Bolshevik-Leninist policies might
be attracted? The idea seems to have been Harber’s [28],
and his also was the belief that within the larger organisation the
Bolshevik-Leninist fraction should be retained. In the Autumn of 1934
the larger organisation was established under the name of the Marxist
Group in the ILP, and it began to publish a bulletin. But Group members
were still protagonists, albeit critical ones, of the ILP, and they
continued to sell the eclectic New Leader. [29]
By this time Trotskyism was a recognised force in the ILP. It was the
protagonist of a policy against war, of a mass united front and for the
Fourth International. Like the RPC, whose principal antagonist it was,
Trotskyism was strongest in London. Indeed Trotskyist influence in the
provincial ILP can be seen only from 1935. In London the paper
membership claimed by the Marxist Group, at seventy, was in excess of
that of a year earlier, but the active membership was not much grown. [30] It was claimed that no new ILP members were recruited to Trotskyism after the CL Minority joined the party. [31]
The four London branches under Trotskyist control convened a meeting
on 3 November to establish the Marxist Group. Sixty ILPers attended and
vowed to transform the ILP into a “revolutionary party”. [32]
This represented a new departure from the original aim of accumulating
basic cadres. Having committed themselves to the ILP however, they had
to turn it towards the Labour Party and trade unions: at present the
ILP, under the RPC influence, was in their view engaged in “spasmodic
anarchist stunts”. The concrete meaning of this lay first in a drive to
make the ILP, work systematically in trade unions, and second, in an
attempt to commit it to critical electoral support for the Labour Party
except where the ILP itself had a greater following. Close attention to
the trade unions was advocated by Bert Matlow [33], Sid Kemp [34] and Ernie Patterson [35],
all members of the Clapham ILP. Bill Duncan of Islington, proposed that
the ILP “support social democracy in order to destroy it” in elections [36], though his view was challenged by Max Nicholls who thought it possible there would be no more elections. [37]
At the Winter 1934 London divisional conference of the ILP the
Marxist Group had behind it sixty or seventy followers, though the
active number was less. The RPC, however, had ceased to be amorphous and
remained strong in the division. It was powerful enough to take
disciplinary action against six Marxist Group members. [38] The two currents clashed on the meaning of the united front and on other issues where the RPC reflected communist policy. [39]
Matlow also attacked the division’s international resolution as “loose
phrases strung together; the stock-in-trade of pseudo-revolutionaries”. [40]
Despite the presence at the forefront of the Marxist Group of Matlow,
who was at this time close to international thinking, Trotsky was not
impressed with the progress made. A full entry by the British Section in
the summer of 1933 would, he thought, have changed the ILP. As it was
he tended not to offer tactical advice to the Marxist Group for some
time, though he was interested in entrism elsewhere. [41]
Within the International Communist League debate on “entrism” began to
shift to a discussion on the fate of the Ligue Communist for whom
Trotsky was advocating joining the SFIO. Trotsky urged that all sections
actively participate in the debate over the French turn, and some of
his followers took his advice to the point of splitting with the
movement. No British seem to have attended the crucial extended plenum
of the ICL, convened on 14-16 October, however; there the leadership of
the international movement resolved that new parties could not be built
on abstract formulas but in actual circumstances. These included the
emergence of parties breaking free of social democracy yet retaining
their independence due to the “total loss” of attraction by the
Comintern. [42]
From early 1935 the Marxist Group could have steered a course out of
the ILP. While it had not greatly grown, the party itself was in
decline. [43]
Whatever attractions there were in the ILP were now rivalled by
developments in the Labour Party whose younger members, like those of
the SFIO, were now showing signs of life. The communists while turning
the RPC back towards the ILP were already paying attention to
developments in the Labour League of Youth, showing again that
flexibility of tactics in which they were to outstrip the Trotskyists
throughout the decade. [44]
Some time early in 1935 Harber and Kirby slipped out of the ILP and
began to work in the League of Youth and the Socialist League. [45] But the recruitment which had taken place in the ILP [46],
together with the knowledge of Trotsky’s lengthy polemic with party
leaders, was a powerful force pulling the Marxist Group back. Some time
in the spring of 1935, the inner Bolshevik-Leninist fraction dissolved
leaving only the Marxist Group. [47] And the Marxist Group’s existence was premissed on the belief that the ILP could be convinced of a revolutionary line. [48]
The Marxist Group issued a call for the like-minded to contact it in anticipation of the Derby conference of the party [49], due at Easter 1935. This may have been the means by which it broke out of London for the first time.
When the national conference convened, the Marxist Group launched its
most forceful attack so far. In several debates it was chief rival to
the RPC as a critic of the National Administrative Council. Matlow again
it was who flayed the leadership for its vague policy statement on the
crisis of capitalism. A full Trotskyist critique was set out in a series
of amendments from Clapham, Holborn and Finsbury, and Finchley and
Hendon, which he moved. Supported by Robinson and Marzillier (Islington)
he clashed with both the NAC and Cullen of the RPC in his view that
Russia’s trading policy tended to ease the capitalist crisis. Cullen’s
speech was more of an attack on Matlow than a positive presentation of
the amendments of the London Division, which the RPC controlled. [50]
While neither the RPC nor the Marxist Group met with success in this
debate, that did not necessarily imply total isolation. Robertson [51] failed by only one vote to carry an editorial board for the New Leader, a proposition which must have weakened Brockway’s grip.
But the tireless Matlow found no support from beyond the Group when he turned to the Method of the ILP.
An even longer list of amendments moved by him included the name of the
East Liverpool branch, a first swallow hinting at a summer of influence
outside the capital. [52]
Matlow took his stand on the need for systematic trade union work,
compared with which street recruitment was of no value. Smith for the
NAC was able to secure the defeat of all amendments with the argument
that Matlow sought to concentrate on industrial activity to the
exclusion of all other work.
As in industrial policy, so on electoral policy, the Marxist Group
found itself not on the ultra-left but urging the ILP back into the
labour movement mainstream. Marzillier argued for critical support for
Labour candidates in the forthcoming election and advanced the slogan of
a third Labour Government. The ILP, he suggested, would have to go
through this struggle with the workers while working for disillusionment
with “boss-class democracy”. This was too much for an old timer like
Joseph Southall, and Robert Smillie of the Guild of Youth weighed in for
the platform with the observation that critical support would mean the
ILP sharing responsibility for the failure of the next Labour
Government.
In the Danger of War debate, after Jennie Lee had clashed
with Jon Kimche over allegations of vagueness in the NAC statement,
Robertson and Robinson argued the classic Trotskyist analysis of the
USSR. Robertson also challenged the long-standing partiality of the ILP
for a general strike against war, which would not, he declared, be
possible without cleaving to a new international.
The NAC had made no reference to the Fourth International in its
international statement, a point Matlow seized upon. Gaster for the RPC
observed that a Fourth International was indeed the logical end even of
the NAC’s present connections with the left socialist parties. But the
NAC knew where it stood, and C.A. Smith reminded the conference that it
was the ILP itself which was the principal stumbling block to the Fourth
International within the London Bureau. [53]
The Marxist Group intervention at the 1935 Derby conference of the
ILP was a high point of Trotskyist penetration. It had managed to deploy
its limited strength to best advantage at the conference by means of
frequent speeches from its few delegates and a phalanx of identifiable
Trotskyist resolutions on each subject. None of its positions was passed
by conference, but it had attained status almost as a balancing force
to the RPC This was Brockway’s view [54]:
it suited him to contrast the “revolutionary socialist” view with
communism and Trotskyism, both of which doctrines were supported only by
factions resembling each other in their call for association of the ILP
and the Labour Party. [55]
The Communist Party also weighed up the Trotskyists against the RPC.
While the Trotskyists never secured more than ten votes for their block
amendments, they appeared to the communists to be boosted by the
leadership of the ILP:
It is quite clear that a large section of the leadership is striving
desperately to take the ILP back to reactionary reformism, and to this
end are prepared to make an unprincipled – even if unavowed alliance –
alliance with any elements – even the Trotskyists (sic) – who will aid
them in the calumniation of the Soviet Union, the Communist
International and the CPGB, and in breaking off the united front which
even in its present limited form has already achieved so much in
cementing the workers in their struggles. [56]
But Derby had also been a successful holding operation for the NAC.
RPC support never passed forty votes against the backing of two-thirds
of conference for the leadership. Cullen failed in his bid to be elected
to the NAC. For the Marxist Group things were worse still: its best
vote count was ten. The NAC felt strong enough to assert itself in the
youth field and it was possible the measures against factionalism in the
party might follow. [57]
The Marxist Group line was to support measures against the RPC because
that body was based outside the ILP. When Aplin, London Divisional
Organiser, charged Cullen, Gaster and Hawkins with preparing a split,
Joe Pawsey, editor of the Bulletin supported him:
“We must have no weakness, no hesitation to rid the ILP, of anti-working class elements.” [58]
At this point, in mid-summer 1935, the Marxist Group was still the
clearest advocate within the ILP of a true united front with the Labour
Party and electoral support [59], though the communist line, and therefore that of the RPC was now changing in that direction too. [60]
But instead of following the logic of critical support for Labour into
transferring its faction to the Labour Party it now adopted a kind of
ILP patriotism and prolonged its stay.
This reversal was brought about by the crisis after the
Italo-Abyssinian war and its impact on British politics. The corollary
of the united front advocated by national communist parties from 1934
was the Comintern policy of League sanctions against fascist Italy to
restrain it from a colonial war. This was the line of the CPGB and also,
after its 1935 conference, of the Labour Party. But the ILP, and the
Socialist League, while firmly against Mussolini’s colonial adventure,
were conscious of the threat of war, sought to advance an independent
view and advocated therefore a policy of workers’ sanctions against
Italy. [61]
The policy of workers” sanctions was strongly urged by Brockway in The New Leader.
When he echoed Lenin’s denunciation of the League of Nations as a
“thieves kitchen” in which he would have no part, he was advancing a
policy with which Trotsky agreed. [62]
The view of the Fourth International was, uniquely, being advanced in
Britain with authority on the main political question of the day. It was
a great opportunity for the Marxist Group, strengthened by the
confusion into which the RPC was thrown. [63]
Within the Group, the best chance fell to C.L.R. James, now chairman of
the Finchley ILP, the most prominent black in the party, indeed in
British politics. [64] The party promoted him to the status of leading spokesman [65]
and he used his status to advocate setting aside the League of Nations
report and fighting not only Mussolini but also “the other robbers and
oppressors, French and British Imperialism”. [66] He had a slightly individual approach to the issue, [67] and this together with his savage handling of communist inconsistencies probably increased his appeal to ILP leaders.
The question of workers’ sanctions introduced confusion into the RPC,
and switched the Marxist Group into reverse gear. In the RPC Jack
Gaster broke ranks and came out for Brockway’s policy on the League of
Nations. [68]
The Marxist Group had resolved on 20 October to oppose League sanctions
and to call on ILP branches to motivate their response to the coming
general election by reference to the imminence of war. War would destroy
workers” freedom, sanctions led to war, Labour favoured sanctions and
so the progressive features of its platform were now defunct: “Critical
support cannot be implemented in the forthcoming election.” [69]
Opposition to war, the united front and the Fourth International had
been the planks of the Marxist Group platform. One stand of the ILP had
sufficed to overturn them. The Marxist Group argued for ILPers to be
adopted wherever possible in the coming general election, that only
anti-sanctions Labour candidates should get support, and indeed that if
the pro-sanctions party kept control of the Labour Party the ILP should
oppose all its candidates, demanding a general strike and direct
recruitment. Workers’ sanctions had reversed roles in the ILP: the
Marxist Group which had advocated ILP-Labour unity against RPC-CPGB
sectarianism now found itself a recruiting sergeant for the ILP. And
yet, while the conformity of the workers’ sanctions policy to Leninist
principles cannot be challenged, the gloss put on it by the Marxist
Group was sheer revolutionary posturing. Labour’s ability to issue a
call for a general strike against war was in doubt [70]: how much more so was that of the ILP, which had no trade union influence at all?
The Trotskyists were supposed to have a militantly anti-pacifist
line. And yet in 1935, and again in 1939, many British Trotskyists found
themselves effectively endorsing pacifism by their argument that policy
on war was the touchstone of all policy:
“The imminence of war must force us to concentrate our attack on the
LP support of a war which will sweep away all democratic liberties The
only basis for advocating critical support does not therefore exist.” [71]
For the Marxist Group the task was how to build “our” revolutionary
party. A special conference of the ILP must be convened: it must aim to
fight for power. This of course was not entrism but one hundred per cent
commitment to the ILP Trotsky allowing that The New Leader
had carried the best articles in the labour press on the crisis,
advised that there was more to a revolutionary party than writing good
articles. [72]
There were dissenters in Britain too. Robinson charged that the new
Marxist Group policy sprang from a misunderstanding of the united front:
“The ILP can adopt more progressive demands than the Labour Party
bureaucracy, but this does not dispense with the need for a united front
with the Labour Party.” [73]
Policies for workers were fine but Marxist Group and ILP policy cut
them off from the workers. These workers did not make a distinction
between Labour’s membership and its leaders. Robertson tried to puncture
illusions about the ILP, pointing out that the NAC retained pacifist
pretensions such as over the refusal of military service, in its letter
to ILP branches of October 20. He also put Trotsky’s analysis of the ILP
position before the party membership. [74]
But Robertson and Robinson were in a minority. The Group drew close
to the NAC for six crucial months during which time Trotskyist forces in
the ILP would have been valuable reinforcements for their comrades
elsewhere. When five Group members voiced criticisms at an FSU meeting,
the London division of the ILP, under RPC leadership, suspended them.
Matlow was kept off the divisional speakers’ list. Another member was
barred as organiser for a London area though nominated by his
federation. When the party NAC intervened and rescinded the suspension,
the Marxist Group triumphantly taunted the RPC for disloyalty: “let them
join the party whose policy they are trying to carry out – the CPGB”.
This was what now happened: sixty three RPC members withdrew to join the CPGB [75], demoralised by failure. [76] Other RPC members remained within the ILP but seem to have achieved minimal impact. [77]
The RPC walk out occurred at a special London divisional conference of
October 26-27. There the Marxist Group scored success with the passage
of a Holborn motion condemning peace councils and one from Clapham
attacking Soviet patriotism. Generally, however, decisions of the
conference were not clear cut. The debate on electoral policy split
communists and Trotskyists. Gaster joined Aplin, the chairman of the
London ILP on the Marxist Group platform; Hilda Lane, who supported the
Robinson line, voted with Cullen and the RPC for critical support. [78]
The Group backed Aplin’s nomination for the chairman’s post and called
on the party to realise that it, and not the CPGB, had the future of the
working class in its hands. [79]
Outside London, Marxist Group influence in the Liverpool Federation had
been strong enough to secure a special conference of the Lancashire
division. Yet against protests from Marxist Grouper Reg Collins of East
Liverpool, the conference was confined to a discussion on war. But Don
James, another Group member, successfully seconded an amendment to a
motion by Hicks of Stockport calling for revolutionary propaganda to be
carried into the army [80], moved a further amendment urging the need to prepare for going underground, and called for work for the Fourth International. [81]
He still failed to carry-the Marxist Group line against a divisional
council resolution which urged critical support for Labour. [82]
C.L.R. James used his prominence over Abyssinia to launch himself
into domestic issues. He predicted a mass swing to the left, a
bourgeoisie that would act against Parliament and turn to fascism. [83] He was patronised by the leadership and Marxist Groupers could be found in a number of provincial areas. [84]
Yet the secession of the RPC, far from clearing the way for the Group,
merely opened the path for the NAC to put its own house in order. The
annual London divisional conference rejected the Marxist Group critique
of the London Bureau by three to one and passed by almost two to one an
instruction to the NAC to disband all unofficial groups. [85]
From now until the Keighley conference, due at Easter 1936, there was
a period of high activity for the Marxist Group. It aimed to sustain
the revolutionary line over Abyssinia, which was now under attack from
some ILP leaders who had remained pacifists. Abroad the International
Secretariat was faced with a Marxist Group still in the ILP more than
two years after it had been urged in for a short stay. The Group’s
tendency to blur differences with Brockway and some ILP leaders was not
shared by Trotsky who, in a series of writings, now again paid close
attention to party affairs. [86]
Some IS members were not as critical of the ILP as Trotsky, however,
and there was some conflict as he now urged the Group to draw its ILP,
experiment to an end.
Trotsky’s view was that the ILP still did not represent a clear
alternative. It had split from the Labour Party primarily to maintain
the independence of its MPs; its critique of Labour’s right wing
leadership was hollow. If valid there was a duty incumbent on the ILP to
enter the Labour Party and advocate a Marxist alternative. As for ILP
electoral policy, Trotsky flatly opposed the line of the Marxist Group.
Eight million Labour voters had not, he suggested, seen through Morrison
and Clynes as Marxists had and it was therefore better to put them in
power where their limitations would be apparent. ILP policy amounted to a
partial boycott of Parliament when the party was in no position to
overthrow it. Meanwhile it was still flirting with the CPGB, which had
all the defects of the Labour Party with none of the advantages.
Trotsky was now urging close attention to the Labour Party, but the
situation within the IS was now more complex than it had been in 1933
when ILP entry had first been mooted. The two IS secretaries now were
Sneevliet, a Dutch signatory of the Declaration of Four, who
was to part with it in revulsion from the French turn and Schmidt, an
SAP leader and former London Bureau comrade of Brockway. Schmidt visited
England in January to meet the Marxist Group and other Fourth
Internationalists and Trotsky watched his dealings with some disquiet. [87] Schmidt advised staying in the ILP for a further period, and for a short time Trotsky did not advocate a break. [88]
For some Marxist Groupers, however, there was no point in remaining in
the ILP and in February they began to withdraw to join Harber in the
League of Youth.
Others redoubled their efforts contrasting the Group with the “disloyal” RPC [89] and a drive on the Yorkshire Party [90] led to that division’s conference rejecting a ban on groups.
Trotsky continued to debate with the ILP ever more sharply. He argued
the irrelevance of it considering its relationship with Labour, while
it failed to build a revolutionary policy. While this continued,
leadership would pass elsewhere, perhaps by means of the Right Wing
employing left phraseology. Above all, there was a chance for the
Stalinists, the most dangerous “radical phrasemongers” of all:
“The members of the CPGB are now on their bellies before the Labour Party – but this makes it all the easier for them to crawl inside.” [91]
Once within the Labour Party the communists’ revolutionary aura would
allow them to pose as the left: only a clear and courageous ILP policy
could prevent it. Trotsky delivered a prescient warning about the
critical position of the Labour League of Youth; “Do not only build
fractions – seek to enter”, he urged. The young were at once more easily
confused by, yet suspicious of, attempts to drive them to a new war.”
They would listen more easily to the Fourth International if it was
there to speak to them. “The British Section will recruit its first
cadres from the 30,000 young workers in the Labour League of Youth.” [92]
The ILP as a whole should sever its bogus united front with the
communists but preserve the right to internal fractions. The success or
failure of these clearly depended on leadership quality. He applauded
the purging of communists as a sign that the ILP meant business. Until
that was sure, such organisational measures might equally be used
against the Marxist Group. But the main question was the international
one: if it was honest the ILP would now come out in favour of the Fourth
before its London Bureau fell apart.
On the eve of the Keighley conference, Robertson published another article by Trotsky from the Clapham ILP. [93] The interview carried a strong attack on the London Bureau which Brockway countered. [94]
Trotsky had concluded that the idea of turning the ILP into a
revolutionary party “must now be described as utopian”, and was talking –
ambiguously – of “an independent perspective for the revolutionary
party”. [95]
His arguments for critical support had convinced at least the Marxist
Group, which called for it at the Keighley conference, without success. [96] This lead to a series of defeats on the Parliamentary Reports [97] and on the establishment of fractions in the unions and the Labour Party. [98]
The setpiece conference debate occurred over Abyssinia. Brockway had
indeed been ploughing a lonely furrow over workers” sanctions, and his
line in The New Leader had been reversed by the National Council. [99]
C.L.R. James, the party member most identified with this position,
moved reference back, arguing that fighting capitalism at home was not
some sort of alternative to this international stand. If the working
class had taken industrial action to support Abyssinia, it must have led
immediately to a conflict with the British bosses. Brockway justified
his line with reference to the Derby decisions, and was supported from a
far wider constituency than the Marxist Group was able to provide.
McGovern summed up along neutralist lines, but was unable to prevent
reference back by one vote. It may have been distaste for the Marxist
Group which led conference to give to a Lancashire resolution endorsing
the original New Leader line a bigger majority of thirteen.
But there was a warning sign when, in the private session, Aplin was
able to carry overwhelmingly the banning of groups, against the
opposition of Matlow and Goffe. Ominously they received no vocal support
from the floor.
And the true significance of ILP policy was about to be revealed. The
following day, Maxton and other party leaders resigned their positions
because they could not accept the conference decision on workers’
sanctions. Alarmed, Brockway reopened the vote and this time the NAC
stance was endorsed by ninety three to thirty nine: This was the
critical moment. The chief reason for a continued Marxist Group presence
had vanished. At least one participant believed it should have walked
out of the ILP there and then. [100]
Instead the Marxist Group persisted with the debate on the
International but found little reward. Brockway, unrepentant, spurned a
united revolutionary international formed from the small groups adhering
to Trotsky, which would “from the heights of Oslo, form a new
International”. This did not prevent Drew, a Hackney delegate, jeering
at the NAC’s Bureau as “Trotskyism without a Trotsky” [101], but pleas by Matlow and James were overridden: conference knew the difference between Drew’s accusation and the real thing.
Trotsky’s reply to Brockway showed him at his most vituperative. [102]
An inability to see more in the war than a struggle between two
dictators displayed “the moral ompotence of pacifism”. But it was the
reversal of the vote which incensed Trotsky most: Maxton, “putting the
revolver of an ultimatum at the breast of the conference”, was no less
dictatorial than Haile Selassie or Mussolini; and Brockway’s
incorrigible centrism was illustrated by the higher value he put on
Maxton’s chairmanship than on a principal policy plank. “That”, observed
Trotsky, “is the fate of centrism – to consider the incidental
seriously and the serious thing incidental.” He concluded that the ILP
cause was hopeless and that the thirty nine firm delegates must seek
ways of building a truly revolutionary party. [103]
Disagreements over what was the best next step after Keighley
shattered the Marxist Group. It split three ways: those who thought that
the ILP phase might usefully be prolonged; those who felt an
independent organisation might now be launched with success; and those
who, after Trotsky, believed the time was now ripe for entering the
Labour Party.
Cooper, Pawsey, Ballard and Marzillier advocated the first option.
Unity was the issue of the hour. The turn of the CPGB from sectarian
opposition to the united front to unity at any price was permitting
Citrine and others to use their slogans in order to sell an anti-working
class policy. It was but a short step to conceding communist
affiliation to the Labour Party, argued Cooper et. al. Trotskyism should
oppose CPGB affiliation to the Labour Party on the grounds that it
would create a powerful opportunist front [104]:
correct propaganda about real unity would expose the communist drift as
a betrayal. While the Marxist Group itself might eventually desire
affiliation, it could only be on a principled basis and it would arise
from present preparations.
Cooper and his colleagues believed mass work to be the task of the
hour; their construction of mass work was involvement in the unions,
factories and co-ops. Trade Unions ranked first in importance, and from
them would be won the most active Fourth Internationalists. Even a short
spell in the Labour Party (the only kind they would countenance) was
permissible only within this framework. Gains in the Labour Party would
be directed to the unions, so that a ready basis would be prepared for
the political split from the Labour Party. The one part of the party
where the “Bolshevik-Leninists” were obliged to work was the Labour
League of Youth. But notwithstanding these ruminations about prospects
in the Labour Party, Cooper felt the Group must continue in the ILP with
a short term split perspective. A national campaign should aim at
splitting off the best elements from the ILP leadership, (Cooper showed
prudence in not filling in any names at this point). Failing an
intervening crisis, the Group should leave at the next ILP conference.
As for the “consolidated” Bolshevik-Leninist forces, if there was a
chance of returning to the Labour Party, it would be impossible to
ignore the presence there of others claiming to stand for the Fourth
International. Cooper and his comrades stood for the amalgamation of all
Bolshevik-Leninists at the time of the Marxist Group’s rupture with the
ILP provided there was an agreement on a short-term Labour Party
perspective and adequate provision for organising mass work. If the
Marxist Group chose an immediate walk-out from the ILP, Cooper proposed
an organisational break so that those who believed ILP work might still
be fruitful could continue. The rest could join the other
Bolshevik-Leninists in the Labour Party. Thus was the seed sown in
December 1933, beginning to sprout weeds.
There was in fact a laughable disparity between the imposing list of
tasks drawn up by Cooper and the size – even the potential – of the
Marxist Group. In one document he proposed the drafting of all available
forces into the Labour League of Youth, that Marxist Group members be
the most active ILPers, the building up of the ILPs skeletal fractions
in the unions, and, altogether, “concentrated, ceaseless, wholehearted
activity”. It seems unlikely that Marxist Group membership exceeded
fifty at the time of the Keighley conference: the Cooper document gives
the impression that he had an audience of thousands.
The second group gathered around C.L.R. James, for whom some sort of
party position remained open even after Keighley. He was still able to
write to The New Leader. [105]
He was in touch with publishers and was to be the first British
Trotskyist to make a substantial theoretical contribution. But James’s
energies had been sparked by the ILP, line on Abyssinia: now, as Trotsky
had observed, the serious was trivial. Without an anti-imperialist
stance the ILP was a meaningless arena. Yet the Labour Party was more
repellent still.
A document of this period [106]
has survived, which may have expressed James’s own views. It analysed
the Communist and Labour Parties and found the only movements of note
among the ILP left and the Labour League of Youth. “Of political
groupings the ILP, alone moves towards a correct revolutionary
line.” The author conjured up the fantasy of expulsions from the Labour
Party, with the victims moving towards the ILP – the reverse of what was
actually happening. In the Labour Party, Trotskyists (“theoretically
equipped workers”) would be used by the bureaucracy against the
communists. Rather than repeat there the experience of being used by
Maxton it was better to stay aloof. The author proposed no single party
commitment but Fourth International Groups which would bisect partisan
boundaries. This grandiose perspective flowed from a gross overstatement
of Marxist Group strength. The author believed it was one-third of the
active London ILP membership and an important influence in the
North-West. He reeled off an impressive list of branches that the ILP
could not afford to lose: this in turn meant that the Marxist Group
could do anything it liked. Such a struggle could not be waged in the
Labour Party, the officialdom of which was much more entrenched.
Objections to joining it were: that unlike the French socialist party it
was at a low level of political life; that the fight within it would be
on organisational and not political grounds; that Group members would
become embroiled in routine non-political activity; that Labour Party
work easily led to neglect of the unions; that the Group would be too
weak to prevent a mass exodus of the best militants from Labour – the
cream might pass the group by; that Labour Party entry would be
misunderstood by the “leftward masses” as a move to the right or
dishonest; finally, that membership could easily lead to opportunism,
along which road Groves and Harber were considered to be travelling
already.
These were objections in principle to membership of the Labour Party:
they would apply at any time. The whole drift of Trotsky’s argument in
the thirties was that this sort of ideological baggage was too crushing a
burden to be carried by the small groups who followed him. A sense of
proportion was entirely absent. Who were these “leftward masses” who
would misconstrue a move to the Labour Party by the Marxist Group?
Certainly not the ILP, now shrunk to a fifth of its former size. Nor the
CPGB whose members were opposed to Trotskyism wherever it surfaced. And
the Labour Party “masses” would surely not be repelled because
Trotskyists joined their party; it marked a step towards them, not away.
Indeed it was the right wing, not the left, who sought to keep
revolutionaries out.
A lingering love for the ILP pervaded these lines. Their author
proposed a split at the next conference, in the event that the party
failed to adopt a minimum programme. Leaving the ILP intact, he argued,
would be to permit the continued existence of a dangerous rump.
Abandoning a smashed ILP would mean carrying a large body of
sympathisers.
The third strand of the rope comprised those who were for entering
the Labour Party, and joining Harber who was already there. They had the
inestimable advantage of support from Trotsky himself, who ridiculed
any “independent” posturing. The Marxist Group was so tiny that its
policies were barely noticeable in any case. “A few hundred comrades is
not a revolutionary party.” [107]
Their job was to oppose reformism within the mass parties. Debating
whether or not to support communist affiliation was an irrelevant luxury
while one was isolated from the mass party. And the mass party was the
Labour Party. Clinging to the ILP was ridiculous. Its best members would
leave in any case, and the time spent on them might be passed more
profitably with the hundreds of potential Labour Party recruits. [108] “We are” observed Trotsky, “too generous with out time”.
Trotsky advised the group to pick an issue that would have a wide
impact and break with the ILP on that. Not the dispute over fraction
rights in the party but “a political issue comprehensible to the broad
mass of workers”: the committal of it to the Fourth International thesis
perhaps, or even ILP affiliation to the Labour Party.
Trotsky impatiently flicked aside any hairsplitting about methods of
joining the Labour Party. Whether as a faction or as individuals the
important thing was to get in. Once there the Bolshevik-Leninists would
establish themselves by their attacks on centrism, not by their critique
of the leadership. That, like raising the banner of the Fourth
International, could wait until their footing in the Labour Party was
more sure.
Of course, re-entry into the Labour Party brought again to the
surface relations with others aligning themselves to the Fourth
International. Trotsky stood for unity. He urged that every effort be
made to merge with Groves and Dewar in order to utilize the Red Flag,
now appearing again after an eighteen month silence. Resistance to
unity by Groves and Dewar would result in their members joining the
Marxist Group, now in the Labour Party. Failure to obtain access to the Red Flag
might mean a new Marxist Group paper in the Labour Party, or the
launching of a “Lenin Club” independent of all parties which would also
have a paper. But again, in the case of the Lenin Club, Trotsky insisted
that it must be an organisation for all Bolshevik Leninists.
Harber and CLR James attended a conference of the ICL on July 29-31 1936 at “Geneva” [109] with two observers. [110]
Conference discussed Britain and concluded that the existence of three
groups was a luxury since no “apparent political divergencies” divided
them. [111]
Geneva was not neutral on the tactical issue however. It passed a
resolution regretting the absence of the Marxist League, and its failure
to submit a political statement, and insisted that the Marxist Group
once and for all transfer its interests from the ILP to the Labour Party
and the League of Youth. The ILP, declared the resolution, was not a
good base from which to conduct the trade union work proposed by Cooper,
and it set up an impenetrable barrier between the Bolshevik-Leninists
and the mass youth movement: “It is necessary to understand not only
when it is fruitful for the revolutionary Marxist to enter a reformist
or centrist organisation, but also when it is imperative that they leave
it and implant their movement and ideas in other milieu”.
A surprising concession was made in the resolution to the Marxist Group which was virtually invited to launch a journal, The Fourth International [112]
the reception of which by the ILP would speedily convince them to
leave. But a caveat was attached even here in the form of a warning of
the dangers of the Group being without a clear perspective for so long.
Back in the ILP a party plebiscite had confirmed the second decision
of Keighley on workers’ sanctions. This drew a definite ceiling on the
growth potential of the Marxist Group. Within the Group support was
growing for pulling out. [113]
Passage of the Geneva resolution and the pace of events in Britain led
to the first national meeting of British Bolshevik-Leninists being
convened for 11 October. [114]
The day before, a Marxist Group gathering met to debate further its
internal differences. At the Marxist Group meeting, C.L.R. James
proposed that all Bolshevik-Leninists should join in one independent
central organisation. Since this would still be small, faction work
would be undertaken, but loyalty would be to the centre for whose sake
recruitment would be made. This centre would issue the independent
journal of the Fourth International. [115]
Cooper and his allies claimed an equal commitment to unification.
Unlike James they set their tactical proposals in a political
perspective. It was a pre-war period and, moreover, one in which the
proletariat had regained its confidence internationally. The
Bolshevik-Leninists’ task was therefore to wield a mass influence with
minimum restraint on speech and action. Militancy was at present
expressed largely on the industrial plane; its political reflection was
pale, except in the Labour League of Youth, which “offers great
opportunities for the Bolshevik-Leninist group to gain the leadership”.
The Socialist League was a petit-bourgeois trend in which the Trotskyist
position need be stated no more. The CPGB, was prepared “to crawl still
further” towards the union bureaucracy to achieve Labour Party
affiliation. The ILP appeared revolutionary by comparison with the
Labour and Communist Parties, but was disintegrating organisationally
and drifting towards political futility: there was a danger that its
membership would, by stages, be stampeded into the popular front. Here
was the kernel of the Cooper case. He believed the ILP, was a hindrance
to the development of Trotskyism, but its decline did not necessarily
mean extinction. Simply pulling out might allow the best elements to
rally round the leadership leaving a potentially dangerous centrist
party like the German USPD, or the POUM in Spain. [116]
“Any split-perspective must be aimed at the decisive smashing of this
party. In the process of splitting the best elements must be won
against the leadership and for a mass exit.” [117]
For Cooper great freedom of action was still possible in the ILP,
whereas Labour Party activities could only be generally left. It was the
unions and the Co-ops which offered the chance to pursue political
demands. Cooper reiterated his conclusions drawn earlier in the year:
work should be centrally coordinated; all available forces should work
in the unions; all available forces should also be drafted into the
Labour League of Youth, but Labour Party involvement should be of a
short term character preliminary to launching an open revolutionary
party. As for the Marxist Group in the ILP, all its members must work
for “a short term split perspective”. Those who did not feel they could
do so should leave and join the other Bolshevik-Leninists in the Labour
Party.
The third position was that advanced by Collins, whose interview with
Trotsky on tactics in Britain had been circulated during the summer. [118]
He had been denied minority representation at the joint conference due
to take place the next day, despite the preponderance of the full
Marxist Group vote.
Collins’s paper was a precis of Trotsky’s replies to his interview.
He only added that the Marxist Group’s theoretic acceptance of the need
one day to leave the ILP was avoiding the issue. An umbilical cord tied
them to the ILP. Meanwhile European revolutionary developments were
preparing a similar pattern in Britain, and the communists were meeting
with great success in their unity campaign and penetration of the Labour
League of Youth. No justification remained for staying within the ILP,
which was not a mass party but a small propaganda machine. There was no
longer even the excuse that the ILP line was the most nearly correct of
all parties, since Maxton was beginning to slide towards a popular
front. The urgent need was for a break with the ILP within a few weeks.
In this discussion on 10 October, it rapidly became clear that James
was proposing a complete reshuffling of members between the groups.
Essentially he and Cooper rejected Labour Party entry whether for
immediate independence or for an extended stay in the ILP; they were
united in their opposition to the view expressed by Trotsky and by the
International Secretariat, which James had heard at Geneva.
Those broadly on this side of the argument questioned Trotsky’s grasp
of the organisational structure of the labour movement in Britain. Had
he had greater authority among British Bolshevik-Leninists the
discussion might have been constructively resolved. As it was all sorts
of discontents surfaced. Liverpool (Don James), Islington (Collins) and
Glasgow were not prepared to stay in the ILP any longer. Matlow, now in
the Labour Party, was quoted to the effect that the Marxist Group had
become integrated in the ILP Don James observed that internal life had
ceased within the group: no bulletin had appeared since before Keighley,
when the group should have been preparing to split.
Harber, like Matlow, was already in the Labour Party, and attended
this preliminary meeting as a fraternal delegate. He claimed that the
fecundity of the Labour Party was illustrated by the growth of his LLOY
group in London from six to sixty since February 1936. Twelve were old
Bolshevik-Leninists, thirteen from the Marble Arch group [119]
and the rest new recruits. But those who had stayed in the ILP rested
on a majority in the Group. A Don James amendment to C.L.R. James’s
resolution, putting the Geneva resolution position was lost eight to
thirteen, and C.L.R. was also proof against an amendment to his
statement from Cooper calling for a continued commitment to the ILP.
This fell ten to thirteen. James’s original resolution was passed eleven
to ten, and Cooper’s full statement was also carried in amended form,
thirteen to eight. This left the Marxist Group in rejection of Trotsky’s
view and the urgings of the International, with James’s resolution as
the basis on which it would approach the other two groups the following
day.
11 October saw the first broad gathering of the Trotskyists since
December 1933. Thirty nine Marxist Group delegates were present and
twenty six from the Labour Party group (the “Bolshevik-Leninists”, those
largely in the Labour League of Youth). The Marxist League sent three
delegates and there were “fraternal delegates and unattached comrades”
in attendance as well. The Marxist League’s attitude was that the widest
possible diffusion of Bolshevik-Leninists was desirable. This view was
no surprise, being essentially a restatement of the Communist League,
majority view. The League believed itself free of blame for the division
of forces in Britain but also held that some degree of cooperation
might now be achieved. To the Marxist League the present discussion
oscillated between false parameters. Taking “a purely formal decision”
between the reformist Labour Party and the centrist ILP did not raise
the Bolshevik-Leninists’ status in the eyes of the advanced workers.
Rather than appear like splitters the Marxist Group ought to set out its
programme and seek to win the ILP to it. Agitation around the demand
for the Fourth International might be a bridge across which local Labour
parties could become involved. Abandoning the ILP for the Labour Party
because it did not support a Fourth International was asking to become a
laughing stock.
The League went further: it believed the time for exclusive work in
the Labour Party was coming to an end. Growing collaboration of the
Labour Party with the government would drive the workers leftward [120],
possibly in the direction of a new revolutionary party comprising the
left, the League of Youth, and the ILP. To achieve this there was
required simultaneous pressure from within the Labour Party and the ILP.
A concerted drive by the Bolshevik-Leninists would bring the creation
of the new revolutionary section nearer.
The Marxist Group was governed by its decisions of the previous day.
It would work towards unity along the lines proposed in some detail by
C.L.R. James, but it would simultaneously intensify its ILP activities
in order to speed up perspectives.
After the Marxist Group, the Bolshevik-Leninists in the Labour Party
represented the most sizeable force. Essentially they were a fusion of
Roma Dewar, and her associates who had published the Youth Militant [121],
and those members of the Marxist Group who had already joined the
Labour Party. They reported sixty members in London, forty of whom were
in the Labour League of Youth, plus small groups in Norwich and
Sheffield. [122] Sales of Youth Militant
had more than trebled from their March total of 250. The
Bolshevik-Leninists clearly believed their own rapid growth in 1936
stemmed from the opportunities offered by the Labour Party. Part of the
strength of this group was that it stood on the Geneva resolution. It
was able to complain that its attempts to fuse with Groves had been
unavailing; a joint EC with the Marxist Group had functioned however and
guided common activities such as trade union work and agitation over
the Moscow Trials. [123]
The Bolshevik-Leninists now went further, and offered to co-operate on
the basis of the James resolution from the Marxist Group.
The three groups, as represented at the meeting agreed to appoint two
representatives each to form a central coordinating committee. The CCC
would oversee each faction’s journal and keep them as supplements rather
than competitors; it would produce a regular bulletin; it would draw up
joint plans and theses to be presented to separate aggregates and a
delegate conference.
While the national meeting went on to discuss Spain and the Trials,
unity was felt by all concerned to be the main achievement. They were
cruelly deceived. After the meeting the Bolshevik-Leninists in the
Labour Party reflected belatedly on why the Marxist Group had passed the
Cooper paper with its ILP perspective. They decided to reject
organisational fusion until there was some definite agreement on
tactics; they also condemned the Marxist League for still being
unprepared to enter an immediate fusion. The Bolshevik-Leninists
declared themselves ready for fusion with any Fourth International Group
which could reach agreement on tactics on the basis of the Geneva
resolution. Since it was precisely the Geneva resolution which divided
the groups, this was disingenuous.
While the Bolshevik-Leninists pulled away from the Marxist Group, the
Group itself changed. On 15 November C.L.R. James, with the support of
Ballard (who earlier had backed Cooper) convinced the Group to break
free of the ILP. [124]
There should be, it resolved, an independent organisation of the Fourth
International in Britain. Factions might be permissible, but they would
be subordinate to the main task of establishing a separate identity.
There was to be an immediate split from the ILP with the aim of
launching the Fourth International. [125]
On 21 November the Group informed the Bureau for the Fourth
International of its decision, and set about: preparing the next issue
of Fight! as an independent paper.
The Marxist Group’s rapid shift did not please the Bureau. At a 13
December meeting it declared the decision for “independence” invalid: it
rested solely on a sixteen to six decision of the London group to
reverse a vote taken only four weeks earlier; there was no fundamental
discussion involving all members; no balance sheet had been drawn up.
The decision of James and his comrades to opt for leaving the ILP
tacitly confirmed the Geneva resolution. The Bureau still found it
reprehensible since no honest accounting of the ILP experience had been
made, and particularly since James’s continued presence in the party had
contributed to the decay within the group which was now advanced as a
reason for leaving. Departing in this way started the independent group
on false premises: “instead of repairing the damage you will greatly
increase it”.
James’s predicted numerical reinforcement had not materialised.
Cooper’s anticipated mass withdrawal had not occurred. The Marxist Group
had, in six months, recruited no-one and lost half its members. No
member of the ILP was likely to follow such a group into isolation; some
might well opt for the nascent Labour left however. [126]
And there was a further ground for criticism. The impromptu split
from the ILP would not only have negative impact, but it would also
obstruct the fusion of all groups deemed a necessity by the
Geneva-conference. James rejected fusion. The Bolshevik Leninists were
growing rapidly with a principal aim “to inoculate British youth against
the Stalinist plague”, that is, to prevent a repetition of the events
in Spain or Belgium. Fusion would strengthen the serum; but fusion was
now impossible.
Meanwhile important developments were unfolding within the Labour
Party, where a left analogous to that of the French and Belgian
Socialist Parties was crystallizing:
“Only someone politically blind could fail to see that the
Bolshevik-Leninists, protected by the growing opposition coming from the
radicalised worker masses demanding democracy in the Party contains
enormous possibilities of development.” [127]
The Bureau impatiently swept away James’s pretensions. The split of
this left wing away from Labour would not lead to it falling in behind
the tiny Marxist Group: “It is only in the closest contact with this
Left Wing, it is only as active members of this Left Wing, that you will
obtain sufficient possibilities of influencing it, to win the
revolutionary part of it for Bolshevik-Leninism. From outside, you will
be regarded as impotent and hopeless sectarians, who fear contact with
the masses, but who want to impose themselves on the masses from outside
as sage counsellors.” [128]
The Marxist Group offer to help the Bolshevik-Leninists in the Labour
Party was in reality no help, declared the Bureau. The Labour Party
Fourth Internationalists were “severe opponents of this over-hasty
independence” which could only harm them by contagion. And in any case
practical experience argued against the feasibility of such joint
operations.
The Marxist Group was, concluded the Bureau, most likely to cultivate
sectarian and opportunist tendencies within itself which would fasten
on personal clique politics. It was already “full of personal
bitterness”, unlike the Fourth Internationalists in the Labour League of
Youth. In practical terms therefore the Bureau called for a new
decision by the Marxist Group recognising the opinions of these who had
voted with their feet by joining the Labour Party. There should be a
constituent conference of all of those who recognised the authority of
the Geneva conference to create a single homogenous organisation. The
majority view of the English Bolshevik-Leninists must prevail: anything
less than a majority would not automatically enjoy relations with the
Secretariat.
Before the view of the Bureau reached Britain, the Marxist Group had taken irrevocable steps. The second issue of Fight!
was not the product of cooperation with the other factions but a plain
appeal for an independent presence. On 16 December the first open
meeting of the Group declared itself as an independent party for the
Fourth International.
Some years later Trotsky reflected on the Marxist Group experience:
It seems to me that our comrades who entered the ILP had the same
experience with the ILP, that our American comrades made with the
Socialist Party. But not all our comrades entered the ILP, and they
developed an opportunistic policy so far as I could observe and that is
why their experience in the ILP, was not so good. The ILP remained
almost as it was before, while the Socialist Party is now empty. [129]
And yet the American Trotskyists came out of the Socialist Party much
strengthened and ready to form the SWP. The Marxist Group made progress
for nearly two years and no serious accusations of opportunism could be
levelled before autumn 1935. Nor was the ILP largely unchanged: by 1936
it was a shrunken shell and replaced as an alternative to Labour by the
Communist Party. [130]
But the Marxist Group failed in the objective of winning the whole ILP
and even in the lesser one of splitting a large portion away. Nor can
the limited success of the CPGB be attributed to Trotskyist
intervention. The best that can be claimed is that Trotskyism did not
become extinct, that the existence of an alternative Marxist critique
was maintained which the communists sometimes had to challenge. But the
chaos in the Marxist Group during 1936 demonstrated again the
preoccupation of Trotskyists with internal and secondary tactical
disputes while great events were taking place.
Notes
1. A.B. Doncaster et al. to the International Secretariat, ICL, [April? 1939], HP, yJH 5/2.
2.
See below. H.N. Brailsford thought a hundred Trotskyists had joined the
party (A. Weisbord to Sara, 22 Oct. 1934, Warwick MSS 15/3/1/60). This
is a not uncommon overestimate of the membership of a revolutionary
group anal may also reflect the extent to which ILPers and Trotskyists
shared ideas.
3.
This seems to be true of Max Nicholls (who later moved to Glasgow),
Bert Matlow, Arthur Cooper, Tony Doncaster, John Archer (known in
internal documents of the Trotskyist movement as “Barclay” or P.J.B.)
and Hilda Lane. Lane had in June 1932, as Chairman of the ILP Women’s
Committee, led the walk-out from the Labour Women’s Conference. Harber
and Graham had briefly been in the CPGB. Allen, and C.L.R. James (q.v.),
whom they were soon to meet, were foreign.
4.
“Boring from within” a Social Democratic party became known in
Trotskyist circles as entrism. Before that following a prolonged debate
in the middle of which the French Trotskyists entered the SFIO, it
became known as the “French turn”. The arguments deployed by Trotsky in
favour of the French turn in 1934 were all anticipated in his writings
proposing entry by the Communist League into the ILP. It is singular
that the official historian of the Fourth International should ignore
the British experience and speak of the French turn being “subsequently
extended” to other countries. (P. Frank, The Fourth International, 1979, 52-4.)
5.
The Minority had written to the IS, on 5 January and to Trotsky on 7
January. Trotsky’s reply of 23 January indicated that the Minority had
complained of the continued links between the Majority and the
International, had criticised an IS draft of a declaration disclaiming
the League, had dismissed the Majority as incorrigible and asserted the
existence of differences in Britain other than those on the merits of
joining the ILP. Trotsky advised,
“At this moment you should forget the existence of the majority of
the section, enter the ILP and develop energetic activity. Then all the
difficulties will be solved by themselves.” (Differences With The British Minority, Writings: Supplement (1934-40), 442-3.)
6. The New Leader,
23 March 1934. Brockway reported that former CL members would be
allowed in as members if they respected party policy and the ILP
constitution. As for the Fourth International, this would be discussed
at the forthcoming conference, (The New Leader, 23
March 1934). The CL Majority wrote to Brockway that it still existed but
no confirmation of this was printed, (Interview with R. Groves, 23
April 2980). The statement misled Dowse (op. cit., 192).
7.
It was the ILP which published his Copenhagen lecture on the Russian
Revolution, albeit with an introduction by Maxton, which Trotsky
challenged, (Trotsky on Maxton, The New Leader, 25 Aug. 1933). See also the interview with him, Can Comintern be reformed?) (The New Leader, 13 Oct. 1933). Joseph Kruk, in his review of The History of the Russian Revolution
for the ILP praised the book’s “studied Marxist objectiveness” and
lamented Trotsky’s exile as “the greatest of revolutionary tragedies” (The New Leader, 8 July 1932, 20 Jan. 1933).
8.
On his return to the editorial chair, Brockway expressed the hope that
all shades of opinion might flourish in the Independent Labour Party,
welcomed the discussion on Trotskyism and thought it would be a disaster
only if a split resulted (The New Leader, 29 Dec. 1933) .
9. Cardinal Questions facing the ILP, 5 Jan. 1934, Writings (1933-34), 186-90.
10.
Having broken with the Labour Party, and therefore with the Labour and
Socialist International (LSI), the ILP grouped around itself other
ex-social democratic parties in the International Labour Community
(IAG), later to be known as the International Revolutionary Bureau of
Socialist Unity (IRBSU) or London Bureau. This was a repetition, on a
lower plane, of developments in the early 1920s, and the Trotskyists,
borrowing Lenin’s scornful appellation of the time, referred to the
London Bureau as the “two and a half” international. Trotsky pointed out
that through the IAG, the ILP was aligned with the Norwegian Labour
Party (moving towards the Second International) and with the SAP (of
Germany) and the OSP (of Holland) which were moving towards the Fourth
International, while in Britain it was holding discussions with the
CPGB, i.e. the Third International.
11.CPGB
influence in the ILP had a lengthy provenance. In the late 1920s the
Young Communist League had hoped to poach Guild of Youth members and
precipitate that organisation’s collapse (W. Rust, The Derby Conference of the ILP Guild of Youth, Inprecorr,
Vol.8, No.31, 7 June 1928, 579). Five years later Pollitt prodded the
YCL along the path which would give its sympathisers a Guild majority
the following year (The Tasks of the Congress of the YCL of Great Britain, Inprecorr,
Vol.13, No.26, 14 June 1933, 584). The CPGB, was uneasy at the RPC
slogan of a “United Communist Party” though it sought unity in action.
Its treatment of the ILP was generally combined with attacks on those
who opposed this course, whom it portrayed as an amalgam of
Right-Wingers and Trotskyists. (J.R. Campbell, New Opportunist Arguments Against the Communist International, Inprecorr, Vol.13, No.33, 28 July 1933, 730-1). An extreme of CPGB worry and distaste for the ILP is shown in Gerhard, The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain, (Communist International, 15 March 1932, 155-64).
12. The RPC up to 1933 published a paper entitled Revolt,
no copies of which have been located. But its relations with the CPGB
as late as the York Conference of the ILP may be gauged from the fierce
criticism it suffered at that time from Pat Devine, (Annual Conference of the ILP, Inprecorr, Vol.14, No.24, 20 April 1934, 614-5).
13.
Pollitt told the Thirteenth Plenum of the ECCI of “the Trotskyist Group
of petty-bourgeois and student elements without any mass influence or
connections”, he had watched at the Derby ILP, conference of 1933 (On the United Front in Great Britain, Inprecorr,
Vol.14, No.5, 30 Jan. 1934, 129-39). Pollitt’s fears led him to
exaggerate by putting the Trotskyists on a par with the NAC and Elijah
Sandham’s supporters. Gallacher showed that criticisms of communist
hostility to a united front were beginning to hurt when he warned that
the inevitabilism of some of his comrades was giving openings to
“Trotskyists and other counter-revolutionaries”, (On the United Front in Great Britain, Inprecorr. Vol.14, No.18, 19 March 1934, 463) See also Inprecorr, Vol.14, No.25, 23 April 1934, 646).
14. Notably in Controversy, the internal discussion journal launched in 1933 under the editorship of C.A. Smith. Controversy
began publication with a Trotsky article raising CPGB suspicions that
it was intended to obstruct closer relations between the parties.
15.
On the National Committee there were many opposed to a close
association with the CPGB, but no Trotskyists. Guilders had met young
Trotskyists however at a gathering of youth sections of parties which
had attended the August 1933 Paris conference, convened in Laren on 24
Feb. 1934. (For the Laren conference, reconvened in Brussels on 28 Feb.,
see Writings: Supplement (1934-40), 893-5.)
Following the Norwich vote, Guild representatives travelled to Paris
with John McGovern MP to meet the delegates of the Young Communist
International. They were urged to abstain from a “new splitting
international” organised by the Trotskyists, indeed, this was a
condition for joining the YCL. The watchful McGovern refused to believe
that Trotsky was a counter-revolutionary, (Young Workers Advance
1934, the agreed verbatim report of the Paris negotiations of May 5/6
1934. The ILP finally intervened to prevent the passage of the Guild
into a YCL merger.
16.
Associated with the RPC at this time was Dr C.A. Smith, who had met
Trotsky, a pacifist who had fought Dulwich and the New Forest, the
second as one of the last ILP candidates approved by the Labour Party.
Smith’s path was to cross with that of Trotskyism many times during the
1930s. Leaders of the RPC were C.K. Cullen, (q.v.) and Jack Gaster, a
Jewish solicitor and son of a famous rabbi. Brockway worked closely with
the Committee for a time. ILP leaders knew of the RPC machine before
disaffiliation but were inhibited from acting against it by Maxton’s
“supreme tolerance”, (J. Paton, Left Turn, 1936, 392; see also R. Dowse, op. cit., 180, though he makes no international parallels and tends to treat the RPC as monolithic).
17.
Dr. C.K. Cullen, an East London doctor and former NUWM activist,
elected unopposed as first chairman of the RPC in March 1932, wrote of
the reference back of an insufficiently revolutionary NAC motion at the
1932 annual conference:
“This was carried by a good majority. No mention of the reason for the reference back was made in the Daily Worker. Why, I wonder? (Or perhaps I don’t.)
Can it be that the Daily Worker really does fear
that the ILP is becoming revolutionary after all? An innocent would
think than a revolutionary party would welcome the accession of another
big group to the revolutionary movement even if it hadn’t reached the
100 per cent purist revolutionary outlook on tactics.” (Daily Worker, 11 April 1932)
18.
Supporters of Brandler had speedily taken over the SAP, a small German
party evolving like the ILP away from Social Democracy. In the United
States, Jay Lovestone, ousted from the leadership of the CPUSA with
similar policies to Brandler and Bukharin, represented for a time, a
parallel trend. For the American Revolutionary Policy Committee, see D.
Bell, Marxian Socialism in the United States, Princeton 1967, 164-5, 172, 178.
19.H, Edwards and J. Pawsey, The Organic Development of the Marxist Group, Marxist Group Bulletin,
4, April 1935, 3. Edwards, Pawsey and Matlow were three of those who
resigned, to be drawn increasingly towards Trotsky’s analysis of the
failure of communism in Germany. This ILP loyalty was to be an important
factor for the future of Trotskyism.
20.In March 1933 Labour Monthly
had warned “the rank and file of the ILP must look past Maxton and
Gaster if they-wish to find the true path” (quoted in R. Dowse, op. cit., 187). The 1935 Derby conference saw the CPGB writing of the RPC in friendly fashion, (R. Bishop, The ILP Conference, Inprecorr, Vol.15, No.18, 27 April 1935, 479-80).
21.See remarks of W. Rust in On the United Front in Great Britain, Inprecorr,
Vol.14, No.15, 5 March 1934, 381-2. To this period belong the
nominations by Gaster of Brockway to replace Paton as national secretary
of the ILP, and the phase when the RPC “innocently imagined that if it
could take over the ILP it would supersede the CPGB as the British
Section of the Comintern”,(R. Dowse, op. cit., 253; B. Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s, Cambridge 1977, 79).
22.
The ILP Affiliation Committee arose from communist dissatisfaction at
RPC inability to answer attacks by ILP party leaders. For its manifesto
see the Daily Worker, 16 Dec. 1933, and for its policy see E. Whalley, Towards the ILP Easter Conference – Trends in the ILP, Labour Monthly,
March 1934, 90-6. The CPGB seems to have hoped that the Derby 1933
conference vote, against an NAC recommendation, for ILP–communist
cooperation would speedily be followed by unity, but this was not an
immediate perspective of the RPC (H. Pollitt, loc. cit., 135).
23.The
Marxist League and the RPC were not the only formations which attempted
to rival the CPGB from the left while eschewing Trotskyism. Richard
Rees and J. Middleton Murry turned the literary journal The New Adelphi
into an ethical Marxist magazine. From 1931-2 a debate on communism was
held in its pages. Murry resigned the editorial chair, joined the ILP,
campaigned for disaffiliation and debated from the left with the CPGB.
Among those who assisted him was F.A. Ridley, (Marxism, History and a Fourth International, The New Adelphi, May 1932, 494-502), who may have seen it as a replacement for The New Man. The Daily Worker
refused articles from Murry. In 1934 Murry left the ILP with Elijah
Sandham to form the Independent Socialist Party and the political bent
of The New Adelphi declined from this date. (See: The New Adelphi, passim; R. Dowse, Left in the Centre, 1966, 188-9; B. Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s, Cambridge 1977, 221-2).
24. H. Edwards and J. Pawsey, loc. cit., 3.
25. Communists had noted little support for Trotskyism in the ILP during the winter of 1933-34, (J. Shields, The Issue before the ILP Conference, Inprecorr,
Vol.14, no.19, 23 March 1934, 487-9). After York the party concluded
that ILP oscillation between the two and a half and four internationals
had allowed some branches to go over openly to Trotskyism. The ILP was
“becoming a breeding ground for open counter-revolutionaries”, (P.
Devine, Annual Conference of the ILP, Inprecorr, Vol.14, No.24, 20 April 1934, 615).
26. D.D. Harber, The present position in the ILP and how we should react to it 1934 (Warwick MSS).
27. Action ILP, Leon Trotsky on Centrism, 1934; E. Robertson (q.v.) Holborn and Finsbury ILP, Conversations with Trotsky, Nov. 1935; Islington ILP, L. Trotsky on the ILP Leadership 1936. Leaflets were also produced by Trotskyist-controlled branches from time to time.
28. ibid., 3.
29.When the Islington ILP, published the ICL declaration France is now the key to the situation (Writings: 1933-34, 238-44) as France’s Turn Next: For The Fourth International, it added that a new revolutionary party was not necessary since the ILP, on a Marxist basis, could play that role.
30. A.B. Doncaster et. al.
to the International Secretariat, ICL (April? 1935), HP, DJH 5/2. The
comparison is between the positions at the time of the 1934 and 1935
winter conferences of the London divisional ILP.
31. ibid.
32. J. Graham, The Meeting of November 3rd, Bulletin of the Marxist Group, 1, 15 Nov. 1934, n.p.
33. Towards A Correct Revolutionary Party, ibid.
34.
Kemp, one of the original Clapham ILP, contacts of the Balham Group
called for the abandonment of the party policy of unofficial committees
and for the unions instead to organise the unemployed and enforce
compulsory membership (Our Work in the Trade Unions, Bulletin of the Marxist Group, 2, 1 Dec. 1934, 4).
35.
Patterson, a NUDAW member who was to stay with the ILP until the end of
the decade had, at the York conference, criticised the London division
stand on trade unions and its failure to involve itself in recruitment
drives. See also his article Our Leaders, Marxist Group Bulletin, 4, April 1935, 3.
36. Towards a Correct Electoral Policy, Bulletin of the Marxist Group, 2, 1 Dec 1934, 2.
37. Prepare The Fight Against Fascism, ibid., 6-7.
38. J.L. Robinson, Gasterism Mis-States A Policy, Bulletin of the Marxist Group,
3, Jan. 1935, 4.5. John Robinson was a member of the Finchley and
Hendon ILP and the author of the most able contributions to the Bulletin.
39. The party itself discerned RPC, Trotskyists and “others” as the recognisable political forces at the conference, The New Leader,
22 Feb. 1935. The RPC had begun a new drive within the party, on
Pollitt’s advice, to win it for the Communist International, (J. Mahon, Harry Pollitt,
1976, 203). This left it vulnerable to enquiries as to why, if it
considered the ILP so imperfect and the CPGB so sound it stayed with the
one and not the other, (J.L. Robinson, ibid.). As for
the “others” in London, if they voted together they outnumbered either
faction and a Hampstead resolution outlawing unofficial groups from
holding office fell at the divisional conference by only four votes, (The New Leader, 22 Feb. 1935).
40. The New Leader, 22 Feb. 1935.
41.
Entry, he told the French, was not a principle but an opportunity. Only
ICL ideas could resist in the SFIO a disintegration which had occurred
in the ILP (The Stalinist And Organic Unity, 19 July 1934, Writings: Supplement (1934-40), 505.)
42. The Present Situation in the Labour Movement and the Tasks of the Bolshevik-Leninists, Documents of the Fourth International, New York 1973, 61-2.
43.
One of the interesting features of the first half of the decade is the
inverse relationship between the ILP membership and that of the CPGB. In
1931, its last complete year in the Labour Party, the ILP claimed
21,000 members; in 1932, the year of disaffiliation, 16,773. By 1935,
this figure had shrunk by almost three quarters helped by sectarianism
towards the trade unions, Labour Party and Coops, association with the
communists and the act of disaffiliation itself. The CPGB on the other
hand claimed 2,724 members in June 1931 and 7,700 in July 1935. Both
sets of figures are unreliable, but the trend is clear, (R. Dowse, op. cit., 193; H. Pelling, op. cit., 192).
44.
Olive Bell had noted in the summer of 1934 that the Labour Party, like
the ILP, was beginning to encounter demands from its youth for
organisational independence, (The Leftward Development of the British Youth Movement, Inprecorr,
Vol.14, No.33, 8 June 1934, 890-I). That winter T. Harvey praised the
“big breakthrough” by the League into united front activity, (Inprecorr, Vol.14, No.59, 24 Nov. 1934, 1590-1).
45.
Two young South African Group members, Sid Frost and Ted Grant, seem to
have raised the possibility of Labour League of Youth work in Spring
1935, but stayed in the ILP. Harber and Kirby withdrew early in the
year, however, though they continued in connection with their erstwhile
comrades of the Marxist Group, (AB Doncaster et al., to the
International Secretariat, [CL, April? 1935], H.P., D.J.H. 5/2).
46.
The most illustrious of those recruited to the Marxist Group was Cyril
Lionel Robert James (1901- ), a Trinidadian writer and cricketer who
came to England in 1932 as a constitutional radical. That year, while
living at Nelson and playing cricket in the Lancashire League, he
published chapters of his The Life of Captain Cipriani as a pamphlet under the title The Case for West-Indian Self Government (1932). Neville Cardus offered him a post as a cricket correspondent for The Manchester Guardian, which he kept for some years. For James’s political evolution see Ivor Oxaal, Black Intellectuals Come to Power, 1966, 66-7 passim and James’s own collection of essays, The Future in the Present (1979). See also Brockway’s portrait of James in Inside the Left, 1942, 326.
47. Attempts were made to revive it from time to time, (A.B. Doncaster et. al., ibid.).
48. A declaration of belief in this thesis was part of the membership form, though the Standing Orders (HP, DJH 5/5, n.d.) required copies of minutes and discussion papers to be sent to the International Secretariat.
49. Bulletin of the Marxist Group, Jan. 1935.
50. The New Leader, 26 April 1935.
51. “Robertson” (Earle Birney, 1904- ) was a Canadian journalist and member of the Canadian Workers Party living in England.
52.
In the debate on the International Statement of the NAC, support for
the Fourth International came from Kingston, another new area.
53. The New Leader, 26 April 1935.
54. Reflections after the ILP Annual Conference, The New Leader, 3 May. 1935.
55.
Brockway at this time easily slipped into that third periodism the RPC,
like the CPGB, had abandoned. The third Labour Government might come
about, he conceded, but the ILP need not help it:
“One might as well say that because Oswald Mosley realises that the
failure of a Third Labour Government will give him his chance, that the
British Union of Fascists should support the Labour Party at the next
election!” (ibid.)
56. R. Bishop, The ILP Conference, Inprecorr,
Vol.15, No.18, 27 April 1935, 479. Bishop complained that the RPC
seemed abstract theorists because they were, like the Marxist Group,
based in London. This may have been an attempt to explain why Cullen had
failed to gain an NAC place in elections at the conference.
57.
Maximum membership age of the Guild of Youth was cut to twenty one and
the Guild subjected to conference decisions. The IBRSU ended cooperation
with the Trotskyists following a sharp polemic against it by Trotsky
himself (Revolutionary Youth. A Break with the Trotskyists, The New Leader, 30 Aug.1935).
58. Notes of the Month, The Bulletin of the Marxist Group, 5, June 1935, 1-2.
59. F. Marzillier, The United Front Tactic of the ILP On The Electoral Field, ibid.
Marzillier argued that the ILP and the CPGB had a futile approach to
elections, the former by its absentionism, the latter by stressing only
the reactionary side of the Labour Programme.
60.
At the Seventh Congress, Dimitrov guided the Comintern to the united
front, recognising that experience – notably in France – was pushing it
that way. Pollitt did not criticise the change but warned that support
for Labour in Britain would be different from that extended to its first
two governments (Communist International, 20 Sept.
1935, 899). Changes in the Comintern policy had been brewing for two
years, certainly since the spontaneous coalescence of French Socialists
and communists against an attempted fascist coup in February 1934. For
united front policy see F. Claudin, From Comintern to Cominform
(1975), who goes so far as to suggest on pp.124-5 that the Comintern
was not dissolved at the time of the Seventh Congress because it was
feared the Fourth International might benefit thereby.
61. For Socialist League policy see The Socialist, 1936 passim, and chapter five, below.
62. Trotsky had some reservations, for which see The ILP and the Fourth International: In the middle of the road, Writings: 1935-36, 69. He also later called Brockway’s policy a lucky hit.
63. For Brockway’s policy see The New Leader, passim and Inside the Left, 326. The split in the RPC is described below.
64. James was at this time writing for The Keys,
journal of the League for Coloured Peoples, and his prestige among
blacks in Britain carried him in 1936 to the editorial chair of International African Opinion, journal of the International African Service Bureau, which George Padmore had founded.
65.
With Maxton and Brockway he addressed an audience of 1,200 at the
Memorial Hall in early October and from then on was a popular speaker.
66. Is This Worth a War?, The New Leader, 4 Oct. 1935; The Game at Geneva, ibid., 18 Oct. 1935.
67. James thought Litvinov, the Soviet foreign minister, had to observe League policy, (The Workers and Sanctions. Why the ILP and the communists take an opposite view, The New Leader,
25 Oct. 1935). Litvinov’s behaviour was contrasted by James to that of
the CPGB which, he claimed, would have supported workers” sanctions a
year earlier. The ILP, he asserted implausibly, would remain true to the
principles of Lenin.
68. B. Matlow, A Criticism of the London Division’s Statement on the Abyssinian Situation, Marxist Bulletin, Oct. 1935, 4.
69. B. Matlow, ibid.
70.
The revulsion of Ernest Bevin and other trade union leaders at the call
for industrial action against war by the largely middle-class
leadership of the Socialist League was one facet of the reversal of
Labour’s policy at its 1935 annual conference, (see R. Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, 1961, 224-6).
71. Elections and the Coming War, loc. cit., 6.
72. The ILP and the Fourth International. In the Middle of the Road, 18 Sept. 1935, Writings: 1935-36, 64-9.
73. The Marxist Group’s Third Period, loc. cit., n.p.
74. Writings: 1935-36,
69. Robertson visited Trotsky with Ken Johnson, another Canadian, in
Norway in November 1935. On his return he published conversations with
Trotsky and Once Again the ILP: An interview with Leon Trotsky, Nov. 1935, from his party branch in Holborn and Finsbury. The second interview is also reprinted in Writings: 1935-36, 69-73.
75. D. McHenry, The Labour Party in Transition, 1931-1938, 1938, quoted in S. Hornby, Left Wing Pressure Groups in the British Labour Movement, 1930-1940
(University of Liverpool M.A. Thesis, 1966, 70). Gaster and Cullen went
on to some prominence in the CPGB, Gaster as a member of the London
district committee and LCC member for Stepney in 1946. Eric Whalley, of
the Affiliation Committee, was killed in Spain 1937.
76. C.K. Cullen, The Revolutionary Policy Committee and the ILP, Inprecorr,Vol.15, no. 59, 9 Nov. 1935, 145, 147-8, and Why We Broke With the ILP, Labour Monthly,
(Nov. 1935), 741-6. Cullen blamed the ILP for standing candidates
against Labour, but did not recall the identical policy of the CPGB in
1931.
77.
Twenty three RPCers remaining in the ILP conferred after the withdrawal
of the main body and decided to battle on against Trotskyism and the
“semi-Trotskyism” of the NAC (Communist Unity, Dec. 1935, 10). Like Cullen this jump also identified RPC failure with the neglect of organisational for political duties.
78. Marxist Bulletin, 25 Nov. 1935, 2.
79. M. Nicholls, The Dis-United Front, ibid.
80.
The amendment was a specific rejection of pacifist refusal to serve.
Under a party directive all conscriptable members would join the army.
81. But the Marxist Group did not feel able to sign the Open Letter for the Fourth International, an updated version of the Declaration of Four, issued in July 1935. Trotsky proposed that they should instead state their policy in a letter to ILP leaders, (The Open Letter and the ILP, Autumn 1935, Writings: Supplement (1934-40), 616). For the text of the Open Letter,
which argued inter alia that a Labour victory in the general election
would precipitate civil war and the consolidation of reaction, see Writings (1935-36), 16-20.
82. Electoral Policy, loc. cit., n.p.
83. “Honest” Stanley in a fix, The New Leader, 27 Dec. 1935; Baldwin’s Next Move, The New Leader,
3 Jan. 1936. Brockway thought James’s view “interesting”, but gave full
publicity to a speaker’s tour he made of South Wales mining areas.
84.
John and Mary Archer had been in Liverpool, and later in Leeds and
Durham respectively; John Goffe (1917- ), an ex public school boy who
had been introduced to the Bloomsbury ILP and Marxist Group by Tony
Doncaster, now was in Sheffield as a steel industry trainee manager.
From this base he visited Guild of Youth and party branches in
Yorkshire. Earl Robertson, like James, had spent time in South Wales,
and Nicholls and Robinson were in Glasgow.
85. The New Leader, 7 Feb. 1936.
86. The ILP and the Fourth International, 18 Sept. 1935, Writings; (1935-36), 64-9; Once Again the ILP, Nov. 1935, loc. cit., 69-73; on the eve of the conference he returned to the subject with Open Letter to an English Comrade, 3 April 1936, Writings:(1935-36), 73-5.
87.
“I would like to underline the fact that Schmidt is tied by a long
friendship to the head of the ILP, and that he has perhaps a certain
uneasiness, not to say mistrust, towards our friends as “sectarians””, (Schmidt’s Trip to England, 19 Jan. 1936, Writings: Supplement (1934-40), 639)
88.
Trotsky had originally drawn up a plan with Robertson and another to
issue a manifesto of the Group for signatures prior to a split, (The Dutch Section and the International, Writings: 1935-36, 41).
89. “P.J.B.” (untitled manuscript), 10 (15?) Sept. 1935, H.P.
90.
“The RPC disrupted the party not because they were an organised group,
but because they were under orders from the CPGB. A Marxist Grouper is
first and foremost a loyal and hardworking ILPer”, (J. Goffe) et. al., Letter from M.G. members to (ILP) members, 6 March 1936, H.P.
91. Once Again the ILP. An interview with Leon Trotsky, Nov. 1935, Writings (1935-36), 71.
92.
Trotsky also developed the concept of “illegal work” in mass
organisations. “You do not enter a reactionary trade union and cry “I am
a revolutionist”” (ibid., 72).
93. Open Letter to an English Comrade, 3 April 1936, Writings (1935-36), 73-5. The Clapham edition carried the revealing overprint “For Sale to ILP Members Only and Circulation Within the Party”.
94. Where Trotsky Goes Wrong, The New Leader, 20 March 1936.
95. Remarks For An English Comrade, 8 April 1936, Writings: Supplement 1934-40, 653.
96. A resolution calling for critical support was attacked both by those who wanted a Labour Government and those who did not.
97. Margaret Johns failed to obtain reference back after being rebuked by Maxton.
98. Arthur Ballard it was who called for the ILP to “assist the leftward and moving elements against the reactionary leadership”.
99.The NAC stuck to a pacifist line and believed workers should take no part in the war.
100. Interview with M. Johns, Oct. 1973.
101. The New Leader, 17 April 1936.
b102. On Dictators and the Heights of Oslo, Writings: 1935-36, 22 April 1936, 75-6. As he remarked, he did not live in Oslo, nor was that capital situated on the heights.
103. ibid. See also Our Kinds of Optimism, 27 April 1936, Writings Supplement (1934-40), 684-5.
104.
“Once inside the Labour Party, it will grow and become a mighty ally of
the “Labour Lieutenants of Capitalism”. There it will be a thousand
times more dangerous and difficult to crush.” (Unity and the C.P. affiliation to the LP, Warwick MSS 15/4/1/14, n.d.)
105. Fighting for the Abyssinian Emperor, a letter of July 1936.
106 Bolshevik-Leninists and the ILP, Warwick MSS 15/4/1/7. n.d.
107. Interview by Collins, Summer 1936, Writings: 1935-36, 76.
108.
“In any event, the suggestion of a time limit such as the next annual
conference of the ILP in April is incomprehensible to me. The European
situation is developing so rapidly that history will not wait for the
ILP conference.”, ibid.
109. This conference, like that of 1938, was held in a Paris suburb. For security reasons the venue was referred to as “Geneva”.
110.
The Marxist League was invited, but failed to attend “for material
reasons”. Harber would have participated in the Youth conference with
which the main conference concluded on 1 August, and at which a report
from England was given. The Youth conference adopted the FI Youth theses
and elected a new Youth Bureau of nine.
111.
None of the three groups was allowed to be the British Section, yet all
three stood for the Fourth International. Conference only devoted a
small amount of its time to Britain. For the main theses and resolutions
of the conference, see Documents of the Fourth International, New York 1973, 84-152.
112. This was to appear as Fight, with For the Fourth International beneath the masthead. See below.
113.
Leigh Davis and Starkey Jackson argued for a majority of the Group to
enter the Labour Party, Socialist League and League of Youth, leaving a
small independent organisation outside. Within the Labour Party all
Bolshevik-Leninists ought to fuse, publish a paper and set the objective
of a short term split (The Role and Tasks of the British Bolshevik-Leninists, Sept. 1936, H.P., D.J.H. 5/3). For awareness that the wisest step would have been a split a Geneva, see Anon., Towards a New Revolutionary Party, [Sept. 1936], HP, DJH 5/1. This author argued for a full and open conference to turn all Trotskyists towards the Labour Party.
114. That weekend the Marxist Group, in collaboration with the other Trotskyist factions launched Fight: For the Fourth International in response to the invitation of the Geneva conference. The first issue of this newspaper sold 1,800 copies.
115. The account which follows is drawn entirely from For Discussion (Internal Bulletin of British Bolshevik-Leninists), 28 Nov. 1936, MSS 15/4/1/15, the only account of the meeting extant.
116.
Trotsky had urged the tiny Spanish Bolshevik-Leninist Group to join the
leftward moving Socialist Party of Largo Caballero. They rejected his
advice, unifying instead with the left nationalist group around Joaquim
Maurin to form the Workers’ Party of Marxist Unity, (POUM).This party
achieved significant support among the working class, notably in
Catalonia up to the time of its suppression after the Barcelona events
of May 1937. But the absence of Trotskyism from the Socialist Party
facilitated a communist entry far more extensive that that carried out
in Britain. In 1935, the whole Spanish Socialist Youth, which the
previous year had invited the Trotskyists to join them, declared for the
Third International. The communists were eventually to become the most
powerful political force in the Republic, but the POUM was to disappear.
For a contemporary Trotskyist appraisal see F. Morrow, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Spain (first published New York 1937, 1975 ed.).
117. A. Cooper et al., Tasks of British Bolshevik-Leninists ibid., 7.
118.
Trotsky had emphatically supported the thesis, advocated by Matlow,
that there should be immediate entry into the Labour Party. Cooper’s
views on the matter had, he thought, “no relationship to Marxism at all”
(Interview by Collins, Summer 1936, Writings (1935-36), 76-7).
119. A loose association of those prepared to sell Fourth International literature in Central London. See Chapter VII.
120. This idea is developed by Trotsky himself in Trade Unions in the Epoch of Imperialist Decay.
121. See Chapter VII.
122. Total membership was claimed to be around eighty with fifty contacts.
123. See Chapter VI.
124. For Discussion, 28 Nov. 1936, 18.
125. The decision for independence was taken sixteen to six at a meeting of London members of the Group.
126.
James had written to Brockway declaring the intention to withdraw and
form a separate organ